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
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ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THEORY AND PRACTICE



Islam and International Relations



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Islam and International Relations

Contributions to Theory and Practice

Edited by

Deina Abdelkader

*Associate Professor, University of Massachusetts, USA, Co-founder,
Co-IRIS (International Relations and Islamic Studies Research Cohort)*

Nassef Manabilang Adiong


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ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Preface

Co-IRIS (International Relations and Islamic Studies Research Cohort) is an organization interested in the advancement of comparative research between International Relations (IR) and Islamic Studies (IS). It was created by a group of researchers interested in developing and sustaining a body of knowledge that addresses the theories and practices of Muslim civilization and societies with regard to international affairs and the discipline of international relations. IR as a field is not a unilateral project but an intellectual platform. The aim of Co-IRIS is to explore Islamic contributions to the field. The inclusion of Muslim contributions is not meant to create an isolationist, controversial divide between what is Islamic and what is not. Co-IRIS was created to act on the inclusion of that knowledge as a building block in the IR field. It is premised on the idea that knowledge is fluid: people adopt and utilize thoughts and ideas regardless of faith, gender, nation, and so on. The mainstream idea that all knowledge presented by the West is from an Orientalist perspective, or that there is a clash of civilizations, are both notions antithetical to our mission.

Co-IRIS was previously known as IR-IS Research Cohort when it was created by Nassef Manabilang Adiong on December 29, 2012 through various social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Google+. His blog/website and Twitter feed served as temporary e-places where he formulated his thoughts and disseminated information. It was his aspiration to introduce Islamic contributions to the field of IR because he observed a tremendous non-recognition among IR scholars of theories and practices of international relations from Islamic scholars, particularly in the West. His dream is to find shared values and a mutual understanding between IR and IS. Up until he found avenues and academic tools for a starting point to materialize his aspirations, he was able to edit a book, create a section conference, and organize meetings with people with similar passions and interests. Firstly, through exchanges of correspondence with Dr. Raffaele Mauriello and Dr. Deina Abdelkader and then, at a meeting in Rapallo (Italy) from 30 October to 02 November 2013 held as part of the annual Exploratory Symposia organized by the European International Studies Association, Co-IRIS was born.

*Your Co-IRIS team,
Deina Abdelkader
Nassef Manabilang Adiong
Raffaele Mauriello*

Notes on Contributors

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Nassef Manabilang Adiong is a student of comparative study in Islam and International Relations. His research interests include nation-states, civilization, and the Bangsamoro. He is the author of, among other articles, “Nation-State in IR and Islam” in the *Journal of Islamic State Practice in International Law*, “The U.S.’ and Israel Securitization of Iran’s Nuclear Energy” in *The Quarterly Journal of Political Studies of Islamic World*, and “The Palestinian Refugee Question: A Constitutive Constructivist Interpretation” in *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*. His first edited book, *International Relations and Islam: Diverse Perspectives*, was published in August 2013.

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Muhamad Ali is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies in the Religious Studies Department, University of California, Riverside, USA. He is the author of *Multicultural-Pluralist Theology* (in Indonesian, 2003), *Bridging Islam and the West: An Indonesian View* (2009), and *Islam and Colonialism:*

Becoming Modern in Indonesia and Malaya (Edinburgh University Press, 2015). He has written articles on *fatwas* on interfaith marriage, gender, jihad, Muslim perceptions of Judaism, Islam in Kelantan, progressive Islam in Malaysia, Islamic liberal movements, and religious pluralism and freedom; and chapters on “Far from Mecca: Modern Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia” (2013), and “Islam in Modern Southeast Asian History” (2013).

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Seyed Mohammad Marandi is Associate Professor of North American Studies and Dean of the Faculty of World Studies at the University of Tehran, Iran. His research focuses on neo-Orientalism and postcolonial studies, with an emphasis on Iranian expatriate literature in North America. As a political commentator, Marandi has appeared on international news networks such as CNN, Al Jazeera, Russia Today, BBC, CCTV and Press TV. He is also a regular columnist for aljazeera.com, where he has written on the Iranian nuclear program, the Syrian and Yemeni crises, and misrepresentations of the Islamic Republic in Western media.

Raffaele Mauriello is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Iran. He is an historian specializing in contemporary Shi’a Islam, international relations and geopolitics. He holds a first-class honours degree in Oriental Languages and Civilizations

(2002) and a PhD in Islamic Civilization: History and Philology (2009) from Sapienza, University of Rome. In 2013, he was awarded the World Prize for the Book of the Year from the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of Islamic Studies. His most recent work is the translation into Italian of the Civil Code of Iran (2015).

Carimo Mohamed is an independent researcher based in Portugal with a PhD in Political Theory and Analysis. His research interests are the history of political ideas in the Islamic world, particularly in South Asia, and relations between religion and politics in different cultural and civilizational contexts. Mohamed is an executive member of the International Political Science Association Research Committee for Religion and Politics, a member of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies' Faith, Politics, and Society Research Network, and member of the editorial board of the *International Journal of Islamic Thought*, published by the International Society of Muslim Philosophers and Theologians and the Department of Theology and Philosophy, National University of Malaysia.

Rodolfo Ragionieri is Professor of International Relations and International History at the University of Sassari, Sardinia, Italy. Before his appointment, he lectured in Mathematical Physics and Mathematics for the Social Sciences at the University of Florence, Italy. He is the author of *Pace e guerre nelle relazioni internazionali* (Carocci, Rome 2008), and co-editor of *Democrazie e fondamentalismi* (with D. Belliti, ETS, Pisa 2006), *Identities and Conflicts: The Mediterranean* (with F. Cerutti, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), *Culture e conflitti nell'area mediterranea* (with O. Schmidt di Friedberg, Asterios, Trieste 2003). His current research interests focus on the relations between monotheistic religions, violence, and peace.

Faruk Yalvaç is Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences of the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. He graduated from Talas American School (Junior High) and Tarsus American College (Senior High). He holds a BA from the Department of International Relations of the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University, Turkey. He holds an MSc and a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, where he was the Noel Buxton Scholar. He also holds an MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Massachusetts, USA, where he was on a Fulbright Scholarship. His main academic interests are international relations theory, Marxism, critical realism, historical sociology, sociology of Islam, international political theory and theoretical analysis of Turkish foreign policy.

Part I

Towards an Islamic Contribution to International Relations Theory: Setting the Stage

Raffaele Mauriello

As an academic discipline International Relations (IR) is still overwhelmingly based on Eurocentric foundations, whose ahistorical character is evident, for example, when research is undertaken on the international order before the rise of the West.¹ When studying mainstream manuals² of International Relations with its many paradigms (realism, liberalism, the English school, constructivism, Marxism, critical theory, postmodernism, feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, green theory, etc.), or when considering its key thinkers and texts,³ one might assume that, as a field of academic inquiry, IR is based on the understanding that it is not open to non-Western contributions. When viewed together the apparently different IR theories simply reproduce Western meta-narratives and the Euro-American nature of international relations (the international practice of states) and of IR (the academic study of the international practice of states).⁴ This observation is particularly problematic when one notices that international relations theories represent not simply tools of analysis but, along with the different IR paradigms, also a way of conceptualizing the international and world order. Indeed international institutions are based exclusively on Western-oriented norms, intellectually sustained on the premises of IR and of International Relations Theory (IRT). This imposes important limits for IR scholars who want, for example, to understand and theorize about the rise of non-European parts of the world such as China (and, more generally, BRICS members) and phenomena such as the birth and endurance of the Islamic Republic of Iran or, on a different note, the recent declaration of the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) in Syria and Iraq. A basic reason for these limits derives from the fact that IR sources clearly fail to correspond to the global distribution of its subjects and their degree of involvement in the practice of both International Relations and international relations.

2 Raffaele Mauriello

As pointed out by S Sayyid, since 1870 Muslims have shown a deep interest in the Western political canon, although largely this interest has not been reciprocated by Western political thinkers; the latter basically ignore Muslim political thought – other than as an Orientalist anthropological curiosity.⁵ Moreover, the limited studies on Muslim political theory and worldview undertaken in the West have been largely dominated by the issue of jihad (understood as holy war) as the axis of Islamic international relations and of the presumed division of the world into *dar al-harb* (the abode of war), *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) and *dar al-sulh* (the abode of temporary peace, alternatively called *dar al-ahd*) as the truly and only form of Islamic IRT.⁶ However, it might be argued that this element has been a distorting consequence of the fact that Western political theorists have largely accepted the conception of IR as a state of nature and hence committed themselves to viewing international relations as primarily concerned with the traditional *ultima ratio* of nation-state rivalries, i.e., war.⁷ In my opinion, the view, within mainstream Euro-American IR, of international relations as oscillating between a state of war and a troubled peace has inevitably resulted in the choice of looking at jihad and the division of the world into opposing abodes (*dar al-harb* and *dar al-Islam*, with a lesser emphasis on *dar al-sulh/dar al-ahd*) as the Islamic IRT; a form of *Alice Through the Looking Glass*. In this respect, in his preface to the first edition of his *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations*, ‘AbdulHamid A AbuSulayman points out how, in his view:

the Islamic theory and philosophy of relations among nations is the only adequate philosophy of peace in the contemporary world. It is the only philosophy, concept, and approach that emphasizes the common origin, interest, and destiny of man as the only base for understanding man’s nature, interpersonal relations, and group interactions.... Other world ideologies and philosophies focus on conflict management and consequently war.⁸

Islam looks quite different from within and behind the looking glass.

In their edited volume on the state of the art of IRT in what they call “the non-West,” Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan show how the observation made by Sayyid about the ignorance in the West as regards Muslim political thought is not limited to the Muslim world; Western political thinkers also largely ignore the political and international thinking of “the rest” of the world.⁹

The experiences collected in their volume seem to indicate that in the non-West, in their case represented by Asia (and by a contribution on the Islamic worldview), Western dominance has both stimulated and hindered the capacity to develop locally based international relations

theories. In the case of most Asian countries we are in a stage of pre-theoretical resources that have been largely either forgotten or marginalized by both Western and local scholars.¹⁰ In this respect, however, N J Rengger points out how:

Most cultures and civilizations have, after all, long and important traditions of reflection about the subject matter of International Relations, however understood: relations between political communities, war, trade, cultural diversity and its implications.... Scholars are more likely to turn to Western IRT first before they discover the possibility and sources of non-Western IRT.¹¹

The single but well-researched chapter devoted to the Islamic worldview in Acharya and Buzan reveals a paradoxical situation in which Muslim scholars seem to think that Western IRT has not found the right path to explain international relations and world politics, yet it has acquired hegemonic status.¹² Despite this apparently gloomy situation, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh points out that, as an ideational, religious, civilizational and worldview “variant,” Islam has obviously sought a distinctive foundation of truth and the good life that undoubtedly allows for the formulation of alternatives to Western IRT. In this respect, along with the expansion of capitalism, globalization has also paradoxically prompted the revival and reinterpretation of classical sources in the Muslim world, as is evident in Part I of this volume. Perhaps it is not by mere chance that two of the chapters (the first and third) are connected to Iran, one being authored by an Iranian (and Iran-based) scholar and the other related to the international relations theory that came into being with the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran; whereas the second chapter addresses the significance of Islamic norms and values in the present global political system, with reference to Turkey’s foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In the case of Iran, Amr G E Sabet has argued that the advent and institutionalization of the Islamic Republic of Iran was brought about by, and at the same time opened up the space for, a self-referential method of thinking in which Islamic epistemology falls back on an Islamic, not on an “alien,” ontology.¹³ It might be argued that a similar, although more limited, scenario has been taking shape in Turkey.¹⁴

The different contributions in this volume, and in particular these in Part I, are premised on the consideration that Western IRT in its current form is not good for the health of our understanding of the social world in which we live, partly because, on the one hand, it is too narrow in its sources and, on the other, too dominant in its influence. They challenge and provide a more complex answer to the main question raised by

Acharya and Buzan, i.e., why there is no non-Western IRT? As shown by the following three chapters, Islamic civilization is well able, in source and political culture, to contribute to the development of both IR and IRT and to provide alternative optics for theorization.

In line with the expressed aims of the International Relations and Islamic Studies Research Cohort (Co-IRIS), the chapters collected in Part I look for new directions in methodology and thought towards modern Islamic theories of international relations, going beyond the idea of the need for an Islamization of knowledge, or the assumption that the Islamic civilization has (or should have) its own single and fixed theory. They offer a general view of key principles of global politics as deducible from the Qur'an and discuss theoretical and concrete policy-making aspects in the foreign policy of two key Muslim countries, (Shi'i) Iran and (Sunni) Turkey.

The first chapter, by Ali Akbar Alikhani, addresses the relevance to international relations in today's world of what the author calls "fundamentals of Islam," deduced directly from the Qur'an and Prophet Muhammad's *sunnah*. To explain the fundamentals extracted from these sources the chapter refers, in some cases, to the ideas of Ali ibn Abi Talib and other Muslim scholars and Qur'an commentators. The chapter identifies three groups of fundamentals. The first group includes the cognitive and epistemic fundamentals comprising the intellectual substructure of human beings; discussions on these fundamentals clarify the attitude of Islam towards human beings, including: Islamic teachings on adopting a respectful attitude towards human beings; recognizing the plurality of religions as a reality; the authenticity of free will and the free choice of human beings; and belief in the original equality of human beings. The second group deals with the intellectual and ethical fundamentals on which a social system should be based and the topics briefly discussed are: peaceful coexistence; avoiding violence; and adherence to moral and ethical principles. The third group includes practical and behavioral fundamentals and the Islamic teachings on approaches that Muslim nations should take in terms of their interactions with other nations. The following topics are discussed in this last group: dialogue and its different levels; treaties and agreements; commitment to rights and justice; retaliation; and renewal of forces for preventive purposes.

The second chapter, by Lili Yulyadi Arnakim, argues that Islam as a comprehensive way of life has a worldview and a system in which religion is harnessed to political power. It assumes that Islam believes that public life, or the state, should embrace Islamic values. According to the author, in international relations, and by extension international politics, Islam has its own norms and prescriptions for relations between

Muslim countries, and between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. He goes on to illustrate that Islam – which upholds values such as mutual sympathy, self-sufficiency, solidarity, mutual trust and help, and mutual advice and justice – does not conflict with universally held values on these matters. More generally, the chapter attempts to highlight the efficacy of an Islamic theory of international relations in contemporary global politics. Making reference to concrete aspects of Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP, the author further examines the strategic role of Muslim countries in upholding Islamic norms and values in connection with present global political challenges. It foresees a future for Islamic values in establishing an aspired-for global political system.

The last chapter, by Raffaele Mauriello and Seyed Mohammad Marandi, argues for a need to advance interdisciplinary research between International Relations (IR) and Islamic Studies (IS). In this framework, it argues for the integration of both the methodology and findings of Shi'itology, the branch of IS that specializes in Shi'i Islam, into the knowledge of the politics of the Islamic world of practitioners of international relations and of academics in International Relations and International Relations Theory (IRT). The chapter shows how – although scholars of IR have assumed as an established fact that the worldview of Islamic IR is historically based (only) in the dichotomy of *dar al-Islam* (the realm or abode of Islam) versus *dar al-harb* (the realm or abode of war) – from a historical perspective, in a Shi'i worldview the role of this dichotomy has, *de facto*, been extremely limited. IR scholars' lack of knowledge in this respect has hindered their ability to properly appreciate and locate the modern Islamic IRT represented by the *mustad'afun* (oppressed) versus *mustakbirun* (oppressors) worldview and its formulation into the founding political document of the Party of God (Hezbollah) and institutionalization into the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Notes

1. See for example Shogo Suzuki, Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan eds. *International Order in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West*. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.
2. See for example Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith eds. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013; Martin Griffiths. *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge, 2007; Cynthia Weber. *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*. 3rd ed. Routledge, London and New York, 2009.
3. Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach and M. Scott Solomon. *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*. 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2009, and Chris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger eds. *International Relations in*

- Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. The latter features two Muslim thinkers (al-Farabi and Avicenna), however, these are figures commonly included in Western intellectual history and *de facto* treated and understood as Western, not Muslim.
4. Shogo Suzuki, Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan eds. *International Order in the Early Modern World*, p. xvii.
 5. Sayyid, S. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. With a foreword by Hamid Dabashi. London: Zed Books, 2015, pp. 125–6.
 6. A case in point are Majid Khadduri's well-known works, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, and *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955.
 7. Beitz, Charles R. *Political Theory and International Relations. With a New Afterword by the Author*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999 (1979), p. vii. With reference to the importance of war and of the division of the world into *dar al-Islam* versus *dar al-harb* in Muslim political thought, numerous Muslim scholars share the view that these became significant in classical Muslim political thought. Among them, it is worth mentioning the case of AbuSulayman, who argued that this happened as the result of the “insensitivity to the space-time element” involved in the interpretation of relevant verses of the Qur'an, manifested in the spread of the concept of permanent abrogation (*naskh*) during the, so-called, High Caliphate (750–813); a period when Muslims were part of a powerful and established society, felt as similar to the late Medinan period of Prophetic leadership and Qur'anic revelation, and therefore let the less legalistic, more spiritual and progressive principles and values revealed in the early Medinan and Meccan periods fall into disuse and be forgotten, AbuSulayman, 'AbdulHamid A. *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Methodology and Thought*. 2nd rev. ed. Herdon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993, pp. 83–85.
 8. In this respect, see AbuSulayman. *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations*, pp. xx–i.
 9. Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan eds. *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.
 10. Acharya, Amitav and Barry Buzan eds. *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, p. 222.
 11. Rengger, N. J. *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations Theory?* London and New York: Routledge, 2000.
 12. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. “International Relations Theory and the Islamic Worldview.” In Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan eds. *Non-Western International Relations Theory*, pp. 174–196.
 13. Sabet, Amr G. E. *Islam and the Political: Theory, Governance and International Relations*. London: Pluto Press, 2008.
 14. A relevant example of this is represented by former Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu's *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1994.



1

Fundamentals of Islam in International Relations

Ali Akbar Alikhani

Introduction

Human beings are dissimilar in their tastes and attitudes, as a result of which their outlook, ways of thinking, and their understanding of issues and phenomena can be completely different. On the other hand, according to Muslim philosophers, all human beings are essentially social. Due to these characteristics, different societies have emerged and each society has developed its own beliefs, then different political systems, each consistent with a given society's beliefs, attitudes and structure. Historical and geographical factors have also played a significant part in the form and structure of societies. What is important in this process is that human beings' interests and demands grow in different and even conflicting ways. If we, in light of these characteristics, consider the differences in interests and demands as normal, we can try to address and solve them constructively.

As substantial differences exist in human beings' interests and demands, the international system is a forum for many conflicts and disagreements. Nowadays there are nearly 50 Muslim countries. They form an important part of the international arena. Their beliefs and attitudes are, more or less, rooted in Islam. However, it should be noted that the depth and nature of each country's adherence to Islam and how each interprets it in the political arena can be quite different.

The main question in this chapter is, what are the fundamentals of Islam pertaining to the establishment of relations between nations and countries? By fundamentals I mean the unchangeable teachings and beliefs that form the intellectual and doctrinal substructures for Muslims. These beliefs, about which Muslims share a relative consensus, have remained fixed and unchanged since the advent of Islam and will

continue to remain so. However, they can be interpreted in different ways. Principles can be based on these fundamentals and theories can be developed based on those principles. The term international relations refers to the relations of Muslim countries with each other and with non-Muslim countries. Naturally, political relations, which govern other relations, are given priority. By Islam, I mean the Qur'an and Prophet Muhammad's *sunnah*. For the explanation and interpretation of the fundamentals of Islam in this chapter I have referred to the ideas of Ali ibn Abi Talib, as well as discussions by Muslim scholars and Qur'an commentators. As Prophet's companion, fourth caliph of the Sunnis and first Imam of the Shiites, Ali ibn Abi Talib is respected and followed by all Muslims.

Epistemic and cognitive fundamentals

By epistemic and cognitive fundamentals I mean the intellectual and doctrinal principles of human beings that form their attitudes and behaviors. Every person sees and interprets other people and phenomena based on their own epistemic and cognitive fundamentals. It follows therefore that interactions between nations will be based on these same attitudes, behaviors, and interpretations. The epistemic and cognitive fundamentals of political leaders and systems form the substructures of policy-making in international relations: a respectful attitude towards all human beings; the authenticity and original equality of human beings; and the recognition of the plurality of religions as a reality.

Respectful attitudes towards all human beings

People are the main actors in states and international relations. Every actor's attitude towards other people has a direct effect on their relationship behaviors. The Qur'an expressly states that God has bestowed dignity on all human beings and given them superiority over many other creatures.¹ The verses about the breathing of His soul into the human body,² the selection of human beings as God's successor on earth,³ and the creation of all that is on earth for human beings,⁴ all highlight the inherent dignity of human beings in this world. Prophet Muhammad's standing up for the dead body of a Jewish person, as a sign of respect for his human soul, indicates that by God breathing His spirit into the human body He has given considerable dignity and stature to all human beings.

Human dignity is a right that mankind cannot be deprived of in this world.⁵ Depriving someone, in any way, would change their nature and

entity.⁶ Javadi Amoli, a prominent Muslim religious scholar (*'alim*), believes that human dignity cannot be grouped under *i'tibariyat* (subjective notions), but is an undeniable reality, like the dignity of angels and the Qur'an, and all these are manifestations of divine dignity.⁷ Human beings who interact with each other in the arena of international relations are the same human beings who have been given dignity by God; they are simply divided into different nations.⁸

Authenticity of human beings; free will and free choice

It is the principle of the authenticity of the human being that causes the Qur'an to pay attention to the diversity of religions and ideologies as a reality, and engage in dialogue with them and open up new ways for interactions and relations. From the Islamic point of view, human beings are authentic in essence and will not lose their inherent essence regardless of the society or situation in which they live. The Qur'an expressly states that if God had wished, He could have placed all human beings in the form of a single nation and created them similar to each other and with shared beliefs and perspectives, and thereby with similar interests, but God intentionally refrained from doing so.⁹ The Qur'an also explicitly states that if God had wanted, He could have created all human beings as pious believers or Muslim,¹⁰ but God wished to leave them free to choose their own path and face the consequences.¹¹ This is one of the origins of the appearance of different nations in the arena of international relations. Based on this Islamic viewpoint, no state has the right to force other states or nations to follow the path it prefers.

Original equality of human beings

There are four groups of reasons to demonstrate that from the viewpoint of Islam all human beings are originally equal. In the first group it is argued that human beings are from a single origin. According to the Qur'an all human beings were originally a single community.¹² In another verse it is maintained that God created all human beings from a single man and a single woman, and divided them into different races and tribes so that they could recognize each other.¹³ Elsewhere in the Qur'an it is noted that if God had wanted, he could have created all human beings in the form of a single nation and created them similar to each other and with shared beliefs and attitudes, but he chose not to do so.¹⁴

The second group of reasons shows that if God wanted he could have made all human beings pious believers or Muslims,¹⁵ but God wished to create them differently and let them choose their own path freely and naturally face the results of their choice in the afterlife.¹⁶ Therefore,

everyone is responsible for his or her own actions and conduct. If someone chooses the right path and true religion, it will be to their advantage, and likewise, anybody who turns a blind eye to the path of truth, will suffer a loss.¹⁷

In the third group of reasons it is argued that acting in a right and humane manner and being righteous are of great value and importance irrespective of what one's religion is. The Qur'an regards Islam as the true religion in God's eyes,¹⁸ but it also stipulates that the followers of other religions will also attain salvation if they truly and honestly believe in God and perform good deeds; moreover, their rewards are safe with God.¹⁹ The Qur'an also considers all other heavenly books as torch-bearers of guidance and asks their followers to adhere to them and follow them.²⁰ These verses confer an exceptional right on human beings and provide an unparalleled opportunity for interactions between among people and countries in international relations; these verses, along with the previous one, which highlighted the freedom to choose one's religion, pave the way for a peaceful socio-political path for all human beings.

The fourth group includes reasons demonstrating the inherent dignity of human beings. According to the Qur'an, when creating man, God breathed his soul into the human body²¹ and bestowed dignity on him and made him superior to other creatures.²² This divine spirit and dignity belongs to humankind and encompasses absolutely all human beings. There are no specific races, or adherents to particular religions or political and social ideologies who are the sole receivers of the spirit of God. During his last hajj, Prophet Muhammad emphasized that everyone's God and everyone's father is none but one only; that the ancestor of all human beings is Adam and that he in turn was created from clay, and that no human being is superior to other human beings.²³ This equality of human beings can be generalized to nations and states including in the field of international relations.

Recognition of the plurality of religions as a reality

Every phenomenon can be studied and analyzed from two different perspectives. From one perspective we can address the right and wrong, or just and unjust nature, of the phenomenon and, from another perspective, we can examine each phenomenon as a reality with an objective and external existence. In relations between states, the presence of religions, sects, and different interests and perspectives as external realities is an undeniable fact, and it is from them that the challenges in international relations arise. A number of verses of the Qur'an deal with this

in a realistic manner, recognizing and acknowledging the presence of other religions as a reality and encouraging them to act according to their own beliefs and principles.²⁴ This does not contradict the Qur'anic belief that the only true religion in God's eyes is Islam.²⁵ The Qur'an expressly maintains that Islam is the most perfect and greatest among all other religions: if such a belief did not exist, followers would question the existence of Islam. Likewise, the followers of other religions consider their own religion to be the best. However, the important point is that the Qur'an's stipulation about the perfect and most excellent nature of Islam does not prevent it from respecting other religions and ideologies, and human beings generally. What is important here is that, even though human beings may consider their own beliefs, attitudes, and religions as the most perfect and just in nature, they must still respect other attitudes and nations, and seek to establish relations with them while protecting their own interests.

Rational and ethical fundamentals

What I mean by rational fundamentals are behavioral rules and the kind of interaction that human reason calls for, and without which social systems cannot be established and maintained: peaceful coexistence, avoiding violence, and adherence to moral principles. Ethical fundamentals are rooted in rationality and strengthen and improve sociopolitical systems.

Peaceful coexistence

The Qur'an expressly commands Muslims to talk to people kindly²⁶ and benevolently.²⁷ Prophet Muhammad spread his cloak under the feet of Najran Christians and greatly respected all people, including non-Muslim groups who entered Medina.²⁸ In Prophet Muhammad's treaty with the Sinai Christians it was stipulated that none of them should be put under pressure and that Muslims should be tolerant with them, protect them from harm or coercion, and respect them wherever they were.²⁹ Thus, according to this treaty, their religion and rituals had to be respected by Muslims.

The Qur'an calls Prophet Muhammad a blessing for people all over the world,³⁰ a point he referred to himself.³¹ Thus Islam is a religion of blessing and affection. The Qur'an favors friendship between Muslims and Christians who are not arrogant and oppressive,³² and even supports the establishment of friendship between Muslims and their enemies.³³ Therefore, and moving to international relations, it can be concluded

that non-Muslim nations are not considered enemies by the Qur'an, and that establishing relations with them is easy and, even more importantly, necessary.³⁴

Avoiding violence

The contrast between violence and the essence of Islam

Islamic political thought is essentially irreconcilable with violence and bloodshed for several important reasons. First, the main objective of power and governance in Islam is to educate people and help them on their path towards perfection and transcendence in order to attain happiness both in this world and in the afterlife.³⁵ The idea of improving human beings' insight is an epistemic matter, best achieved in a peaceful and rational environment. Second, Islamic political thought is based on moral issues and values, and aims to actualize the moral, humane, and divine values in society. Violence is essentially immoral, and an ideology whose objectives are moral and based on human values cannot employ immoral methods to fulfill them.

Third, the main features of Islamic political thought, and its most important objectives in the political arena are the promotion of justice³⁶ and the protection of rights,³⁷ at both domestic and international levels. The fulfillment of these two goals depends on people in local societies and international actors. Both local people and international actors should be willing to promote justice, they cannot be forced to obtain justice and protect rights in society. Moreover, the act of employing force and violence is in contrast with justice and can be considered a kind of corruption. Imam Ali, who had failed to carry out the reforms he had in mind because people were uncooperative, said to the people, "I know how to make you accept the reforms; the only way is to use sword, but I will not get involved in corruption to make you accept reforms."³⁸

Fourth, according to Islam, power and governance are not objectives, but only the means to achieve more important goals. Justice and rights can be regarded as the most important bases of Islamic political thought. Power and governance are simply the means to fulfill these objectives³⁹ and have no value per se, and are worthless when there is no chance of fulfilling rights, justice, divine, moral, and humane values through them.⁴⁰

War and jihad in Islam

Research has shown that all verses in the Qur'an concerning war and jihad are intended for defensive purposes and none of them encourage violence and war.⁴¹ Those verses concerning war and jihad can be divided into three categories.

The first category contains verses that restrict jihad to certain terms and conditions, according to which Muslims are prohibited from initiating any battle and from any kind of oppression during battles, and are obliged to adhere to moral and humanitarian laws and rights. These verses only give permission to take preventive actions that do not go beyond the limits of retaliation.⁴²

The second category contains verses that encourage Muslims to jihad unconditionally. Two points should be noted here with regard to these verses. Firstly, based on the rules and principles of Qur'anic sciences, unconditional verses are subordinate to the terms and conditions of conditional verses and should be interpreted and followed in compliance with those terms and conditions.⁴³ Secondly, it should be noted that these verses, based on the context and the occasion of the revelation, give a command, explain a situation, or encourage Muslims towards a certain action that has already been prescribed under certain circumstances.

The third category includes verses that explain and clarify different aspects of jihad, or refer to the rewards for combatants and martyrs. These verses do not command Muslims to carry out jihad; they only clarify its different aspects. The overriding matter to note here is that jihad should comply with particular terms and conditions.

Violence in Prophet Muhammad's sunnah

The conduct of Prophet Muhammad during his rule in Medina towards enemies and opponents was reasonable, mild, and peaceful. His conduct towards different Jewish tribes in Medina was based on agreements, treaties, and dialogue. In times of emergency and crisis, he resolved issues without tension or violence.⁴⁴ Prophet Muhammad's position against pagans and idolaters was defensive, as were his battles and military conflicts.⁴⁵ Whenever he gained victory over his enemies, he was mild, kind, tolerant, and forgiving.⁴⁶

Imam Ali told his son Hasan "never to invite anyone to a battle"⁴⁷ and recommended the ruler of Egypt not to reject any invitation to peace from the enemy. He advised that God would favor peace, because it brings about comfort for soldiers, eliminates sorrows, and results in security for cities.⁴⁸ During his rule, Imam Ali never started a battle. In the battles of *Jamal*, *Siffin* and *Nahrawan*, he conducted many negotiations. Even when the two sides had already deployed their armies he continued to suggest peace and invited them to negotiations several times.⁴⁹

Adherence to moral principles

God only sent prophets on a mission to deal with issues and achieve objectives of vital importance for human society. One of the most important aims of Prophet Muhammad's mission, as he highlighted himself,⁵⁰ was perfecting and completing moral values and qualities. One reason for following the moral instructions of Islam in the political arena and international relations is that adherence to moral values and promoting them in society are among the most important objectives of Islam. Power and governance are means to goals and means can be sacrificed to reach an objective, however Islam does not allow the reverse.

According to Islamic teachings, all moral and humane principles should be upheld in the political arena and international relations, even at times of war. Early Islamic texts point out that enemies at war must not prevent each other from having access to water, food, and similar needs, and should not contaminate food or water, or make them unusable. Muslims are commanded to comply with this principle even when fighting pagans.⁵¹ The most important argument in this regard is based on a verse from the Qur'an that allows Muslim to defend themselves only to the degree they have been violated, and warns them not to go to extremes or to violate or oppress their enemies.⁵² During his battles, Prophet Muhammad warned his followers against breaching trust or killing women and children.⁵³ There are many examples of his own conduct showing the prohibition on killing women and children.⁵⁴ He also disapproved of any breach of trust during war and told his combatants to fight but not to commit any deception, breach of trust or betrayal against their enemies.⁵⁵

Practical and behavioral fundamentals

By practical and behavioral fundamentals I mean methods that facilitate and move forward relations in bilateral and multilateral interactions in international relations. Recommended methods and codes of conducts that can be extracted from the Qur'an and *sunnah* in this regard are discussed below: dialogue, agreements and treaties, justice and rights, retaliation, and renewal of forces for preventive purposes.

Dialogue

Importance and levels of dialogue

Dialogue is given precedence as one of the most important strategies to consider in Islam. The Qur'an emphasizes that dialogue should take

place with due regard for mutual respect and using a desirable negotiating manner⁵⁶ based upon logical reasoning.⁵⁷ The first condition for good and reasonable dialogue is that it should be free of any kind of intolerance, extremism, prejudice, or bias, and without underestimating or undervaluing the opposite side. In a reasonable dialogue, parties look forward to a better understanding, and to identifying new ways and more accurate perspectives, and they do not engage in any kind of argument or defensive action.

Dialogue may take place at four levels and with four objectives. The first level of dialogue could take place with the objective of recognizing and gaining a better understanding of the opposite side in order to achieve a more accurate solution. God has pointed towards various instances of dialogue between the divine prophets and their opponents in the Qur'an,⁵⁸ and it is logical reasoning that is clearly prominent in all such dialogues. God commanded Prophet Muhammad himself to choose the path of dialogue with regard to idolaters and his enemies.⁵⁹ In accordance with God's will, he first invited these parties to dialogue and logical reasoning.⁶⁰ However, when they rejected his invitation and eliminated any possibility of reasoning or dialogue by their acts of violence, he left Mecca and went to another city, which had more appropriate conditions and where the possibility of dialogue with the local inhabitants existed.⁶¹

In this new city, Medina, and the areas surrounding it, which were inhabited by various tribes with different religions, the second level of dialogue was achieved, to reach an agreement about basic and fundamental principles. A short while after Prophet Muhammad entered Medina, this second level of dialogue served as the basis for his actions and progress; the peak of this dialogue was a written agreement in the form of a constitution, which was agreed upon and implemented. The peaceful coexistence of all people of different religions was formally recognized and their security was ensured as the basis of this agreement.⁶²

The third level of dialogue seeks to identify common ground for cooperation, and the fourth level aims to resolve and settle political and social differences with a view to achieving better cooperation. After Prophet Muhammad settled in Medina, some groups and tribes broke their promises and agreements and began hostile actions against him. One of these tribes was named Bani Qaynuqa'. He tried his best through dialogue and discussion to convince them to stop their hostile activities.⁶³ For example, before the battle of Badr, he sent 'Umar ibn al-Khattab to the opposition to convince them to withdraw from an imminent battle and instead to engage in dialogue and negotiation. However, they refused to

negotiate with him.⁶⁴ Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali's numerous negotiations with non-Muslims are well known to historians.⁶⁵

Not considering oneself as always right in dialogue

The Qur'an clearly explains and stresses the true and just nature of Islam.⁶⁶ Everybody with any belief or ideology naturally considers himself as right and considers his path as the true path. However, during interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims, as in interactions between different groups and people in every society, if every side argues from the beginning that they are right and the opposite side is wrong, then the possibility of any constructive interaction will be lost and the path of dialogue will be closed on both sides. The Qur'an commands Prophet Muhammad to tell non-believers and idol worshippers that, among Muslims and non-Muslims, one side is on the true path of guidance and the other is walking astray.⁶⁷ Prophet Muhammad knew for a fact that he was walking on the true path of guidance, but during debate and discussions with the opposite side, he did not introduce himself as someone who was right and on the path of truth, rather he told the opposite side that one of them was right and walking on the path of truth and the other was not, so that the possibility of dialogue and reasoning could remain open and eventually lead to interaction and cooperation between them.

The Qur'an ordered Muslims to say, during any dialogue with the religious minorities of those times, that they believed in what had been revealed to them by God, that their God and the non-Muslims' God was one.⁶⁸ This position necessitates equal and fair treatment of the opposite side during dialogue. Prophet Muhammad also said to Muslims, "Neither approve the religious minorities nor refute them; but tell them that we believe in God and whatever he has revealed upon us and upon you."⁶⁹ He again says in a similar situation that they "should neither approve the scriptures of religious minorities nor refute them; in this manner if they are true and right regarding the topic under discussion, you have neither refuted nor disproved that truth and if they are wrong and erroneous on the other hand, you have not approved and validated that wrong."⁷⁰ This means that the religious minorities or other individuals whose views are against our views may sometimes say true things regarding certain topics, or that a portion of their beliefs and teachings may be true and correct.⁷¹

Dialogue on the basis of commonalities

Another important point is Islam's emphasis on finding commonalities between participants in dialogue. The Qur'an invites the followers

of other divine religions (*ahl al-kitab*) to agree with Muslims on the common points between them.⁷² This agreement is the most important factor in the realization of a peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the Qur'an (29: 46) commands Muslims to "Say, 'We believe in what was revealed to us and in what was revealed to you; our God and your God are one [and the same]; we are devoted to Him.'" The people whom the Qur'an is addressing here are the followers of divine religions (*ahl al-kitab*) and, because at the time and place that the Qur'an was revealed the only other religious adherents were the *ahl al-kitab*, it might be suggested that if another minority community had been present in those times, then the verse would have referred to them as well. When Prophet Muhammad sent his emissary Ma'az to Yemen, he told him that "if the *ahl al-kitab* ask you what the key to paradise is, tell them it is nothing but believing in one God."⁷³ In this instance, Prophet Muhammad was emphasizing the common and similar points that non-Muslim interlocutors also understood and believed in. As we have already discussed, agreement on common points is one of the important strategies of Islamic negotiators, and acting on the basis of this principle will prevent many undesirable matters from arising.

Agreements and treaties

The sociopolitical importance of treaties

The concepts of agreement and treaty appear 50 times in the Qur'an in different contexts.⁷⁴ There are different forms of agreements and treaties in personal and social life, and a great deal of them concern the political arena and international relations. The Qur'an strongly emphasizes the importance of adhering to agreements and treaties,⁷⁵ and considers violating them unacceptable and a sin.⁷⁶ Agreements have often been used as a fundamental strategy to solve issues and discord, and to establish peaceful relations. The first sociopolitical agreement or treaty that ensured systematic relations in the form of a political system were the treaties concluded between Prophet Muhammad and other tribes and religious minorities in the city of Medina upon the Prophet's entrance into this city.⁷⁷ Agreements and treaties can be concluded between different parties, in accordance with the conditions of time and place of the day, as a practical mechanism to ensure interaction and cooperation, and the consequent benefits. The agreements and treaties recounted in Islamic jurisprudential texts are historical examples of agreements and treaties between Muslims and minorities in different periods and with respect to the relatively simple societies of those times, but there is no limit or prescription for the ideal model or type of agreement. Historical

agreements and treaties were intended to support coexistence and interactions between Muslims and non-Muslim minorities, whether they living in Islamic or non-Islamic societies. These agreements and treaties, which have their roots in the Qur'an and the tradition of Prophet Muhammad, were followed throughout the history of Islam, and were explained and interpreted by religious jurists in later centuries.

Adherence to agreements

Adhering to agreements is an absolute necessity, and it is an issue of even greater importance in the social and political arena. As already pointed out, the Qur'an has repeatedly and strongly stressed the necessity of adhering to agreements and treaties and never permits them to be broken. They are given such importance due to the necessity of their presence as a basis for the formation of social and political systems and institutions. Prophet Muhammad's agreements and treaties with non-Muslims and minorities, after his entrance into Medina, served as the basis for the formation of Islamic society and the Islamic state,⁷⁸ a formula that gradually spread to other regions.⁷⁹ From Imam Ali's views on agreements and treaties it can be concluded that circumstances in which there are no common motivations, interests, and beliefs for human beings to agree upon can be very dangerous, and that only treaties and agreements can serve to connect human beings of different religions, tribes, and nations.⁸⁰ By implementing and adhering to them, human beings can enjoy a coexistence and cooperation that ensures peace and social security. For the same reason, Imam Ali maintains that under no circumstances is it permitted to violate agreements, even when the agreement is concluded with an enemy, or when keeping to it results in loss and damage. In the latter circumstances, the adverse consequences should be accepted since violation and deception, in any form or for any reason, are unacceptable; even when the two parties are enemies at war.

Justice and rights

Recognizing the rights of opposing sides

The word *haq* (right), signifying the rights of individuals, also referred to as *haq ul-nas* (human rights) in a broader sense in Islamic culture, is among the deepest and most complex sociopolitical concepts of Islam.⁸¹ The parties enjoying a right can be individuals, groups, nations, or governments. The word *haq* appears 247 times in the Qur'an, about 40 of which directly mean rights. This is a comprehensive and pervasive concept, which includes all the material, and non-material, individual,

social, national, and international aspects of human life. Muslims believe that Prophet Muhammad was the most eminent and distinguished human being and that no other human being can ever reach his high standing in relation to any given characteristic. Prophet Muhammad always paid great attention to protecting the rights of others and tried not to violate anyone's rights.⁸² Imam Ali stated that every human being in this world has rights and there are also certain rights that each human is obligated to ensure for others.⁸³ The only exception to this is God, who has rights that everybody should observe while nobody has any reciprocal rights that God needs to observe.⁸⁴

One of the most important aims of politics and governance in Islam is to protect the rights of individuals.⁸⁵ According to Islam, every person, party, and state has to protect the rights of others, even if the interested parties are unaware of their rights and do not claim them. Recognizing and protecting the rights of human beings is a necessity at individual, national, and international levels. Imam Ali, as an Islamic ruler, said, "If all that this earth and the heavens hold in them is given to me and I am asked to unreasonably and unjustifiably take a barley husk from the mouth of an ant, I will not do so."⁸⁶ In the lives of human beings in general, and in the peaceful relations between human beings of various religions and ideologies in particular, no one should violate the rights of others, and everybody should pay due regard to the rights of others. This was one of the fundamental principles of Imam Ali,⁸⁷ and there are numerous other examples throughout Islamic history of due importance being given to the rights of minorities.⁸⁸

Justice

Justice is regarded as an important practical mechanism in the relations between human beings and nations that helps protect rights and resolve problems efficiently. Although justice is a collective issue, it does not necessarily require the action and agreement of several parties. Rather, it is possible that only one side may observe and pay due regard to this concept and put it into practice, while other individuals concerned could benefit from the ultimate results. Justice has two core features in the Qur'an: one as regards friends and relatives,⁸⁹ and the other regarding enemies.⁹⁰ The Qur'an stresses that one should act with justice even if the consequences of such acts are contrary to the interests of themselves or their close and dear ones.⁹¹

The Qur'an commands Muslims to show kindness and compassion to those people who have not fought battles against them, or driven them out of their cities and homelands, and encourages Muslims to treat such

people with equality and justice.⁹² The occasion of the revelation of this verse concerns people other than *ahl al-kitab*; that is, the idolaters and non-believers.⁹³ Apart from the application of fair and equal treatment, these verses also show that such individuals lived in Islamic society and may continue to live in Islamic societies in the future, and thus Muslims will interact with them and are obligated to treat them with justice and equality. The necessity of paying due regard to justice in any and every situation, and with regard to any and every person, is one of the most distinctive features of Islam. Various verses of the Qur'an command Muslims to observe and pay due regard to justice in every situation. Acting on the basis of justice gains more importance and value in situations where it is carried out with regard to the people who are the followers of other religions.⁹⁴ The clear commandment of the Qur'an to Prophet Muhammad is that if you ever wish to pass judgment on non-Muslims and religious minorities, act and judge with complete justice and equality.⁹⁵

The Qur'an clearly states that during confrontations with enemies any sense of enmity, hatred, or violence must not become an obstacle to the fair and just treatment of others. Moreover, it commands Muslims to pay due regard to justice and equality, even in battles,⁹⁶ and requires them to refrain completely from any unjust behavior towards their enemies. It is clear that when Muslims are obligated to administer justice and equality in dealing with their enemies, they must also act with justice and equality with regard to all other people and groups who are living and interacting with them.

Retaliation

Retaliation is counted among the Islamic principles in international relations, but the important point is that this principle is not absolute and should be implemented within a moral framework. It is restricted to certain conditions determined in accordance with justice and moral principles so, therefore, retaliation is not allowed under all circumstances. As the Qur'an has stressed, Muslims should observe justice even in retaliation.⁹⁷ Further, the Qur'an clearly states that if a group oppressively and vengefully prevents Muslims from going to the *Masjid al-Haram*, they are not allowed to treat them oppressively in return, but should try to show kindness and benevolence and avoid hatred, enmity, and oppression, and that they should fear God.⁹⁸ Thus, retaliation is not always allowed, and in many cases a person who tries to retaliate will be as sinful as one who has committed the original act. Prophet Muhammad recommended that Muslims do not betray one

who has betrayed them, because then Muslims would be in the same position.⁹⁹

However, there are verses in the Qur'an that prescribe retaliation as a preventive act. One case in which retaliation is allowed concerns the issue of retribution,¹⁰⁰ and another case, which is related to international relations, is aggression.¹⁰¹ However, it has been stressed that retaliation should be limited and proportionate to the original act, and that exceeding that limit is considered unacceptable and is disapproved of by God.¹⁰² The principle of retaliation in Islam can be interpreted as an important strategy that emphasizes one should never oppress others nor allow themselves to be oppressed by others.¹⁰³

Renewal of forces for preventive purposes

Islam's emphasis on peace, friendship, and peaceful coexistence,¹⁰⁴ and observing moral principles and rules under all circumstances is so strong that it can make it seem idealistic, to the extent that one may think that the bitter reality of societies suffering from injustice and crime have been ignored. It is true that Islam's emphasis on peace, coexistence, and the observance of moral principles is so strong that the significance of these values cannot be compared to that of military issues.

However, a verse in the Qur'an clearly states that Muslims should strengthen their forces for preventive purposes.¹⁰⁵ The same verse stresses that such strengthening is merely for frightening enemies and has defensive purposes. It can be considered in line with the Islamic strategy of never oppressing others nor allowing oneself to be oppressed by others.¹⁰⁶ From this perspective it can be argued that the production of military materiel as a precautionary measure, making use of the latest advances and technologies, is reasonable and acceptable from an Islamic perspective. However, the ideal situation would be a time when human beings' intellectual and spiritual perfection caused all countries to cease militarism altogether.

Conclusions

Do modern Muslim countries found their foreign policy on Islamic fundamentals and viewpoints? Is there a clear theorized Islamic basis for conducting international relations?

The answers to these two questions are to a significant extent negative, which has caused Muslims to be inactive in international relations. However, they are also to a lesser extent positive, and this has enabled them to provide some active input in the international arena.

Non-Muslim actors in international relations can be regarded as *active inactive* actors and Muslim actors can be considered *inactive active* actors. Active inactive actors are mainly Western countries that create the fundamentals and frameworks of international relations; this can be regarded as their creative input. However, as they develop the fundamentals and frameworks of international relations for all countries and want to interact with them, they must also pay attention to the demands and situations of other countries; this is their inactive characteristic. Inactive active actors, mainly comprised of Muslim countries, have to comply with the rules and frameworks designed and developed by the active actors; this is their inactive characteristic. However, these countries try to adapt these frameworks to their own situation, interests, and needs and to influence the international processes as much as possible; this can be regarded as their active input.

Muslim countries have accepted the frameworks and rules governing the international system for two reasons. First, they have not been among the developed countries in recent years and have had no active role in recent global and international developments. During the formation of international systems and rules in the last 100 years, these countries have been mainly on the sidelines and thus inactive. Second, Muslims consider some of these fundamentals, rules, and frameworks to be right and rational. In terms of the parts they consider wrong and unfair, these countries could do nothing but attempt to accept and comply with them, seeking their own benefit where possible. In early Islamic texts, such as the Qur'an and *sunnah*, and consequently in the writings of Muslim scholars throughout history, there are themes, discussions, and rules for relations and interactions with other states and nations, however, Muslims have not yet undertaken the difficult task of presenting them in the form of more widely acceptable theories.

The right and fair parts of the fundamentals and rules of the international system in the modern world are rooted in the rationality and intellectual maturity of those who have developed them, while the wrongs and unfair parts are based on the whims and desires for superiority on the part of certain people, states, and pressure groups. By introducing the fundamentals and rules of Islam, that is, the Qur'an and *sunnah*, into these rules and framework, it seems there will be more rationality and harmony in these frameworks, and that they will result in more justice and peace in the world. Islam's attitude towards different issues and subjects, including political and international ones, is essentially humanistic and moral, and is also more compatible with human essence. The differences in the rituals, laws, and legal rules of Muslims

and non-Muslims will not cause any problem or discord, because Islam has not imposed its laws and rules on non-Muslims. Moreover, it should be noted that there is no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in issues such as human dignity, protecting rights, promoting justice, and adhering to moral and human principles.

Notes

1. "We have honoured the children of Adam and carried them by land and sea; We have provided good sustenance for them and favored them specially above many of those We have Created," Qur'an 17: 70. All Qur'anic quotations are from *The Qur'an: A New Translation*. Translated by M A S Abdel Haleem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
2. "When I have fashioned him and breathed My spirit into him, bow down before him" Qur'an 15: 29.
3. "[Prophet], when your Lord told the angels, 'I am putting a successor on earth'," Qur'an 2: 30.
4. "It was He who created all that is on the earth for you," Qur'an 2: 29.
5. Alikhani, Aliakbar. "Human Dignity and Violence in Islam." *Pajuhishnami-yi 'Ulum-i Insani*, n. 3 (2006), pp. 3 and 100–106.
6. Nobahar, Rahim. "Religion and Human Dignity." In *The Theoretical Principles of Human Rights* Qom: Mufid University, 2005, p. 620.
7. Javadi Amoli, Abdullah. *The Philosophy of Human Rights*. Qom: Asra' Publications, 2001, pp. 151–162.
8. "People, We created you all from a single man and a single woman, and made you into races and tribes so that you should recognize one another. In God's eyes, the most honoured of you are the ones most mindful of Him", Qur'an 49: 13.
9. "If your Lord had pleased, He would have made all people a single community, but they continue to have their differences" Qur'an 11: 118; "If God had so willed, He would have made you one community" Qur'an 5: 48.
10. "Had your Lord willed, all the people on earth would have believed" Qur'an 10: 99.
11. "Say, 'Now the truth has come from your Lord: let those who wish to believe in it do so, and let those who wish to reject it do so.' We have prepared a Fire for the wrongdoers that will envelop them from all sides" Qur'an 18: 29.
12. "Mankind was a single community..." Qur'an 2: 213.
13. Qur'an 49: 13.
14. Qur'an 11: 118; Qur'an 5: 48.
15. Qur'an 10: 99.
16. Qur'an 18: 29.
17. "Now clear proof has come to you from your Lord: if anyone sees it, that will be to his advantage; if anyone is blind to it, that will be to his loss– [Say], 'I am not your guardian'", Qur'an 6: 104.
18. "True Religion, in God's eyes, is *Islam*: [devotion to Him alone]. Those who were given the Scripture disagreed out of rivalry, only after they had been given knowledge", Qur'an 3: 19.

19. "The [Muslim] believers, the Jews, the Christians, and the Sabians – all those who believe in God and the Last Day and do good– will have their rewards with their Lord. No fear for them, nor will they grieve", Qur'an 2: 62.
20. "We revealed the Torah with guidance and light, and the prophets, who had submitted to God, judged according to it for the Jews. So did the rabbis and the scholars in accordance with that part of God's Scripture which they were entrusted to preserve, and to which they were witnesses. So [rabbis and scholars] do not fear people, fear Me; do not barter away My messages for a small price; those who do not judge according to what God has sent down are rejecting [God's teachings]", Qur'an 5: 44; "So let the followers of the Gospel judge according to what God has sent down in it. Those who do not judge according to what God has revealed are lawbreakers", Qur'an 5: 47; "Say, 'People of the Book, you have no true basis [for your religion] unless you uphold the Torah, the Gospel, and that which has been sent down to you from your Lord,' but what has been sent down to you [Prophet] from your Lord is sure to increase many of them in their insolence and defiance: do not worry about those who defy [God]", Qur'an 5: 68.
21. Qur'an 15: 29.
22. "We have honoured the children of Adam and carried them by land and sea; We have provided good sustenance for them and favoured them specially above many of those We have created", Qur'an 17: 70.
23. al-Harrani, Muhammad b. Hassan ibn Shu'bah. *Tuhaf al-'Uqul fi ma Ja'a min al-Hikam wa-l-Mawa'iz min Al al-Rasul*. Qom: Jami'a Mudarrisin Publications, 1404AH, p. 30.
24. Qur'an 5: 44, 47, and 68.
25. Qur'an 3: 19.
26. "speak good words to all people;", Qur'an 2: 83.
27. "but do good, for God loves those who do good", Qur'an 2: 195.
28. Zanjani, A. Amid. *The Rights of International Commitments and Diplomacy in Islam*. Tehran: Samt Publications, 2000. pp. 153 and 196.
29. Zaydan, J. *History of Islamic Civilization*. Translated by Ali Javaherkalam. Tehran: Amirkabir Publications, 1906, vol. 4, pp. 119–120.
30. "It was only as a mercy that We sent you [Prophet] to all people", Qur'an 21: 107.
31. al-Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir. *Bihar al-Anwar*. Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Wafa', 1403 AH, vol. 10, p. 30.
32. "You [Prophet] are sure to find that the most hostile to the believers are the Jews and those who associate other deities with God; you are sure to find that the closest in affection towards the believers are those who say, 'We are Christians,' for there are among them people devoted to learning and ascetics. These people are not given to arrogance", Qur'an 5: 82.
33. "God may still bring about affection between you and your present enemies – God is all powerful, God is most forgiving and merciful –", Qur'an 60: 7.
34. Islam's strategic attitude towards peaceful coexistence requires a more extensive discussion. In this respect, Alikhani, Ali Akbar. *Islam and Peaceful Coexistence: The Challenge of Modern World for Existence*. Tehran: Bihafarin, 2013.
35. Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, Sermon 105, p. 98.
36. Qur'an 4: 58; Qur'an 16: 90; Qur'an 5: 8 and 42; Qur'an 42: 15. Also Qazwini, Abd al-Karim Muhammad Yahya. *Survival and Decline of State in the Political*

- Ideas of Imam Ali*. Qom: Ayatollah Mar'ashi Library, 1992, pp. 97, 98, 100, 112, 125; and al-Khwansari, Jamal al-Din Muhammad. *Comments on Ghurar al-Hikam wa Durar al-Kalam*. Edited by Mir Jalal al-Din Husayn Armuyi. Tehran: University of Tehran, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 11, 104, 198, 216, vol. 2, pp. 30, 90, and vol. 3, pp. 205, 374, and 420.
37. al-Khwansari, *Comments on Ghurar al-Hikam*, vol. 3, p. 239, vol. 5, pp. 158, 168, and 338; Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, Sermon 87, pp. 69–70, Sermon 216, p. 248, Sermon 72, p. 250, Qisar 125, pp. 54–55.
 38. al-Shaykh al-Mufid, Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Ni'man. *al-Jamal*. Beirut, Dar al-Mufid, 1993, pp. 272–273 and 281; Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, Sermon 69, p. 53.
 39. Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, Sermon 3, p. 11, Sermon 33, p. 34, Sermon 131, p. 129, Sermon 295, p. 239, Sermon 173, p. 179; al-Shaykh al-Mufid, Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Ni'man. *al-Irshad*. Beirut, Dar al-Mufid, 1993, vol. 1 p. 247.
 40. al-Shaykh al-Mufid, *al-Irshad*, vol. 1, p. 247; Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, Sermon 33, p. 34, and Sermon 224, p. 259.
 41. See Alikhani. *Islam and Peaceful Coexistence*, pp. 104–236.
 42. See Alikhani. "Human Dignity and Violence in Islam," pp. 106–110.
 43. Suyuti, Jalal al-Din. *al-Durr al-Manthur fi Tafsir al-Ma'thur*. Qom: Ayatollah Mar'ashi Library, 1404 AH, vol. 2, p. 103.
 44. For more details on Prophet Muhammad's interaction with Jews, see Alikhani, Aliakbar. "Interaction of Prophet's Government with Jews." In edited by A. Alikhani et al. *The Policy of Prophet Muhammad*, pp. 269–293.
 45. For more details on Prophet Muhammad's battles, see Alikhani, Aliakbar. "An Analysis of Prophet Muhammad's Battles with Non-Believers." In edited by Alikhani et al. *The Policy of Prophet Muhammad*, pp., pp. 487–504.
 46. See Habibzadeh, Tavakkol. "War, Peace and Humanitarian Right in Prophet Muhammad's Conduct." In edited by Alikhani et al. *The Policy of Prophet Muhammad*, and Kariminia, M. M. "Prophet Muhammad's Peaceful Conduct with Non-Muslim." In edited by Alikhani et al. *The Policy of Prophet Muhammad*, pp. 419–445 and 457–480.
 47. al-'Iqad, Mahmud. *'Abqariyah al-Imam Ali*. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Misriyah, 1967, p. 18.
 48. Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, Letter 53, p. 338.
 49. Ibn al-Juzi, Sabt. *Tazkirat al-Khawas*. Tehran: Maktab Naynawa al-Hadith, n.d, p. 69; al-Mas'udi, Abu al-Hassan Ali Husayn. *Murawij al-Zahab*. Translated by A. Payandeh. Tehran: Ilmi va Farhangi, 1991, pp. 718 and 763; Ya'qub, Ahmad b. Abi. *Tarikh al-Ya'qubi*. Beirut: Dar al-Sadir, n.d., vol. 2, pp. 94 and 182; al-Munqari, Nasr b. Muzahim. *Paykar-i Siffin*. Translated by Parviz Atabaki. Tehran: 'Ilmi va Farhangi, 1991, pp. 75, 207, 255, 432, and 530; al-Shaykh al-Mufid. *al-Jamal*, p. 339; al-Tabari, Muhammad b. Jarir. *Tarikh al-Tabari*. Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Ilmi li-l-Matbu'at, 1879, pp. 517–520; al-Dinuri, Abi Hanifa Ahmad b. Dawud. *Akhbar al-Atwal*. Edited by Abdu al-Mu'im Amir. Cairo: Dar al-Ihya' Kutub al-Arabyah, 1960, p. 147.
 50. al-Majlisi, *Bihar al-Anwar*, vol. 15, pp. 210, 287; vol. 18, p. 269; vol. 21, p. 98; vol. 22, pp. 56, 356; vol. 24, p. 292; vol. 51, p. 249; vol. 69, pp. 370, 375, 386, 394, 397, 405; vol. 70, pp. 371, 374; vol. 71, pp. 373, 382, 391, 420; vol. 74, p. 286; vol. 77, p. 158; vol. 78, p. 245.

51. al-Kulayni, Muhammad b. Ya'qub, Abi Jafar. *Furu' Kafi*. Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyah, 1983, vol. 5, p. 28.
52. "A sacred month for a sacred month: violation of sanctity [calls for] fair retribution. So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God, and know that He is with those who are mindful of Him," Qur'an 2: 194; "Fight in God's cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits," Qur'an 2: 190.
53. Ibn Hisham. *al-Sira al-Nabawiyah*. Edited by Mustafa Saqa Akhirun. Beirut: Dar al-Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, n.d., p. 992; Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad Muhammad. *al-Musnad*. Research by Ahmad Muhammad Shakir. Cairo: Dar al-Turath al-Islamiyah, 1414 AH, vol. 8, p. 41.
54. al-Qazwini Ibn Maja, Abi Abdullah Muhammad b. Yazid. *Sunan*. Beirut: Ihya' al-Thurat al-'Arabi, 1395 AH, vol. 2 p. 947, vol. 2, p. 101; al-Sijistani al-Azdi, al-Imam Abi Dawud Sulayman b. Ash'ath. *Sunan Abi Dawud*. Dar al-Ihya' al-Sunna al-Nabawiya, n.d., vol. 3, p. 52; al-Tusi, al-Shayhk. *Tahdhib al-Ahkam*. Tehran: Dar al-Maktab al-Islamiyah, 1985, vol. 138, p. 138.
55. Ibn Hisham. *al-Sira al-Nabawiyah*, p. 992. It should be noted that war stratagems, which are allowed in Islam, are very different from betrayal and deception for the difference and some examples of them see, M. Mohaqeq Damad (2004) *International Humanitarian Rights* (Tehran: Nashre Olum-e Ensani) pp. 94-97; al-Munqari. *Paykar-i Siffin*, pp. 219-222 and 253; Ibn al-Juzi. *Tazkirat al-Khawass*, pp. 88-89; Ibn Athir. *Usd al-Ghaibah fi Ma'rifat al-Sahibah*, Beirut: Dar al-Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, 1390 AH, vol. 2, pp. 197-198; al-Majlisi, *Bihar al-Anwar*, vol. 42, p. 288.
56. "[Believers], argue only in the best way with the People of the Book, except with those of them who act unjustly", Qur'an 29: 46; "Argue with them in the most courteous way, for your Lord knows best who has strayed from His way and who is rightly guided" Qur'an 16: 125; "[Prophet], repel evil with what is better and your enemy will become as close as an old and valued friend", Qur'an 41: 34.
57. "They also say, 'No one will enter Paradise unless he is a Jew or a Christian.' This is their own wishful thinking. [Prophet], say, 'Produce your evidence, if you are telling the truth'", Qur'an 2: 111.
58. Noah's dialogue with pagans and non believers: Qur'an 7: 59-64, 11: 25-36, and 26: 105-124. Abraham's dialogue with idolaters: Qur'an 6: 83-84 and 26: 104-69. Abraham's dialogue with Nimrud: Qur'an 2: 258. Hud's dialogue with opponents: Qur'an 7: 65-72.
59. "[Prophet], call [people] to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good teaching. Argue with them in the most courteous way, for your Lord knows best who has strayed from His way and who is rightly guided", Qur'an 16: 125.
60. Ghazban, Munir Muhammad. *Political Policies in Prophet Muhammad's Conduct*. Translated by 'Umar Ghadiri. Tehran: Ihsan, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 207-209 and 135-138.
61. Hamadani, Rafi' al-Din Ishaq b. Muhammad *Sirat-i Rasul Allah*. Edited by Asghar Mahdavi. Tehran: Bunyad-i Farhang-i Iran, 1980, pp. 268-269 and 459-476.
62. To read the text of this agreement, see, Hamidullah, Muhammad. *Letter and Political Treaties of Prophet Muhammad*. Translated by Muhammad Husayn.

- Tehran: Surush, pp. 103–110. The original agreement has been quoted in various historical accounts such as: Ibn Hisham. *al-Sira al-Nabawiyah*. vol. 2, p. 147; Ibn Kathir. *al-Sira al-Nabawiyah*. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, n.d., p. 419. al-Ahmadi al-Miyanji, Ali b. Husaynali. *Makatib al-Rasul*. Qom: Matba' al-Ilmiyah, 1339 AH, p. 241.
63. Ibn Hisham. *al-Sira al-Nabawiyah*. Vol. 1, pp. 50–51. al-Tabarsi, Abi Ali al-Fadhl b. Hasan. *al-'Alam ul-Wari*. Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1979, pp. 89–90.
 64. Waqidi, Muhammad b. Umar. *Maghazi*. Translated by Mahmud Mahdavi Damghani. Tehran: Markaz-i Nahsr-i Danishgahi, 1990, p. 45.
 65. For examples see, al-Tabarsi, Ahmad b. Ali b. Abi Talib. *Ihtiyaj*. Translated by Bihrad Jafari. Tehran: Dar al-Kutub Islamiyah, 2008, pp. 106–118.
 66. "If anyone seeks a religion other than [islam] complete devotion to God, it will not be accepted from him: he will be one of the losers in the Hereafter" Qur'an 3: 85.
 67. "Say [Prophet], 'Who gives you sustenance from the heavens and earth?' Say, 'God does,' and '[One party of us] must be rightly guided and the other clearly astray'", Qur'an 34: 24.
 68. "[Believers], argue only in the best way with the People of the Book, except with those of them who act unjustly. Say, 'We believe in what was revealed to us and in what was revealed to you; our God and your God are one [and the same]; we are devoted to Him'", Qur'an 29: 46.
 69. al-Bukhari, Muhammad. *Sahih al-Bukhari*, Hadith 2684.
 70. Ibn Hanbal, *al-Musnad*. Vol. 4, p. 36, No: 17264, and a similar Hadith: Kashani, Faiz. *Tafsir-i Safi*. Tehran: Maktab al-Sadr, 1415 AH, p. 119.
 71. Among Muslim religious scholars this viewpoint is, for example, expressed by Tabatabai, Seyyed Muhammad Husayn. *Tafsir al-Mizan*. Translated by Muhammad Baqir Musavi Hamidani. Qom: Intisharat Islami, 1988, vol. 1, p. 239.
 72. "Say, 'People of the Book, let us arrive at a statement that is common to us all", Qur'an 3: 64.
 73. al-Ahmadi al-Mianji. *Makatib al-Rasul*. Vol. 2, p. 583.
 74. Abd al-Baqi, Muhammad Fu'ad. *al-Majma' al-Mufarhis li-Alfaz al-Qur'an al-Karim*. Tehran: Ismailian, 1983, p. 492.
 75. For example see, "fulfill your agreement with them to the end of their term. God loves those who are mindful of Him", Qur'an 9: 4; "No indeed! God loves those who keep their pledges and are mindful of Him", Qur'an 3: 76; "who are faithful to their trusts and pledges", Qur'an 23: 8; "Fulfil any pledge you make in God's name and do not break oaths after you have sworn them", Qur'an 16: 91; "Do not go near the orphan's property, except with the best [intentions], until he reaches the age of maturity. Honour your pledges: you will be questioned about your pledges", Qur'an 17: 34; "The truly good are those who believe in God and the Last Day, in the angels, the Scripture, and the prophets; who give away some of their wealth, however much they cherish it, to their relatives, to orphans, the needy, travelers and beggars, and to liberate those in bondage; those who keep up the prayer and pay the prescribed alms; who keep pledges whenever they make them", Qur'an 2: 177; "who, whenever you [Prophet] make a treaty with them, break it, for they have no fear of God", Qur'an 8: 56; "You who believe, fulfil your obligations", Qur'an 5: 1.

76. "They are indeed like Pharaoh's people and those before them, who denied the signs of their Lord: We destroyed them for their sins, and We drowned Pharaoh's people – they were all evildoers. The worst creatures in the sight of God are those who reject Him and will not believe", Qur'an 8: 54–55; "but those who sell out God's covenant and their own oaths for a small price will have no share in the life to come", Qur'an 3: 77.
77. To read the text of this treaty and its source, see Hamidullah. *Letter and Political Treaties of Prophet Muhammad*, pp. 106–110.
78. See Hamidullah. *Letter and Political Treaties of Prophet Muhammad*, pp. 103–110.
79. See Hamidullah. "Different treaties with other tribes and Regions." In Hamidullah, *Letter and Political Treaties of Prophet Muhammad*.
80. Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, vol. 7, Letter 53, p. 339.
81. See Kadivar, Mohsen. *Human Rights (Islam and Human Rights)*. Tehran: Kavir, 2008 (Persian).
82. Beihaqi, Abubakr Ahmad b. al-Husayn. *Dala'il al-Nabawiyah*. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1985, Introduction, p. 33, vol. 6, p. 278; Ibn Athir. *Usd al-Ghaibah fi Ma'rifat al-Sahibah*, Beirut: Dar al-Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, 1390 AH, vol. 2, p. 137.
83. Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, vol. 7, Sermon 216, p. 248.
84. Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, vol. 7, Sermon 216, p. 248.
85. See Imam Ali's statement regarding the importance of governance in realization of rights: al-Shaykh al-Mufid, *al-Irshad*, vol. 1, p. 247; Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, vol. 7, Sermon 216, p. 248, vol. 7, Sermon 33.
86. Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, vol. 7, Sermon 216, p. 248, vol. 7, Sermon 224, p. 259.
87. "You should know that I fight with two types of people: the ones who want things which they are not worthy of and those who do not pay any respect to the rights of others", Hadid. *Comments on Nahj ul-Balagha*, vol. 7, Sermon 216, p. 248, vol. 7, Sermon 173, p. 179.
88. Qarzawi, Yusuf. *al-Aqaliyat al-Diniyah wa-l-Hal al-Islami*. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1998, pp. 58–59.
89. "You who believe, uphold justice and bear witness to God, even if it is against yourselves, your parents, or your close relatives. Whether the person is rich or poor, God can best take care of both. Refrain from following your own desire, so that you can act justly – if you distort or neglect justice, God is fully aware of what you do", Qur'an 4: 135.
90. "Do not let hatred of others lead you away from justice, but adhere to justice, for that is closer to awareness of God", Qur'an 5: 8; "Fight in God's cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits", Qur'an 2: 190.
91. Qur'an 4: 135.
92. "He does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with anyone who has not fought you for your faith or driven you out of your homes: God loves the just", Qur'an 60: 8.
93. Suyuti, Jalal al-Din. *al-Durr al-Manthur fi Tafsir al-Ma'thur*. Qom: Ayatollah Mar'ashi Library, 1404 AH, vol. 6, p. 205; Qomi, Ali b. Ibrahim. *Tafsir-i Qumi*. Qom: Dar al-Kutub, 1404 AH, vol. 3, p. 362.
94. "do not let hatred of others lead you away from justice, but adhere to justice, for that is closer to awareness of God", Qur'an 5: 8.

95. "If they come to you [Prophet] for judgement, you can either judge between them, or decline – if you decline, they will not harm you in any way, but if you do judge between them, judge justly", Qur'an 5: 42.
96. "Fight in God's cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits", Qur'an 2: 190.
97. Qur'an 5: 8.
98. "Do not let your hatred for the people who barred you from the Sacred Mosque induce you to break the law: help one another to do what is right and good; do not help one another towards sin and hostility. Be mindful of God, for His punishment is severe", Qur'an 5: 2.
99. al-Majlisi, *Bihar al-Anwar*, vol. 100, p. 175.
100. "Violation of sanctity [calls for] fair retribution. So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God, and know that He is with those who are mindful of Him", Qur'an 2: 194; "In the Torah We prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound: if anyone forgoes this out of charity, it will serve as atonement for his bad deeds. Those who do not judge according to what God has revealed are doing grave wrong", Qur'an 5: 45.
101. "So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God, and know that He is with those who are mindful of Him", Qur'an 2: 194.
102. "Fight in God's cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits", Qur'an 2: 190.
103. "and without suffering loss or causing others to suffer loss", Qur'an 2: 279.
104. See Alikhani. *Islam and Peaceful Coexistence*.
105. "Prepare whatever forces you [believers] can muster, including warhorses, to frighten off God's enemies and yours, and warn others unknown to you but known to God", Qur'an 8: 60.
106. "and without suffering loss or causing others to suffer loss", Qur'an 2: 279.

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- , *al-Sirat al-Nabawiyah*. Edited by Mustafa Saqa Akhirun. Beirut: Dar al-Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d.
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2

Islamic Norms and Values in International Relations and Their Reinterpretation in AKP-Governed Turkey

Lili Yulyadi Arnakim

Introduction

The relationship between Islam and the state has been extensively written on by many scholars.¹ Islam is a comprehensive way of life with a worldview and a system in which religion and state are not separated.² It believes that public life, or the state, should embrace Islamic values. In international relations, Islam has its own norms and prescriptions for relations between Muslim countries and between Muslim and non-Muslim countries.³ Islam, upholds values such as mutual sympathy, self-sufficiency, solidarity, mutual trust and help, and mutual advice and justice, which do not conflict with universally-held values.

The earliest Islamic norms in international relations were articulated by Shaybani, a judge and advisor in Caliph Harun al-Rashid's court, in the latter half of the 8th century. Shaybani was a jurist and his contribution, *Siyar* (law of nations), was conceptualized in legal terms and was essentially an external extension of Islamic laws.⁴ This was a time when a number of independent Muslim states existed in Spain, Morocco, Egypt, the Abbasid territories, and some smaller states in Persia and Turkey.⁵ Outside the Islamic world there were still empires, kingdoms and nations. The legal theory of *siyar* was developed to explain the Islamic perspective on how to manage relations within the Islamic world and with the rest of the world.⁶ The sources of Islamic laws had by now expanded to include *maslaha mursala* (unrestricted public interest) besides the Qur'an, *sunnah*, *ijma* (consensus of the jurists) and *ijtihad*

(independent reasoning), which means that law-making was not solely based on the interpretation of authoritative texts, but had become a more complex process involving a deference to empirical reality and necessities besides traditionalism.⁷

Shaybani's theory divided the world into three domains: *dar al-harb* (domain of war), *dar al-Islam* (domain of peace), and *dar al-sulh* (domain of alliance).⁸ *Dar al-Islam* is essentially governed by Islamic law, therefore deemed a peaceful domain. *Dar al-sulh* refers to the territories where there is no Islamic governance, but where a state of peace exists based on treaties, alliances, and cooperation with *dar al-Islam*. *Dar al-harb* is the region that is neither under Islamic laws nor at peace with Islam so it therefore falls in the domain of war. Muqtedar Khan argues that Shaybani's theory can be upgraded to modern conditions and may be read as follows: the regions with Muslim populations or under Islamic governance are domains of peace and order, whereas domains outside are essentially anarchic and in a state of nature. For Muslim jurists, including Shaybani, the non-application of the will/law of God in a region amounts to it being in a state of nature. Thus the medieval Islamic concept of the international arena looks very similar to the realist, neorealist, and neoliberal visions of international relations.⁹

However, Muqtedar Khan notices that there is a marked difference. For the realists, anarchy implies the complete absence of any central authority, which plunges a state into dilemmas with self-help and security.¹⁰ The only sense of order comes from a minimalist code of moral restraint called the morality of states.¹¹ However, as regards *dar al-Islam*, also translated as *Pax Islamica*,¹² the Shari'ah and the principles of Islamic ethics still apply unilaterally, even in the field of international relations. Thus, Muslim states cannot make realistic arguments to privilege issues of national security over ethical considerations, since they are bound by their own international law, the *siyar*, to act in accordance with unilateral ethical principles. The primarily deontological nature of *siyar* demands that states obey the will of God and act in a just and equitable fashion, without consideration of the consequences, since in the end all things belong to Allah and all affairs tend to him alone. Thus, even if the rest of the world exists in a state of nature, anarchy, and war, Muslim states are still required by Islamic international law to act according to ethical principles. This is one example of how the close relationship between ethics and jurisprudence in Islam converts moral action from voluntary to mandatory, unilaterally and without any expectation of reciprocity.¹³

Shaybani's is the early systematic theory of international relations advanced from an Islamic perspective. It is, without doubt, tempered by the political conditions that prevailed in his time and by the needs of empire, for by that time Islam was not just an idea or a philosophy, it had become an empire and a civilization. Needless to say, the theory of *siyar*, which does reflect some characteristics of modern realism in so far as it is guided by the security interests of *dar al-Islam*, definitely indicates a grasp of the notions of sovereignty and territoriality, the central pillars of realist international thinking. It differs from present realist theories only in its rather mild assumptions of anarchy and its recognition of a higher authority to which states are responsible. In a sense, the theory of *siyar* can be described as Islamic realism.¹⁴

The constitution of Islam, as primarily an ethical tradition, both challenges and advances Islamic international thought. In a world in which international organizations, regimes, and norms proliferate, and where nearly all states are members of a non-aggression treaty (through membership of the UN), and are interconnected through trade and alliances, one can argue that no *dar al-harb* exists, in its strictest sense. The world today consists of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-sulh*. In Shaybani's time Muslims mostly lived in Muslim lands. That is no longer true. The Muslim population is truly globalized, even a non-Muslim country like India has more than twice the Muslim population of the entire Arab world. More Muslims live in NATO countries than in the Arab world.¹⁵ Indeed, Shaybani's category of *dar al-harb* has outlived its usefulness, at least in the territorial sense. For instance, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan found that they had moved from *dar al-harb* to *dar al-Islam* practically overnight. The complexity and meaninglessness of borders in today's world has rendered Shaybani's concept of *dar al-harb* obsolete.¹⁶

This chapter attempts to locate the significance of Islamic norms and values in the present global political system. It examines the strategic role of Muslim countries in upholding Islamic norms and values in the face of current global political challenges, and looks at how its values apply in establishing the future of a global political system.

Limitations of international relations theories in present world politics

The Western tradition of political thought in the field of international relations has proven insufficient. The Westphalian system was a reflection of the formation of a Western paradigm in world politics, which began in the West and then spread all over the world. Since its rise

international politics the West and Eastern Europe have failed to provide a world order of peace and justice.¹⁷ Faruqi highlights that the failure is due to the fact that neither West (realist) nor Eastern (communist) Europe offers a principle that makes the ideal of a universal community work.¹⁸ International relations theorists have been limited in explaining what has been going on in world politics. As a result, they have only been able to explain, predict, and justify why injustice and war are inevitable, but present theories are not able to offer the best world system to aspire to.

The realist school, for example, has focused on the power impulse and usually considers states as monolithic actors.¹⁹ According to this school, states rationally calculate costs and benefits in the power-balancing game of international relations, the rules of which, in the “anarchic society” of world politics, are presumed as given.²⁰ Furthermore, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that it is at an international, rather than a state, level where power becomes a goal in itself and the prime focus of analysis. To him, it is the anarchy of the international system that drives states to adopt the behavioral patterns of “power politics,” to ensure survival.²¹ Despite this, Waltz admits that changes in the international system may result from structural factors within the states. He has little or no interest in descending below the systemic level.²²

As recorded in world history since the late 17th century, under Western hegemony, the world has never been at peace and with a just world order. Far more important, and far more dangerous for the peace and the security of humankind, is the fact that, according to some observers, the firepower at the command of the West equals more than 500 pounds of high explosives for every man, woman, and child on earth.²³ During the Cold War the world’s population was continually worried. The establishment of a new world order in the early 1990s created a domination by the sole superpower over both developing and underdeveloped countries. Lastly, over the last decade, the world has witnessed a global war against terrorists that has created hatred between Muslims and non-Muslim countries. Faruqi states that these are basically the result of the West’s hegemony over a world that has been neither safe, nor peaceful, nor contented. It is a time bomb which could explode at any moment.²⁴

Islamic norms and values in international relations

In the nation-state system there is a great need for an international order that would establish a just and permanent peace without tyranny,

one that would recognize as legitimate the religious, cultural, social, and economic differences and distinctions among the people of the world. An international order whose laws would be based upon people's common need to order their lives as they wish, in justice and freedom. To do so, religious values – such as a continuous commitment to covenants, liberty, openness, egalitarianism, universalism, justice, and the freedom to convince and to be convinced – must be applied in world politics.

In international relations Islam has centered on the concept of *ummah*, which offers *l'esprit de corps*, a sense of mission, and an integrative force to Muslim groups. It can also be an influence on Muslim political elites and communities in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. *Ummah* is a unique concept and there is no equivalent term in Western languages.²⁵ Its essential features can be summarized by: firstly, the identity of believers constitute a solid unity among themselves and against those who reject the faith; secondly, Islam, which gives identity to the *ummah*, obliges it to be universal rather than particularistic; thirdly, it is organic in nature and characterized by cohesion among its component parts, which is closely linked to the concept of brotherhood; fourthly, the organic nature of the *ummah* does not mean it espouses the evils of collectivism; finally, its political expression in the political system attempts to actualize the Divine will.²⁶

The word *ummah* appears 64 times in the Qur'an.²⁷ As Muhammad Asad says, the primary meaning of the word denotes "a group of living beings having certain characteristics or circumstances in common."²⁸ Choudhury adds that the word *ummah*, used in the Qur'an in different ways, connotes excellence, way, length of time, a group, and a people.²⁹ In current times, Islam foresees an international order composed of a commonwealth of nations which accepts racial diversity and ever-changing geographical demarcations only for facility and aptitude of reference, and not as a constraint on the social sphere of its members.³⁰ Thus, *ummah* is not limited by national boundaries, racial configurations or geographical demarcations, but is an ideologically based community. Indeed, the Qur'an highlights:

O, Mankind! We created you from the single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each other, not that ye may despise (each other), verily. The most honored of you in the sight of God is (he who is) most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well-acquainted (with all things).³¹

The re-emergence of the significance of *ummah* in Muslim society has been an indication of an Islamic awakening. Hussin Mutalib, for example, asserts that one of the characteristics of the Islamic awakening, especially in Southeast Asia, is a tendency to relate and view Muslims in different parts of the world within the framework of a global Muslim *ummah*.³² To him, the Islamic awakening has at least four characteristics:

first, a greater eagerness, if not confidence in wanting, to view Islam as *al-din*, that is, a total, comprehensive and all encompassing way of life; second, a tendency to relate and view Muslims in different parts of the world within the framework of global Muslim *ummah*; third, a certain sense of vigor or assertiveness in espousing Islamic fundamentalist issues, values and solutions; and finally, the establishment of movement-type bodies or organizations aimed at making Muslims better organized and hence more effective in resolving their problems and plights.³³

Historically, the Islamic awakening has been associated with an attempt to revive the significance of the *ummah* in the Muslim world. The emergence of pan-Islamism after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was strongly supported by many Muslim reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida.³⁴ The fundamental centrality of Islamic unity and pan-Islamic cooperation in the works of al-Afghani and 'Abduh significantly reduced nationalism to a secondary element across Muslim countries. They regarded the Islamic *ummah* as a superior basis for cohesion.³⁵ This thinking was accepted by Muslims across the Muslim world, including Muslim countries in Southeast Asia. Muslims in Indonesia participated especially in the pan-Islamism which was centered on the Ottoman Empire before it shifted to Mecca, as the center where Muslims gathered for cohesion in the later period.

However, with the emergence of the nation-state system in the post-colonial era, the *ummah* has become more nationalistic in nature. Muslims have been confined to their national boundaries and geographical demarcations. As a result, the Islamic awakening has taken the form of Islamic movements or political parties at the level of nation-states, with the goal of establishing Islamic political parties to attain an Islamic state. Those involved with the practical aspects of such Islamic movements or political parties –including Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Sayyid Abul 'Ala al-Maududi in Pakistan,³⁶ and the Refah party of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey – are considered as the Muslim reformers who led the Islamic awakening across the Muslim world.³⁷

The Islamic awakening as a global phenomenon goes back to the mid-20th century. It was followed by the Iranian revolution in 1979, which motivated and triggered the awakening of Islam in the 1980s and 1990s in other parts of the Muslim world, such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa, where Islam plays a significant role in domestic politics.³⁸ Despite the fact that Muslims are divided into national entities, their aspiration to form a bloc in the international community continues. The pan-Islamism of al-Afghani led to reactions in the Muslim world such as the 1967 Arab–Israeli war and the establishment of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference). Muslims from all over the world gathered to seek solutions to the challenges facing the world of Islam. However, many observers of the OIC have been very critical of the organization, which has not successfully united the Islamic *ummah* across the Muslim world to face current challenges.³⁹

Although the project of pan-Islamism currently appears in disarray, Islam as a factor in foreign policy-making still has the capability to function as an integrative force, creating consensus on foreign policy objectives, providing *esprit de corps* and vision, and helping to mobilize external resources, or even serving as a constraint.⁴⁰

A constructive interpretation of Islamic norms and values in international relations can be found in the thoughts of Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi. According to whom Islam and its adherents (*ummah*) regard themselves as committed to the task of bringing in a new world order based on peace, justice, and brotherhood. He asserts that Islam's commitment to peace is absolute, universal, and comprehensive.⁴¹ For any people to enter a new Islamic order it is necessary that they disband their army, destroy their weapons or surrender them to the world government, except for those necessary for the maintenance of public order or for the enforcement of verdicts of the courts of law.⁴² Faruqi further argues that an Islamic commitment to a world order of peace, justice, and brotherhood is both religious and utilitarian. According to him, Islam holds that desiring this world order, working for it, and making sacrifices to bring it about are constituents of heroism and virtue, of piety and saintliness.⁴³

In Islam everybody is both entitled and obliged to join the covenant of peace. Faruqi insists that Islam demands that all nations and peoples enter the realm of peace and it commands its adherents (*ummah*) to do so with enthusiasm. If a nation repudiates a peace accepted by everyone else on the same universal terms, Islam understands this to be a declaration of war.⁴⁴

The basic identity framework in Islam is religious society (*millah*). Indeed, the Islamic world order has historically been composed of Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Sabeian, Hindu, and Buddhist religious communities.⁴⁵ Islam is founded on the repudiation of tribalism and nationalism, for it regards ethnocentrism, whether based on racial, territorial, linguistic, or cultural particularism, as evil and unbecoming of humans created equally by God and endowed by Him with His spirit.⁴⁶ Faruqi argues that ethnic characterization demeans humans, who ought to be identified by thoughts and ideals, or by voluntary deeds and accomplishments, rather than by circumstances of birth and biological or social formation, which are not of the person's own choosing.⁴⁷

Faruqi further argues that Islamic jurisprudence equally recognizes those peoples who opt for non-religious identification, provided they have a legacy of law (even a secular one) by which they wish to order their lives. The only group which may be barred from membership of the world order is that group whose law is anti-world order and anti-peace.⁴⁸ As such, whatever the religious, ethical, or sociopolitical content of their dominant ideology, their entitlement to join the world order rests on their humanity and will for peace alone. In fact, Islamic jurisprudence enables one to confirm today that any group claiming to be a religious society, on any grounds, is entitled to membership.⁴⁹

Islam and its adherents affirm that human beings are all born free and remain so as long they live. Equally, by virtue of their humanity, people may not be seized, detained, or incarcerated without due legal process. Faruqi further insists that no law can be regarded as legitimate by Islam that empowers a government to seize, detain, or incarcerate any person without legal charge before a court of law.⁵⁰ In addition, in Islam people's movements should not be restricted, and they should be free to settle wherever they choose. An individual choice of profession or work is an inviolable right in God's cosmic order, and so is one's title to one's earthly possessions and one's freedom to move such possessions wherever one desires.⁵¹

Finally, justice, universalism, and egalitarianism are values that Islam and its adherents are committed to. The Islamic law of nations is pluralistic, providing legitimacy and protection to the laws of all human groups. Under it, no minority would be a minority, since it would enjoy as much as legitimacy in the eyes of international law as any larger or majority community.⁵² As in universalism, all humans in Islam are born equal and remain so in the eye of the law, they are entitled to equal opportunities in education, employment, and compensation. Distinction must be made purely on the basis of intelligence, knowledge, work, productivity,

excellence, virtue, or righteousness. Faruqi insists that Islam regards any kind of apartheid built on race or biology, language or culture, geography or age, as an offense against humanity and its Creator, and treats it as a punishable crime.⁵³

The role of Muslim countries in promoting Islamic values in international relations: the case of AKP-governed Turkey

Four basic national interests dominate the nation-state system: security and stability; economic development; ideological formation; and the temptation of hegemony. Muslim countries are not exceptional, they are competing among themselves as well as with non-Muslim countries. However, since the postcolonial era no Muslim country has achieved the third, ideological formation. Few Muslim countries have achieved economic development and many are still striving for national security and stability. Those who have achieved national security and stability are very much dependent on, formerly colonial, developed countries and have not been freed from the latter's intervention in their internal domestic affairs. As a result, the world order that emerged post-Cold war has not benefited Muslim countries.

Undoubtedly, western-driven globalization has produced a favorable context for the interaction of liberal democracy and capitalism, but there has not been the opportunity or ability to create similar conditions for the proliferation of Islamic international values. However, Islamic ideas of international relations have to deal with the existing reality. Muslims should be able to champion the cause of a world of nation-states, comprising Muslim and non-Muslim nations coexisting and cooperating on various levels for the benefits of both and the world at large. Muslim countries within the OIC must perform a truly Islamic role and should not allow nationalistic tendencies to ruin the unity of the *ummah* or jeopardize its interests. As such, foreign policy approaches among Muslim country leaders can be accommodated so long as they do not collide with the overall objective of the organization. The organization should apply the spirit of Islamic unity in managing crises within Muslim countries and should attempt to fuel the convergence of Islamic interests.

For Muslim countries to introduce Islamic norms in international relations, Muslim elites should lead their respective countries, with Islamic movement leaders governing their countries using Islamic norms and values in both domestic and external affairs. In this case, it is worth at our endeavor to introduce an Islamic theory of international relations;

as stated by Hassan Turabi, "if all Islamic movements become Islamic state, the balance will change."⁵⁴ In other words, if Muslim countries are currently imbued with their elite's approaches to foreign policy, and their societies are still mired in ethnic struggle and civil war, it will be very hard to introduce the Islamic theory of international relations to the world.

Within the globalization process, Muslim countries should make the effort to ensure that they are beneficiaries of the present. By involving ummatic ideas, Muslim countries have not only been expressing nostalgia for past Islamic achievement, but also trying to create a future based on Islamic considerations. It is expected that increased globalization will create greater harmonization of differences among Muslim nations, especially when they are exposed to the universality (universal principles) of Islam.

Given the fact that Muslim countries have been under the domination of other developed Western countries, it is very difficult to show an example of a Muslim country which has based its foreign relations on Islamic norms and values. According to my reading, Turkey under the AKP is a reasonably good case study, particularly because of a continuity with Ottoman identity and history.

The present foreign policy of Turkey under the Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), is a case in point. Since AKP rule started in 2002, Turkey has projected its sense of identity and history into its regional and global engagements, seeking to pursue a value-based and principled foreign policy, and responding to the hard realities of power struggles and national interests.⁵⁵ As a result, AKP governments since 2002 have implemented a number of policies, including developing stronger bilateral relations, lifting visa requirements, establishing high level strategic councils, and increasing Turkey's mediation efforts. Though the AKP does not directly mention Islamic values in its foreign policy, Islam has substantively been inserted into its values and principles in this matter.

The new sense of history and geography as a strategic asset has been most clearly articulated by Ahmet Davutoglu, current Prime Minister of Turkey, who served first as chief foreign policy advisor to Erdogan and then, between 2009 and 2014, as Turkey's foreign minister. In his book *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position), Davutoglu argues that the strategic depth of a nation in the complex web of international relations depends on its ability to use its geostrategic location on the one hand and its historical and cultural legacy on the other. Turkey is centrally situated

across the geopolitical and civilizational fault lines that unite the Euro-Asian landmass with the Middle East and North Africa.⁵⁶

Davutoglu's redefinition of Turkey's geostrategic position is reinforced by its historical and cultural ties to the countries and nations in its neighborhood. Turkey's history and geography, both of which were seen by the republican elites in the 1930s and 1940s as a burden and impediment to development, modernization, and national unity, are gradually being reinterpreted by the new elite and rising social classes as strategic assets. Furthermore, this new strategic thinking is also the result of a shift from the nation-state as the primary unit of international relations to a new civilizational outlook—an outlook that projects a cultural, historical, and normative dimension into international relations. A practical application of this outlook is the UN's alliance of civilizations initiative, co-chaired by the prime ministers of Turkey and Spain under the UN secretary-general. As part of the alliance of civilizations project, Gul, Erdogan, and other Turkish leaders have called for mutual respect and dialogue between Muslim and Western governments and societies.⁵⁷

The new context for the justification for global politics and the new outlook of Turkish foreign policy have propelled Turkey into the heart of regional politics in the Middle East and the Balkans, and opened up new possibilities for Turkey in international relations. For instance, the numerous mediation efforts by Turkey – which include the Afghanistan–Pakistan–Turkey trilateral summits, Syrian–Israeli negotiations, Bosnian–Serbian reconciliation, political groups in Iraq and Lebanon, and the Tehran declaration signed with Iran and Brazil – have all not only tested Turkey's diplomatic abilities but also exposed the volatile nature of regional and global politics in the 21st century.⁵⁸

In addition, national interest as the primary referent of international politics is not a static concept, as its definition is socially and politically constructed and displays a dynamic nature. With the rise of multilateral institutions, international law, and various regional and international alliances and initiatives, even the traditional realist definitions of national interest have been expanded to include value-based considerations. It is against this background that a number of new principles have been enacted and pursued in recent Turkish foreign policy initiatives. Ibrahim Kalin has argued that Turkey's foreign policy has been based on three main principles as tools to strengthening bilateral relations: political and economic justice; the balance between security and freedom; and finally, trade and economic development.⁵⁹

First, Turkish leaders have repeatedly emphasized that the global order has to be based on principles of justice and equality as a precondition

to finding sustainable long-term solutions to current conflicts, and other chronic problems the world is facing.⁶⁰ The principle of justice has been defended as a key component of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. It has also been raised in the context of reforming such international bodies as the UN. For instance, when Turkey defended the Palestinian cause and demanded the end of the Israeli occupation, it framed it as the responsibility of the international community to deliver political justice to a people under occupation.⁶¹

At the UN's least developed countries summit, which Turkey hosted in Istanbul in 2011, Turkish leaders raised the issue of economic injustice and called upon the rich nations of the world to help poor countries in Africa and Asia. They have also supported Arab revolutions as a matter of political and economic justice, and defended the equal representation of different constituencies in Arab and Muslim countries. Overall, this emphasis on the principle of justice can be interpreted as an outgrowth of an interrelated trend in the making, the Turkish foreign policy elite's desire to strike a balance between ethical values and political necessities. As Erdogan put it, Turkey "[acts] with a sense of 'real politik' as well as 'ideal politik' in that [it strives] to uphold the principles of justice, equality, and peace as the backbone of national and global politics."⁶²

The second principle of Turkish foreign policy is to maintain a balance between security and freedom, and also pertains to domestic policy. It is based on the understanding that security without freedom leads to authoritarianism, and freedom without security invites chaos and instability. Domestically, the securitization of social and political problems has limited Turkey's ability to protect and deepen democracy and political freedoms during much of the republican period. A fully functioning democracy has been delayed and periodically put on hold in the name of protecting national security. The military coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, as well as the infamous February 28th process, have created a culture of fear and military tutelage and shaped Turkey's relations with its neighbors.

Ibrahim Kalin argues that the transformation of the Turkish domestic political scene has had strong ramifications for the country's foreign policy practices.⁶³ The emerging notion of maintaining a balance between security and freedom has altered Turkey's security culture, especially transforming the way Turkey perceives its neighbors. While the state establishment has adhered to the old definitions of the Cold War and considered a host of national political actors and regional countries to be a threat to Turkey's national security, the emerging security culture

has created new possibilities for engaging with old foes. On a domestic level, social and political issues (such as the Kurdish question, the Alexis, religious minorities, and the freedom of religion) are no longer seen as matters of national security. Regionally, countries such as Russia, Syria, Iran, Greece, and Armenia are no longer on the "list" of Turkey's enemies. On the contrary, they are seen as neighbors and partners in establishing a more stable regime at home that upholds fundamental freedoms.⁶⁴

The third principle that underlies Turkey's current foreign policy is the development and strengthening of political relations through trade and investment. As the 17th-largest economy in the world and the sixth largest in Europe, Turkey has gained a credible place among the big economies. With the exception of Russia, it is the largest economic powerhouse in its land and sea neighborhood. Turkey's economic interests have expanded into several continents and propelled policymakers to work closely with the business community. Some analysts have described this new attitude as that of the "trading state."⁶⁵ It was with such a consideration in mind that, over the last decade, Turkey consistently sought to develop closer economic relations with other rising powers in Asia and Latin America, partly in an effort to adjust to the shift of world economic power to nonwestern regions.⁶⁶

Another reflection of this principle is seen in repeated calls from Turkish leaders to pursue cooperative schemes to reach full economic integration with Turkey's neighbors through free trade zones or the lifting of visa requirements. This quest is an expansion of what Ibrahim Kalin calls the policy of "mutual empowerment," i.e., the attempt to create a win-win situation for all parties involved, especially in the economic field. This policy has paid many dividends for Turkey and its trading partners in the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and Central Asia. A concrete outcome is that while Turkey continues to conduct over 45 percent of its foreign trade with Europe, it has also increased its trade volume with its neighbors, and in particular with Russia, Iran, and Iraq.⁶⁷ Drawing on these new economic openings, Turkey has achieved an impressive growth rate in recent years despite the global financial crisis. Additionally, Turkey had visa waiver agreements with more than 70 countries at the end of 2011, reflecting the importance it attaches to removing barriers to the free flow of people and goods.⁶⁸

Conclusion

Islamic norms in international relations can provide a peaceful and just world order. If Muslim nations and the OIC serve as a countervailing

force in international politics, allowing for a balance of power situation to operate, then Islamic norms such as peace, justice, and equality in international relations will prevail. When Islam is able to function optimally, Muslim nations should be able to display all the characteristics that would make for "a model community."⁶⁹ As such, Muslim policy-makers have to prepare the climate of thought and cultural parameters necessary for the transformation of the present international order into a better world order based on Islamic values and principles.

Notes

1. See for example, Esposito, John L. (1984), *Islam and Politics*, (New York: Syracuse University Press); Ferdinand, Klaus and Mozaffari, Mehdi (1988) *Islam: State and Society*, (eds.), (London: Curzon Press, 1988); Salvatore, Armando (1997), *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity*, (UK: Ithaca Press); Al-Azmeh, Aziz (1993), *Islams and Modernities*, (London and New York, Verso Press); Moten, Abdul Rashid (1996), *Political Science; An Islamic Perspective*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd); Sjadzali, Munawir (1993), *Islam dan Tata Negara*, fifth edition, (Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas Indonesia).
2. For further elaboration on Islamic worldview, see for example, Al-Attas, S M. Naguib (2001), *Prolegomena To The Metaphysics of Islam*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC)); Al-Fafuqi, Isma'il Raji (1982), *Al-Tawheed: Its Implications for Thought and Life*, (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)); Al-Qaradawy, Yusuf (1995), *Introduction to Islam*, Translated by Muhammad Higab, (Egypt: Islamic Inc.); Islahi, Sadruddin (1998), *Islam at Glance*, translated by M. Zafar Iqbal, (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust).
3. There are classic books on Islamic international relations which are in Arabic and generally deploy the normative theory by emphasizing some values derived from the sources of Islam (Qur'an and *sunnah*), see, for example, *Shaybani's Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir* from the 8th century and *Ibnu Hisham' al-Sirah al-Nabawiyah*. For books in English, see Al-Shaybani, Muhammad (1965), *The Islamic Law of Nations*, translated by Khadduri, (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press); Khadduri, Majid (1965), "The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Relevance", in J. Haris Proctor (ed.), *Islam and International Relations*, (London: Frederick A. Praeger), pp. 24-39; AbuSulayman, A A (1994), *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations*, (Herndon, Virginia: IIIT).
4. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), "Islam as an Ethical Tradition of International Relations," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 186.
5. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), p. 186.
6. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), p. 186; see also Al-Ghunaimi, M. T. (1968), *The Muslim Conception of international Law and the western Approach*, (The Hague: Matyinus Nijhoff).
7. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), p. 186.
8. AbuSulayman, A. A. (1994), p. 19.
9. AbuSulayman, A. A. (1994), p. 19.

10. As is argued by Buzan and Alexander Wendt. For further reading on anarchy see Buzan, B., Jones, C. & Little R. (1993), *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structuralism*, (New York: Columbia University Press); Wendt, Alexander (1992), "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46 (spring). pp. 391–425.
11. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), p. 186.
12. I agree with Khan's proposition that *dar al-Islam* may be translated as *Pax Islamica* because both terms refer to Islam as a basis for any constitution and policy orientation.
13. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), p. 187.
14. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), p. 187.
15. Khan, Mohammed A. Muqtedar (1997), p. 187.
16. Khan, Mohammed A Muqtedar (1997), p. 187.
17. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXI.
18. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXI.
19. For further reading on the realist school see, for example, Morgenthau, Hans (1973), *Politics Among Nations*, 5th eds., (New York: Knopf).
20. Morgenthau, Hans (1973), p. 5–14.
21. Waltz, Kenneth (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading Mass: Addison Wesley).
22. Waltz, Kenneth (1979), pp. 79–101.
23. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXII.
24. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXIV.
25. Moten, Abdul Rashid (1996), p. 63.
26. Moten, Abdul Rashid (1996), p. 66–68.
27. Choudhury, Golam W. (1994) *Islam and The Modern Muslim World*, (Kuala Lumpur: WHS Publications Sdn. Bhd.), p. 172. For the different uses of the term ummah in the Qur'an, see AbuSulayman, A. A. (1994).
28. It has been cited in Al-Ahsan, Abdullah (1950), *OIC: The organization of the Islamic Conference*, (Handen USA), p. 2, and it is quoted by Choudhury, Golam W. (1994), p. 172.
29. Choudhury, Golam W. (1994), p. 172.
30. Choudhury, Golam W. (1994), p. 172.
31. Qur'an, Chapter 49:13. for a translation, see Ali, Abdullah Yusuf (n.d), *The Meaning of the Glorious Quran*, (Cairo).
32. Mutalib, Hussin (1990), "Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN Countries", in *Asian Survey*, vol. XXX, no. 9, p. 878.
33. Mutalib, Hussin (1990), p. 878.
34. Al-Afghani was born in 1839 in Afghanistan and died in 1897; along with his colleagues, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), Afghani contributed greatly to the intellectual foundation of Pan-Islamism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They basically played a fundamental role in the formulating of an Islamic response to the twin problems of domestic development and Westernization. For further reading, see Choudhury, Golam w. (1994), pp. 84–88, 176.
35. Choudhury, Golam w. (1994), p. 178.
36. Maududi's thought and theology has been embodied in the movement which he established and led in Pakistan known as the Jama'at-I Islami (the Islamic party). This party was established by him self and a number of

- young ulama and Muslim activists in August 1941. See Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza (1994), "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-I Islami: the Origin, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism", in Ali Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.), pp. 98–124. For further reading on the influences of Maududi's thought on Islamic movements see Esposito, John L. (19192), *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, (New York: Oxford University Press); Sivan, Emmanuel (1995), *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, (New Haven: Yale University Press).
37. For further reading on Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, see Trip, Charles (1994), "Sayyid Qutb: the Political Vision", in Ali Rahnema (ed.), pp. 154–183; Qutb, Sayyid (1988), *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*, (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruuq); Qutd, Sayyid (1980), *Al-Adalah al-Ijtima'iyyah fi al- Islam*, (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruuq). For further reading on Islam in Turkey see, for example, Othman, Mohammad Redzuan and Sulaiman, Mashitah (2005), *Islam dan Politik di Turki*, (Kuala Lumpur: Tradisi Ilmu Sdn Bhd.), pp. 12–59.
 38. See Choudhury, Golam W. (1994), pp. 189–213.
 39. Bakar, Mohammad Abu (2004), *Without Locke or Lenin; the Impact of Resurgence of Islam on International Politics*, Inaugural Lecture, (Kuala Lumpur: UM Press), pp. 29–33.
 40. Dawisha, Adeed, ed.(1983), *Islam in Foreign Policy*, (London: Royal Institute of International affairs), p. 4.
 41. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXII.
 42. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXII.
 43. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXII.
 44. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXVIII.
 45. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXVIII.
 46. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXVIII.
 47. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXVIII.
 48. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXVIII.
 49. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXVIII.
 50. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XXXIX.
 51. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XL.
 52. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XLI.
 53. Al-Faruqi, Ismail Raji (1994), p. XL.
 54. Turabi, Hasan (1993), *Islam, Democracy, the State and the West*, (Florida: World & Islamic Studies Enterprise), p. 79.
 55. Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), "Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, Value and Mechanisms," in *International Journal*, Vol. 67. No. 1(Winter), pp.7–21.
 56. Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), pp. 7–21.
 57. Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), p. 12.
 58. Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), p. 14.
 59. Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), p. 14.
 60. As was emphasized by Erdogan in his speech, "The alliance of civilizations and world peace," as cited by Kalin. Ibrahim (2011), pp. 7–21.
 61. Kalin. Ibrahim (2011), pp. 7–21.
 62. Kalin. Ibrahim (2011), p. 15.
 63. Kalin. Ibrahim (2011), p. 16.
 64. Kalin. Ibrahim (2011), p. 16.

65. Kirisci, Kemal (2009), "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign policy: The rise of the trading State," in *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40 (Spring), pp. 29–57. It was also cited by Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), p. 16.
66. Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), p. 16.
67. For further reading on Turkey's trade pattern, see Onis, Ziya (2011), "Multiple Faces of the 'new Turkish foreign policy: underlying dynamic and critique," in *Insight Turkey* 13, No. 1 (winter), pp. 47–65.
68. Kalin, Ibrahim (2011), p. 17.
69. Al-Qur'an, chapter 3:110.

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3

Oppressors and Oppressed Reconsidered: A Shi'itologic Perspective on the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah's Outlook on International Relations

Raffaele Mauriello and Seyed Mohammad Marandi

Introduction

Article 3 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) declares that the government has the duty to direct all its resources to a series of listed goals. The last of which is

the formulation of the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, brotherly commitment to all Muslims, and the unstinting support of all oppressed and deprived [*mustad'afan*] people throughout the world.¹ (square brackets added.)

Moreover, Article 154 of the Constitution, which is part of the four articles of Chapter X of the text (on foreign policy), reads:

The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human happiness throughout human society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and just government to be the right of all peoples in the world. While scrupulously refraining from all forms of aggressive intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, it therefore protects the just struggles of the oppressed and deprived [*mustad'afin*] against their oppressors [*mustakbirin*] in every corner of the globe. (square brackets added.)

A very similar perspective is to be found in the Open Letter circulated by the Party of God (Hezbollah) in 1985. This is, in reality, a proper manifesto, the heading of which reads:

The text of Hizbullah's Open Letter addressed to the oppressed [*mustad'afin*] in Lebanon and the World, 16 February 1985.² (square brackets added.)

The issue of the struggle between oppressed and oppressors is found in numerous passages of the text, we counted 31 occurrences. The following is in the very first sentence of the dedication at the beginning of the Open Letter:

To the torch that has increased in light and brightness, so that it lit the path to a free dignified life for the oppressed [*mustad'afin*] in Lebanon, and burned with its pure glittering blood (jihad and martyrdom) the power of the Zionist Entity (Israel) and its myth. (square brackets added)

The letter has what can be described as 23 small sections and the issue debated here is mentioned in the headings of sections 2, 14, and 21, titled respectively: "The 'Oppressors' [*al-'Alam al-Mustakbir*] are in concordance about fighting us," (with the word *mustakbir* used to identify the oppressors, as in the Iranian Constitution); "Our story with the world oppressors [*al-Istikbar al-'Alami*]," and the "International front for the oppressed [*Jibha 'Alamiyya li-l-Mustad'afin*]." We find further mention at the beginning of sections 13 and 14, which address "You noble oppressed [*Ayyuha al- Mustad'afin*]." There are several parts of the Open Letter that are relevant to international relations, in particular sections 8, 21, and 24. Section 8 deals with "Our Friends," and begins with the statement that:

So... These are our goals in Lebanon; those are our foes. Regarding our friends, they are all the world's oppressed [*al-shu'ub al-mustad'afa*]; anyone who fights our enemies and is careful not to offend us... whoever they might be; individuals, political parties, or organizations... we address them and say: (square brackets added)

As already mentioned, section 21 concerns an "International front for the oppressed." It states that:

We exhort all the oppressed in the world [*jami' al-mustad'afin*] to the necessity of forming an international front comprised of all their

liberation movements in order to fully coordinate their efforts so that an efficient action will transpire, thus concentrating on the weaknesses of the enemies ... So if the colonizing countries and regimes have shown a consensus on fighting the oppressed [*harb 'ala al-mustad'afin*] so the oppressed [*'ala al-mustad'afin*] must bond together in order to face the conceit of the world oppressors [*quwwa al-istikbar fi 'l-'alam*]. All the oppressed populace [*kaffa al-shu'ub al-mustad'afa*], especially the Arab and Islamic ones, should understand that only Islam is capable of becoming the intellectual foundation or thinking that [it] is capable of resisting and confronting the aggression because all man-made ideologies have been disbanded forever. (square brackets added)

Section 24, the last section of the Open Letter, declaredly regards international organizations and is worth quoting at length:

Finally, there is a need for a few words concerning international organizations such as the UN, the Security Council and others... We note that these organizations do not constitute a podium for the oppressed nations [*al-umam al-mustad'afa*], and in general, they remain ineffective and inefficient due to the procedural hegemony and domination of the world oppressors [*duwwal al-istikbar al-'alami*] over its decisions... From this perspective, we do not predict these organizations to issue anything serving the interests of the oppressed [*al-mustad'afin*]. We call on all the countries who have self-respect to adopt a resolution banning the right to veto, which is accorded to the oppressor countries [*duwwal al-istikbar*]... You free oppressed [*ayyuha al-mustad'afun al-ahrar*]... These are our visions and goals, and these are the basic regulations that guide our path... We patiently await till God has judged us, and the oppressors (*al-qawm al-zalimin*) [in this case, the word *zalimin* is used to identify the oppressors]. (square brackets added)

Since its very inception the *mustad'afun* (oppressed)/*mustakbirun* (oppressors) dichotomy has been the main constituent point of Hezbollah's political ideology and its political and social outlook. It is thus an essential element in properly understanding its world outlook (Alagha, 2006, pp. 115–119 and 141–142).

If we try to locate the relevant articles of the Iranian constitution and the relevant passages of Hezbollah's Open Letter referring to international relations within the presumed classical Islamic law of nations, or Islamic paradigm of international relations as described by accounts in

academia, we come up against an evident vacuum. Indeed, as demonstrated by the highly acclaimed work carried about by Prof. Majid Khadduri in the 1960s – and more specifically in his two major books on this subject, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* and *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* –, scholars of international relations have assumed as a given fact that the world view of Islamic IR is exclusively represented, and has been historically based, on the dichotomy of *dar al-Islam* (the realm or abode of Islam) versus *dar al-harb* (the realm or abode of war).

Upgrading IR as regards Islamic civilization: on methodology

The following pages offer an Islamic Studies (IS) perspective on how and where to locate the international relations outlook put forward by the relevant articles of the Iranian Constitution and passages from the Open Letter by Hezbollah. They argue for the need to advance interdisciplinary research between International Relations and Islamic Studies to integrate the methodology and findings of Shi'itology, the branch of IS that specializes in Shi'i Islam (Scarcia Amoretti 2010), into both IR and International Relations Theory (IRT).

On a theoretical level, scholars of IR have assumed as an established fact that the world view of Islamic international relations is historically based on the dichotomy *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* (Sheykh, 2003, pp. 21–22, and Griffiths et al., 2008, p. 179). This, we will argue, is more properly a Sunni Hafani perspective (Calasso, 2010).

Therefore, one should not be surprised to find this dichotomy as an essential element of the Islamic politico-legal world order in the work of current Turkish prime minister (and former foreign minister) Ahmet Davutoglu³ *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory* (1994, pp. 165–202). More surprising – and highly unjustified, as we argue in this chapter – is the fact that we also find it in works by scholars who have been arguing for the seriousness of the *wilayat al-faqih* theory, as exemplified by Amr G E Sabet's *Islam and the Political: Theory, Governance and International Relations* (2008, 125–151 and 76–79). Sabet, on the basis of a re-elaborated theory of Khaldunian *assabiyya*, argues forcibly for the necessity to coalesce around the Islamic Republic of Iran as a possible savior of Islam in the contemporary world order.

As we argue in this chapter, the role of the *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* model in a Shi'i world view appears to have been historically limited, and is

almost irrelevant in contemporary times. IR scholars' lack of knowledge of the specificities of Shi'i Islam has hindered their ability to properly appreciate and locate modern Islamic IR theory (IRT) as represented by the *mustad'afun* (oppressed)/*mustakbirun* (oppressors) model. Moreover, the few that have ventured to mention this view as a possible alternative Islamic IRT paradigm have largely ascribed it solely to Ayatollah Khomeini (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p. 181), and to a minor extent to Ali Shariati. In fact, the genesis of this model can be traced to a wide and sustained theoretical effort by a number of eminent Shi'i religious scholars (*ulama*) and thinkers during the 1960s and 1970s, such as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and Musa al-Sadr.

The *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* world view differs greatly from the classical Islamic (Sunni Hanafi) dichotomy of *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* (Scarcia Amoretti, 2013). Among the many peculiarities of the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* model lies the fact that, unlike the *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* model (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p. 174), the former does not contain major contradictions with the nation-state system established in the Muslim world as a result of both modernization and colonization (and then decolonization). This has been a major concern of the current debate on the relevance of the supposedly classical Islamic theory of IR to the Westphalian world order (AbuSulayman, 1993). Moreover, as it is based on an ethical approach to politics, the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* paradigm appears to be more appropriate for addressing current issues of globalization and the tendency to look for the creation and expansion of supranational political (inclusive) institutions (Griffiths et al., 2008, p. 214); i.e., a post-Westphalian world order. Finally, as it is anchored in sound Qur'anic language and Islamic epistemology (and ontology), this model has a distinctive Islamic legitimacy and authority.

Khadduri's Siyar: Hanafi or Islamic, option or Weltanschauung?

In the introduction to the translation of Shaybani's *Siyar* (1966, pp. 6–7), Khadduri writes that:

[T]he Islamic law of nations was binding on territorial groups as well as individuals. Like all ancient law, the law of Islam was inherently personal rather than territorial...It is true that only a single school of law, the Hanafi, stressed the territorial character of the law, while others, like the Shafi'i school, stressed the personal; but all accepted territorial limitations in varying degree.

The point here is twofold: firstly, among the four surviving schools of the Sunni tradition only one (the Hanafi) included the territoriality of law in its principles; secondly, the Shi'i Imami school of law was not based on this principle either. Therefore, the claim that "all accepted territorial limitations in varying degree" does not represent a sound balance since all but one of the Islamic law schools followed the personal (and not the territorial) principle of law. This element should have been taken into account when uncritically accepting *Siyar* (Islamic law of nations) as based on a clearly territorial dichotomy such as *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb*.

As indicated by the early research carried out by Vanna Calasso (2011, pp. 271–296), the expressions *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* are not present in Bukhari's *Sahih*, arguably the most important collection of *hadiths* (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). Neither is *dar al-Islam* found in a major classical work on geography, such as Ibn Hawqal's *Kitab al-Masalik wa-l-Mamalik* (circa 988, 10th century). In this work, we only find the phrase *dar al-harb*, and it is not even used with the legal meaning given to it by the Hanafi tradition (Calasso, 2011, pp. 288 and 295). In addition to the works cited above, the renowned classical travelogue *Kitab ila Mulk al-Saqaliba* (10th century) by Ibn Fadlan makes no mention of them. Nor do we find any definition of *dar al-Islam* in essential lexicons of the Arabic language, such as *Lisan al-'Arab* (13th century) and *Taj al-'Arus* (18th century), in which we only find *dar al-harb*, defined as "the country of the polytheists who do not have a pact with the Muslims" (*wa dar al-harb bilad al-mushrikin alladhina la sulh baynahum wa bayna 'l-muslimin*). Finally, as mentioned by Khadduri himself in his works on the Islamic law of nations, these two phrases are completely absent from the Qur'an.

The fact that we do not even encounter the expressions *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* in such an important and essential range of works in 7th to 18th century Islamic civilization suggests that probably the very idea or notion that those expressions convey may have been absent from the overall intellectual and cultural horizon of the times and people who produced those fundamental works (Calasso, 2011). This is not to deny that in some circles and among certain law experts the idea of the world's political order was not linked in some – and sometimes important – ways to the notion of two opposed, or at least intrinsically different, abodes. Indeed, this is clearly the case with works, or parts of works, dedicated to jihad in its acceptance of Sharia-sanctioned war. However, in these very same works the concepts of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* are neither posited nor elaborated as main or core concepts, but are treated more like ancillary elements to the actual discussion to

follow (Calasso, 2011, p. 272). Therefore, as we argue in this chapter, we do not face what, according to Khadduri and Davutoglu, is an essential and defining element of the Islamic *Weltanschauung* as regards the world order. Consequently, there is considerable room for alternative thinking and Islamic paradigms.

Oppressors and oppressed in the Qur'an

In addition to the absence of the expressions *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* in classical Muslim thought as represented by the geographers, lexicographers, and travellers taken as random samples and analyzed in accordance with Islamic Studies criteria, what is more important is that these two expressions are absent from both the Qur'an and the *hadiths* (Calasso 2010). On the other hand, *mustad'afin* and *mustakbirun* are both Qur'anic terms. *Mustad'afin* in the Qur'an means: "those who are considered weak [enough to be persecuted], the oppressed" (Badawi and Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 553). We find this term in several verses of the Qur'an, notably 4: 75, 97–8, 127 and 8: 26:⁴

Why should you not fight in God's cause and for those oppressed [*mustad'afin*] men, women, and children who cry out, "Lord, rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors [*zalim*]! By Your grace, give us a protector and give us a helper!" (Qur'an 4: 75, square brackets added)

When the angels take the souls of those who have wronged [*zalim*] themselves, they ask them, "What circumstances were you in?" They reply, "We were oppressed [*mustad'afin*] in this land," and the angels say, "But was God's earth not spacious enough for you to migrate to some other place?" These people will have Hell as their refuge, an evil destination, but not the truly helpless [*mustad'afin*] men, women, and children who have no means in their power nor any way to leave. (Qur'an 4: 97–98, square brackets added)

Remember when you were few, victimized [*mustad'afin*] in the land, afraid that people might catch you, but God sheltered you and strengthened you with His help, and provided you with good things so that you might be grateful. (Qur'an 8: 26, square brackets added)

As pointed out by Lewis (1988, p. 124), in contemporary Islam verse 4: 75, mentioned above, has become a reference for Muslim revolutionaries. This is also true in the case of the Lebanese Hezbollah. The verse became part of the movement's ideology and its rationale for

conducting defensive jihad (Alagha, 2006, p. 85).⁵ More generally, the term *mustad'af* has been used in Muslim political language from medieval times up to contemporary revolutionary movements with the meaning of deprived or oppressed (Lewis, 1988, p. 15). In linguistic terms, it is a participial form derived from the Arabic word *da'if*, which has as its primary meaning physically weak and has been used in Islamic history to denote those who are socially weak or in a socially inferior position (Lewis, 1988, p. 15). In mainstream Qur'anic exegesis, verse 4: 75 refers to the situation of the early Muslim community in pagan Mecca. In a translation by Lewis it reads (1988, p. 124):

And why should you not fight in the cause of God, and of those men, women and children who are downtrodden [*mustad'af*], and who cry out: Our Lord, take us out of this city whose people are oppressors [*zalim*], and appoint for us a protector [*wali*] and a helper [*nasir*] from you. (brackets added)

Mustakbirun is the plural of an active participle, and in the Qur'an means one who is puffed up with pride (Badawi and Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 793). As an example of its meaning in the Qur'an, the *Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur'anic Usage* (Badawi and Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 793) reports a passage from verse 31: 7, "*Wa ida tutlâ 'alayhi 'ayatuna wallâ mustakbiran* = and when Our verses are recited to him, he turns away disdainfully." Abdel Haleem translates the verse as follows:

When Our verses are recited to him, he turns away disdainfully [*mustakbiran*] as if he had not heard them, as if there were heaviness in his ears. Tell him that there will be a painful torment. (square brackets added)

Islamic Revolution in Iran and its political language

In order to understand the politics of Islam, Lewis (1988, p. 5) consistently describes and analyzes how one must first fully understand the language of political discourse among Muslims, the ways in which words are used and understood, and the metaphors and allusions that are part of the cultural universe of this civilization. He also pointed out that, in fact, as regards the contemporary Near and Middle East, this understanding is complicated by the changes brought about by the impact of Western power and thought (and its quest for hegemony) on Muslim societies. The issue of acculturation, understood as the negative

side of this asymmetrical power encounter, is a key element of analysis in the European academic tradition of IS (Bausani and Scarcia Amoretti eds., 1981) and of Shi'itology (Scarcia Amoretti, 2010). This issue must be examined within the framework of the imitation/reaction that came about as a result of encounters between Muslim countries and the West (Tadjbakhsh, 2010). These resulted in a recreation/reconciliation response consisting of both the unconscious integration of Western elements into the Islamic *Weltanschauung* (i.e., acculturation) and in the Islamization of Western elements (i.e., hybridization). This chapter argues that an example of the second, more creative case (hybridization) is represented by the *mustakbirun/mustad'afun* IRT model. This offers an alternative Islamic way to conceptualize the world, both new but at the same time well integrated into Islamic epistemology and the Islamic tradition of justice, particularly relevant in Shi'i thought.

Khomeini formulated a new Islamic interpretation of state and society (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 17). He re-elaborated numerous Islamic concepts, borrowing words, slogans, and ideas from the non-Muslim world. As was the case with Islamic reformist movements of the last century, he claimed to have undertaken a return to the native roots of Islam, the eradication of cosmopolitan ideas and the charting of a non-capitalist, non-communist third way towards development. However, many of the slogans and key concepts Ayatollah Khomeini put forward were the result of a marked process of hybridization between historical and modern elements, both Islamic and European.

As pointed out again by Lewis (1988, p. 1), revolutions are characterized by the fact that they express themselves differently and hence each formulates its own critique of the past and aspirations for the future. In the case of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, this issue has been addressed in particular by Ervand Abrahamian (*Khomeinism*, 1993). As we argue in this chapter, the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* dyad has been of paramount importance when dealing with the foreign policy and general international relations outlook of the IRI and of Hezbollah.

Shi'ism, geography, territory, and justice: "In Islam there are no frontiers"

As is the case with Sunni Islam, Shi'i Islam recognizes the existence of a distinct non-territorial *ummah*. In this respect, Ayatollah Khomeini habitually proclaimed that: "In Islam there are no frontiers." (quoted in Sheikh, 2003, p. 62) As already mentioned, the Islamic world view in terms of IRT is usually associated with the dichotomy *dar al-harb* (the

realm or abode of war) versus *dar al-Islam* (the realm or abode of Islam). Scholars of IRT have described the basis for this association within classical Islamic sources, and its link to the concept of jihad (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, pp. 177–8; and Khadduri, 1955). As already stated, however, this essay argues that from a Shi'itologic perspective the association between Islamic IRT and *dar al-harb/dar al-Islam* is largely erroneous, or at least grossly misleading.

From a historical perspective, Shi'i Islam developed as a series of local communities within the larger Sunni-dominated Muslim world. Therefore it was not concerned with a *dar al-Islam* versus *dar al-harb* dynamic and its legal implications. Indeed, it elaborated a peculiar term to indicate Shi'i communities not settled in a precise and delimited territory, *dar al-iman* (the realm or abode of faith) (Scarcia Amoretti, 2013). The consequences of this and other peculiarities of Shi'i Islam are evident, for example, when dealing with the rules concerning jihad, a very relevant issue in contemporary world politics. Throughout most of Shi'i history, jihad, when understood as holy war, has been considered legally permitted only in the case of a defensive war; especially given the absence of the twelfth Imam, the only one entitled to declare an offensive (or expansionist) jihad (Cole, 2002 pp. 161 and 171 and Peter 2005, p. 4).

In the course of history, Shi'i Islam elaborated a perception of geography more properly linked to scattered and loosely connected sacred places, in particular represented by the tombs of the Imams and of members of the family of the Prophet (*Ahl al-Bayt*), than to a territorial view (i.e., clearly delimited on the ground) in the strict sense. The Shi'i world view has, moreover, been historically connected to the single believer, or better, the single small community of believers' personal relations to the system of religious scholars that developed over the centuries (Scarcia Amoretti, 2013). A geography more human than territorial. This was partly modified by the establishment of the Safavid Shi'i dynasty in Iran (1501–1736). But again, Safavid Iran largely had as its adversaries the Muslim (Sunni) Ottoman Empire (1281–1923) on one side and the (Sunni) Moghul Empire (1526–1707) and (Sunni) Uzbek Empire on the other, and hence still operated outside a *dar al-harb/dar al-Islam* perspective. In this respect, and with reference to contemporary history, it is worth recalling how the IRI fought the only war of its more than 35-year history with another major Muslim – and even largely Shi'i – country, Iraq; once again outside a purely *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* dynamic.

Another major characteristic of Shi'i Islam when compared to Sunni Islam is represented by the absolute importance of justice in Shi'i

political thought (Jafri, 2009). This considers justice as the supreme political virtue (Dabashi, 2006, pp. 190–192). In this respect, scholars have observed how, when representing an oppositional movement, early Shi'i jurists were more interested in substantive questions of justice, corruption and knowledge than in formal categorizations of territory (El Fadl, 1994, p. 148. Quoted in Scarcia Amoretti, 2013). Again with reference to the centrality of justice over territory (and geography) in Shi'i Islam, scholars have documented how Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765), one of the twelve Imams and the one considered to be the founder of the Shi'i school of law, suggested that the believer might be able to serve Islam better in non-Muslim territory (Scarcia Amoretti, 2013).

Khomeini and alternative modern Islamic international relations theories

In the case of the IRI, during its more than 30-year history we have witnessed some sustained effort at theorizing and institutionalizing an Islamic state and its interaction with the international world system. As part of the intellectual Islamic revolutionary process, some leading Iranian academics have attempted to produce IR texts for teaching in Iranian universities that challenge Western paradigms, and in some cases are entirely based on, or use some element of, an Islamic paradigm (Sabet and Safshekan, 2012). Moreover, the Islamic Republic has arguably put forward a consistent foreign policy consciously based on Ayatollah Khomeini's definition of politics as a struggle between *mustakbirun* and *mustad'afun*; suggesting an alternative understanding of Islamic IRT, and one very different from the *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* model.

A few political science scholars have superficially pointed out the existence of the *mustakbirun/mustad'afun* model in terms of Islamic IRT (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p. 177). However, they have failed to trace and understand its roots within the distinctive Shi'i political, social, and geographical history and, moreover, to properly evaluate the extent of its credibility and viability in terms of Islamic law and political culture, or in terms of ontology and epistemology. In this respect, they have not addressed its level of acculturation and/or hybridization; a key element in the proper evaluation of its theoretical consistency and/or of the full influence of Western *Weltanschauung* and political thought (Euben, 2002, p. 40). Islamic Studies as a long established and consistent field of research provides the tools for such an analysis to be undertaken.

In the 1970s, Ayatollah Khomeini began describing society and humanity at large as divided into two antagonistic components:

oppressed (*mustad'afun*) versus oppressors (*mustakbirun*). He spoke more generally of: oppressed nations (*millat-i mustad'af*) versus Satan's government (*hukumat-i shaytan*); slum dwellers (*zaghih-nishin-ha*) versus palace dwellers (*kakh-nishinha*); poor (*fuqara*) versus rich (*sirvatmandan*); lower (*tabaqi-yi payin*) and needy classes (*tabaqi-yi mustamdan*) versus the aristocratic class (*tabaqi-yi a'yan*).

He began using the word *mustad'afun* in most of his speeches to depict the poor, the exploited, and the downtrodden (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 27). He also used as synonyms of *mustad'afun* and *mustakbirun* the *zalim* (oppressor) and *mazlum* (oppressed) dyad; with the *mustad'afun* and *mazlumun* also described as the *mahrumun* (deprived). This choice by Khomeini had a clear basis in Islamic textual and intellectual tradition, and all three words (*zalim*, *mazlum*, *mahrum*) are found in the Qur'an. As indicated by the *Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur'anic Usage* (Badawi and Abdel Haleem, 2008, p. 203 and pp. 586–7), *zalim* is used in the Qur'an with the following meanings: one who acts unjustly, one doing wrong, one acting tyrannically; one who lets another down; a transgressor, wrongdoer, one who violates a command; unjust person, tyrant. *Mazlum* is used to refer to one who is treated unjustly. Finally, *mahrum* (pl. *mahrumun*) appears in the Qur'an with the following meanings: one who is deprived, disadvantaged; one who is denied something; desolate, destitute.

An important document that addresses the issue of the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* struggle and which lays down Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation of the Islamic world view is his *Wilayat al-Faqih: al-Hukuma al-Islamiyya*, the famous series of lectures he gave in Najaf (Iraq) in 1970. In this work, Khomeini uses the *mazlum* (oppressed) and *zalim* (oppressors) dyad. Moreover, he refers to two important classical (Shi'i) Islamic sources, a *hadith* and an oration attributed to Imam 'Ali. Here again, it is important to mention a significant difference between Sunnis and Shi'as. While for the former the main source of law is represented by the Qur'an and the *hadiths* (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), in addition to the overall prophetic *sunnah* (the conduct of the Prophet), in the case of the Shi'as the sayings (and *sunnah*) of the twelve Imams are an integral part of the second source of law. In *Wilayat al-Faqih*, we find quite a long section dedicated to the issue of the *zalim/mazlum* (i.e., *mustad'afun/mustakbirun*) dyad where we read that:

Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have also imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors [*zalim*] and oppressed [*mazlum*]. ... It is our duty to save the oppressed

[*mazlum*] and deprived [*mahrūm*]. It is our duty to be a helper to the oppressed [*mazlumin*] and an enemy to the oppressors [*zalimin*]. This is nothing other than the duty that the Commander of the Faithful (upon whom be peace) [Imam 'Ali] entrusted to his two great offspring [i.e., al-Hasan and al-Husayn] in his celebrated testament: "Be an enemy to the oppressor [*li-'l-zalim*] and a helper to the oppressed [*li-'l-mazlum*]." ⁶ (Square brackets added.)

The Commander of the Faithful (upon whom be peace) [Imam 'Ali] says: "I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of the gluttony and plundering of the oppressors [*sitamgaran*], on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed [*mahrūmiyat*], on the other." Here is the full text of the passage we refer to:

I swear by Him Who causes the seed to open and create the souls of all living things were it not for the presence of those who have come to swear allegiance to me, were it not for the obligation of rulership now imposed upon me by the availability of aid and support, and were it not for the pledge that God has taken from the scholars of Islam not to remain silent in the face of the gluttony and plundering of the oppressors [*zalim*], on the one hand, and the harrowing hunger and deprivation of the oppressed [*mazlum*], on the other hand – were it not for all of this, then I would abandon the reins of government and in no way seek it. (square brackets added.)

These two extracts are of particular importance in that they refer to primary sources of the Islamic Shi'i legal and intellectual tradition that are essential to legitimize the modern re-interpretation proposed here by Khomeini. As already mentioned, during the period 1970–1982, Ayatollah Khomeini described society as consisting of two antagonistic classes (*tabaqat*), the oppressed (*mustad'afun*) and the oppressors (*mustakbirin*) (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 47). He declared that, "The Islamic Revolution will do more than liberate us from the oppression and imperialism. It will create a new type of human being." (quoted in Abrahamian, 1993, p. 49) Moreover, he urged his followers to "unite the oppressed of the world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, against their class oppressors and foreign exploiters." (quoted in Abrahamian, 1993, p. 49, emphasis added). This last declaration allows me to briefly recall another important element concerning the issue addressed here, the absolute importance of justice in Shi'i Islam and its value *per se*; that is

as a humanistic value, a value above the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim. What is relevant for this chapter is that we are again outside the understanding of (territorial) space and conflicting abodes distinctive of the *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* model and in tune with the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* world view.

Another key document of the Islamic political doctrine elaborated by Ayatollah Khomeini is represented by his *Political and Divine Testament (Matn-i Kamil-i Vasiyat-nami-yi Siyasi-Ilahi)*. Its prologue hails true Islam as the message of "liberation" and "social justice," and not just for Iranians and Muslims but for all "the oppressed people of the world irrespective of nationality and religion" (quoted in Abrahamian, 1993, p. 36). In the 35-page handwritten text of the *Political and Divine Testament* the term *mustad'afun* recurs 15 times. Furthermore, we find a notable occurrence of the terms *mahrum* (41 times), *mazlum* (34 times) and *mustakbirun* (seven times).

Abrahamian (1993, p. 52) has argued that before 1982 Ayatollah Khomeini used the term *mustad'afun* mainly as an economic category for the deprived masses. However, he goes on to point out that in the period between 1982 and 1989, Khomeini ceased to use this term in that fashion and began to use it as a more encompassing political label for the intellectuals, the religious scholars, the peasants, the workers, and the bazaaris. Moreover, he later started referring to the whole of Iran as the nation of the *mustad'afun (millat-i mustad'afin)* (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 53). An eminent disciple of Khomeini and future president of the Republic, Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, argued that the Qur'an used the term as a general conceptual (*fikri*) category to refer to those fighting oppression, and added that they would inherit the earth (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 52).

The Mustad'afun/Mustakbirun paradigm: Marxist or Shi'i Islamic?

A few scholars have advanced the hypothesis that the most important source in Khomeini's thought in terms of international relations and social world view must be searched for in the Sufi tradition (Mirbagheri 2006). From a political science perspective, it has been argued that Khomeini borrowed language, concepts, and imagery from the Sorbonne-educated Iranian sociologist and revolutionary Ali Shariati and from the Marxist-inspired militant revolutionary organization Mojahedin-e Khalq. More specifically, scholars have advanced the hypothesis that Khomeini made use of the meaning that the word *mustad'afun* had acquired through the 1960s translation into Persian of Franz Fanon's *Les damnés de la terre*

(*Mustad'afun-i Zamin*) by Shariati and his disciples (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 47 and Arjomand, 1988, pp. 95–6).

Although this assumption bears an important component of credibility, it is arguably mainly meant to imply the high level of acculturation in Khomeini's thought in this matter, and the absolute importance of Marxism in this process. However, these scholars, and political science scholars in general, have failed to notice and address the wider development of this concept in contemporary Shi'i thought and to analyze its claimed consistency with Islamic sources. In this respect, we have already delineated the solid Qur'anic language and reference to (Shi'i) *sunnah* sources at the basis of the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* world view. As regards the development of this model in contemporary Shi'i thought, the interrelation between Ruhollah Khomeini, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Musa al-Sadr, and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah appears important.

In the case of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Khomeini, it has been documented that the analysis of the former's written work indicates that he laid the basis for the latter's assertion that it is possible to sum up all human struggle as one between the oppressed and the oppressors (Lux, 2007, p. 110). Al-Sadr differs from Khomeini in that the former referred to the oppressors mainly with the term *qawi* (strong), in addition to the term *mustakbirun*.

On the other hand, both consistently referred to the oppressed with the term *mustad'af* (Lux, 2007, p. 110). In the case of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, his influence on the thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini has been proven (Mallat, 2003). Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's role in this chapter's perspective is relevant for two reasons. The first is that he was an Iraqi and Arab thinker, and ideologue of the al-Da'wa party, the party of all democratically nominated prime ministers in post-Saddam Iraq (Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, Nuri al-Maliki, and Hayder al-Abadi).⁷ The second is that he most probably preceded Ayatollah Khomeini in his elaboration of the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* world view and represented a key source of inspiration for the latter (Lux, 2007, p. 110).

In this respect, it is important to mention that Musa al-Sadr, the father of the Shi'i renaissance in Lebanon and a first cousin and brother-in-law of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, in March 1974 created a mass movement in Lebanon called *Harakat al-Mahrumin* (the Movement of the Deprived); a movement once again clearly characterized by the centrality of the idea of *mustad'afun* (here referred to as *mahrumin*). In his PhD thesis, Lux (2007, p. 110) argued that an analysis of the production of Muhammad

Baqir al-Sadr indicates that, with respect to the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* world view, not only is his thinking identical to Khomeini's but that it is also identical to that adopted by Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. We know that Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah was close to, and indeed worked with, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr while in Najaf and he later made use of the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* dichotomy (Alagha, 2006, pp. 118–9).

He is considered the spiritual founder of Hezbollah in Lebanon and it is possible that it was through him that the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* outlook became an essential part of the movement's Open Letter and ideology. It is important to mention that Lux's analysis was to compare the thought of two major contemporary Shi'i religious scholars, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, with that of Mao Tse Tung (and Marxism in general). As with Abrahamian, we are once again within the perspective of underlining the defining influence of Marxism on contemporary Shi'i thought. Although Lux's analysis is useful, he fails to take into consideration or mention the compatibility of this thought with the particular Shi'i intellectual and doctrinal history. As already pointed out, what scholars of political science and international relations have failed to do is to address the viability of the contemporary re-elaboration of this thought in terms of the Islamic textual and intellectual references or in terms of ontology and epistemology; at least in addition to its relation to Marxist thought.

Concretizing the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* paradigm: third-worldism and non-aligned foreign policy

The *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* model materialized in the IRI internally in (populist) concerns with the welfare of the lower classes, and externally in anti-dependency trade relations, third-Worldism, and a sustained non-aligned foreign policy. During the revolution, non-alignment even had its own successful slogan: *na sharqi na gharbi, jumhuri-yi islami* (Neither East Nor West, Islamic Republic). In this respect, Article 152 of the Constitution, which is part of the four articles of the already mentioned Chapter X of the text on foreign policy, reads:

The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, the preservation of the complete independence and territorial integrity of the country, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the

hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent states.

Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration and its close relations with Brazil, Venezuela, several African countries, and China represent a clear recent example of the implementation of this foreign policy. Ahmadinejad appointed Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaie, his in-law and right hand, to the head of the organization of the Sixteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in Tehran on August 30 and 31, 2012. On that occasion Iran took over the presidency of the Movement, which it held until 2015.

In this respect, one should not lose sight of the attention paid by the IRI to the Islamic third-world, and in particular Africa, and to the economic third-Worldist dynamic within the foreign policy of the IRI. This attention could also be explained within the framework of the interest of Shi'i Iran in other Islamic "peripheries." This world view very much represents the foreign policy doctrine of the IRI, which associates religion and political projects aimed at economic development and (national) independence. Within this approach, one should also locate Iran's attention on Muslim communities in East Asia where, so far, the Islamic Republic has not been able to obtain any noticeable result. The same applies to Iran's efforts among Muslim communities in Latin America, where success has again been limited.

Dialogue among civilizations and persistence of the *mustad'afun* versus *mustakbirun* world view

In the Muslim world, especially in Iran, whenever *oppressed people* have risen against tyranny, their activism has been channeled through religion. People have always witnessed the fiery and bloodied face of religious revolutionaries who have *risen to fight oppression and despotism*. (emphasis added.)

This quotation from Muhammad Khatami's writings on *Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society* (Khatami, 2000, p. 112) provides another example of the persistent importance of the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* world view. The theorization offered by a dialogue among civilizations framework appears to be particularly relevant in that it goes beyond the persistent confrontational association between Islamic faith and politics, and hence beyond the idea that the identity of Islam is fulfilled by its position as "the other" *par excellence* of Western modernity (Tadjbakhsh, 2010,

p. 175), typical of the abodic *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb* model. Moreover, it challenges the Western view, recently associated with Huntington and Fukuyama (1992), that Islam is an essentialist, unchangeable system of thought and beliefs, neither inferior nor superior to the West or to Christianity; and hence an alternative civilization to the West, not in dialogue with it and with other civilizations.

The optics for theorization put forward here by Khatami exemplifies the already mentioned use by Muslim scholars of a consistent (religious) Islamic language to express political ideals and aspirations. In this chapter we have argued that this language has specificities within the Islamic tradition, in particular the Sunni and Shi'i intellectual traditions, that should be seriously taken into account and evaluated when analyzing politics and international relations of and among Muslim states. Moreover, the view offered by the dialogue among civilizations framework confirms that (Shi'i) Islam should be addressed not only within but also relevantly beyond the realm of geopolitics; and as a cultural tradition capable of theorizing and being theorized upon, and hence as an object of enquiry for IR theorists.

Final considerations

This chapter has argued that an integration of important aspects of Shi'itology and Islamic Studies into the knowledge of the politics of the Islamic world by academics and practitioners of international relations could offer concrete additional methodological and conceptual instruments applicable to both ongoing theoretical debates and concrete policy-making within the international arena.

Although there have been serious theoretical efforts at formulating Islamically defined approaches to international relations and politics on the part of eminent Shi'i scholars, Shi'i Islam has, in terms of global affairs, until now been seen mainly as an element of geopolitics, not of International Relations and International Relations Theory (IRT). This is a prejudice more widely suffered by Islam and by Islamic scholars and thinkers.⁸ On the other hand, when Islamic approaches to international affairs have been taken into account, these have been substantially limited to the *dar al-harb/dar al-Islam* model.

As we have argued in this essay, in addition to being an element of geopolitics, Shi'i Islam also represents a worthy element of IR theory and practice. Over the last decades, Shi'i scholars and thinkers have offered a fresh Islamic world view that can be of interest for the study of non-Western IR theories and theorists, one based on the

mustad'afun/mustakbirun model. We find the development and presence of the *mustad'afun/mustakbirun* world view:

- in different Shi'i communities of the Near East (Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran);
- as an essential component of the political and social thought of major Shi'i religious scholars, such as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Musa al-Sadr, Ruhollah Khomeini, and Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah;
- in the Constitution of the IRI;
- in the ideology of the first Shi'i political movement formed in Lebanon (*Harakat al-Mahrumin*) in contemporary history;
- and in the ideology of the major political Shi'i party/movement of the same country (Hezbollah).

This world view is based on the interpretation of the most important sources of Islamic tradition (the Qur'an and the *hadiths*) and is proposed by some of the most eminent religious scholars of contemporary Shi'i Islam.

More generally, a number of leading Muslim Iranian academics have attempted to produce IR texts that challenge Westerns paradigms and in some cases are entirely based on, or use some elements of, an Islamic IR paradigm. Nevertheless, students of international relations have so far failed not only to address but even to take into due account the issue of the (Islamic) legitimacy of the Shi'i world view; that is the primacy of hybridization over acculturation or vice versa. Moreover, they have also failed to notice the importance, apparently even the existence, of different perceptions in essential foundational elements of the Islamic outlook on international relations.

Notes

1. All quotations from the Constitution of the IRI are from *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Translated from the Persian by Hamid Algar. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980.
2. All quotations as regards the Open Letter are from Alagha, Joseph. *Hizballah Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto*. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2011, pp. 39–56. In a very few cases, we slightly modified the translation according to the Arabic original. A different translation of the Open Letter is also available on the website of the *Council on Foreign Relations*, www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967.
3. Essential, in his work, is the triad represented by the concepts *Ummah*, *dar al-Islam*, and *dawlah*. Davutoglu, Ahmet. *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*. Lahman: University Press of America, 1994, pp. 200–2.

4. All Qur'anic quotations are from *The Qur'an: A New Translation*. Translated by M A S Abdel Haleem. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
5. In Twelver Shi'ism, following the death of the Prophet Muhammad the sole prerogative to order jihad lies with the twelve imams and, since the Occultation of the last Imam (873), in theory no jihad of the expansionist type has been possible. See Hallaq, Wael B. *Shari'a: Theory, Practice, Transformations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 327.
6. All quotations of the *Wilayat al-Faqih* are from Khomeini, Ruhollah. *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941–1980)*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981.
7. In this respect, for example, in the speech in which he relinquished his power to favor the transition toward the formation of al-Abadi's government, Nuri al-Maliki stated that: 'I will remain a soldier defending Iraq and its people, supporting firmly those who take on the responsibility with courage and rigor of doing right, defending those who face injustice [*al-mazlumin*] and standing against terrorism, sectarianism, and the division of Iraq.' Tim Arango, "Maliki Agrees to Relinquish Power in Iraq." *The New York Times*. 14 August 2014.
8. For the use of the term Islamic in this respect, see Sabet, Amr G. E. *Islam and the Political: Theory, Governance and International Relations*. London: Pluto Press, 2008, pp. 1 and 6.

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Part II

Diplomacy, Justice, and Negotiation in Islamic Thought

Deina Abdelkader

Despite the 1979 Iranian revolution, our knowledge of the Muslim world and the reasons people mobilize or follow certain transnational movements is still inaccurate and insufficient. It was only in the wake of the Iranian revolution that the United States and the Western world started to pay attention to Islamic activism as a phenomenon. Transnational and national Islamic movements today vary in their sects (Sunni and Shiite), their political ambitions, and whether they seek those ambitions through political channels (elections, political parties, etc.) or outside the political system through violence and terrorism. The world has turned its attention to atrocities committed by ISIS, and terrorism experts continue to study its actions and methods of recruitment, to the extent that some have claimed that ISIS is following the “true Islam.” On the other hand, populist movements have been neglected, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Nahda, among others.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood have been removed forcefully from power and al-Nahda has given up power to avoid the “Egyptian experience,” popular support for those groups could still, potentially, lead to other political victories in a freer political environment. Non-violent groups are also important in understanding public sentiment and ideals regarding governance. ISIS, however, is a sensationalized phenomenon that does not reflect the ambitions or sentiments of a popular base in Muslim societies, who would rather focus on public discourse and an Islamic ideal society; a society that is just and that upholds Islamic law as its guiding moral compass.

Dismissing that Islamic activist discourse and the literature on Islamic states are connected to a larger problem, Euben¹ writes: “I want to argue that political theory is an enterprise perhaps produced by, but not conterminous with, Western civilization.” (Euben 1999, p.10) She explains

that the reflex to dismiss fundamentalism as irrational or pathological is not merely a product of the almost habitualized prejudices and fears operative in the relationship between the West and Islam but, as I have argued, is also a function of the way a post-Enlightenment, predominantly rationalist, tradition of scholarship countenances a foundationalist political practice in the modern world. (Euben 1999, p.14)

Euben is critical of any "universal truth," whether it is religious or rationalist, because she rightfully explains that the enlightenment/rationalist discourse is just as proselytizing in its attempts as any religious fundamentalism. She characterizes that "rationalist truths" as "dismissive of other points of view" are "wrong and dangerous." Euben's most valuable contribution is her analysis of how current Islamic activists are viewed in comparative political theory. The study of modern Islamic fundamentalism is thus often reduced to an examination of fundamentalist political behavior divorced from fundamentalists' own understandings of action: ideology is understood as the set of beliefs that both obscures and expresses what structural tensions essentially are.

The subtext of this reading is that the growing appeal of fundamentalism owes little to its own inherent power as a moral ideal. As Foucault has pointed out, to be irrelevant is to be shut out of the realm of what is normal and acceptable; it is to be silenced as if mad. (Euben 1999, p.24). Part II analyzes contributions made to the International Relations field by Islamic scholars and theorists. Its three chapters address the void in literature about traditions in Muslim international relations and the study of the nature of inter- and intra-state interactions. It situates public discourse in Islam on the state and international policies.

The first chapter analyzes Ibn Khaldun's contribution to the field of sociology through his writings about nomadic desert versus sedentary societies. Faruk Yalvaç's chapter focuses on a comparison between the realist school of International Relations today and Ibn Khaldun's writing about "cyclical transformations" of civilizations that manifest themselves at the international level of analysis. Yalvaç asserts that Ibn Khaldun was aware of writing structuralist constraints on change in the international system. He argues that Ibn Khaldun's popularity in Western literature is based on his analysis of cyclical change and how that resembles the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP). AMP literature is Eurocentric and therefore Ibn Khaldun's structuralist argument is in agreement with holding Europe as the quintessential example of modernity and progress.

The second chapter addresses the writing of Abu Zahra and it analyzes his focus on the human interpretation that Islamic states should act

among other states. Therefore, the chapter distinguishes between *Dar al-Islam*, *Dar al-Harb*, and *Dar al-'Ahd/Sulh*, i.e., the abode of Islam, the abode of war, and the abode of peace treaties, respectively. Al-Dawoody highlights the contribution of Abu Zahra to the field of International Relations because of his focus on the abode of peace and treaty making (*Dar al-Sulh* or *Dar al-'Ahd*). Al-Dawoody then compares Huntington's "clash of civilizations" with Abu Zahra's work as an alternative voice in relations between states. The chapter concludes with an analysis of how the two approaches deal with contemporary strands of violent jihadi terrorism.

The third chapter addresses similarities of concepts in intellectual history that are currently still relevant to our knowledge of what democracy means and how it is practiced. The similarities between legal codes, and how those codes are enacted, are striking when Abdelkader compares St. Thomas Aquinas' notion of the "common good" with al-Shatibi's "public welfare." Abdelkader asserts that the stagnation after the Arab Spring is due to epistemological constructs that divide reason and faith as per the Enlightenment era in Europe. The binary discourse on the divide between faith and reason upholds Eurocentric values of the separation of Church and State, i.e., democracy in Western discourse necessitates that there is a separation between church and state, even if the people being ruled reject it. Abdelkader emphasizes that this dichotomy is a Eurocentric project that overextends its argument to the rest of the world, however, this argument is far from being universal in nature. The argument in this chapter focuses on historical differences in the role of the church in Europe versus Islam in Muslim societies, in which governments, societies, and states, are all built on a moral foundation which is basic and necessary in all communities. Therefore, there is a huge difference, according to the author, between a theocracy, aka Khomeini's *Vilayet-i-Faqih* versus Ghannouchi's Nahda Party in Tunisia. The first was definitely a theocracy, while the latter was a government informed by Islamic moral standards but which functioned like any secular government.

Therefore Part II addresses the economic and political aspects of Muslim states on international and domestic levels with a primary focus on addressing the different aspects of an Islamic state and how it acts as an international entity. The chapters cover Ibn Khaldun's structuralism, Abu Zahra's emphasis on the abode of peace (*dar al-Sulh*), and the analysis of a definition of democracy that is more tolerant than the Enlightenment's rigidity in separating faith and reason.

Note

1. Euben, Roxanne L. *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory*. New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1999.

4

Ibn Khaldûn's Historical Sociology and the Concept of Change in International Relations Theory

Faruk Yalvaç

Introduction

This chapter analyzes Ibn Khaldûn's *historical sociological* concept of change as described in *Muqaddimah* and compares it with the *ahistorical* and *asociological* concepts of change in international relations (IR) theory; not only in realist and neorealist accounts of change but also in some works of international historical sociology, particularly as it relates to an analysis of the non-European world.¹ Compared to the "structural ahistoricity" of neorealism and its "a-social concept of the international"² Khaldûn's analysis of the premodern world in terms of the coexistence of multiple communities provides, on the one hand, a sociological account of the *international* missing in *internalist* classical sociological theory,³ and on the other, a sociological account of the *domestic*, which is missing in IR.⁴ The formation of the Westphalian state system marks the basic date for conceptualizing the modern international system and the basis of IR theory. Although Khaldûn lived before this time his analysis of the interreaction between premodern political units provides important insights into the organic role of the international on social change. He avoids the ontological exteriority (Morton, 2013) of the domestic and international that is the distinguishing mark of mainstream and neorealist orthodoxy.

Khaldûn's cyclical theory of dynastic change differs from the unilinear, progressivist concepts of change that exist in realist and liberal theories, in development and modernization studies, and in some statist interpretations of Marxism. Khaldûn's analysis, despite its repetitive appearance, is also a corrective to cyclical realist theories of international system

change,⁵ which ignore the *social* as a determinant of change. Finally, in its conceptual structure his analysis overcomes one of the issues for which the first Weberian historical sociology⁶ was criticized, i.e., ignoring the effects of the social on the international. Kenneth Waltz once famously stated that “someone may one day fashion a unified theory of internal and external politics...Nevertheless students of international politics will do well to concentrate on separate theories of internal and external politics until someone figures out a way to unite them.”⁷ Indeed, this is what Ibn Khaldûn does in *Muqaddimah* when he tries to explain the rise and fall of dynasties in terms of their inner social conflicts in relation to their competition, which is the focus of this chapter.

In his analysis of the dynamics of nomadic and sedentary societies Khaldûn explicitly takes the interaction between multiple units as the basis of social change in different dynastic formations. Despite its relevance to a different period of history Khaldûn’s theory appears superior to various modern analyses of change by virtue of its historical and sociological character. As in other recent sociological works with a similar aim, in interpreting Khaldûn’s theory I draw on Trotsky’s⁸ concept of uneven and combined development (UCD) which has, so far, been limited in its application to intersocietal dynamics in Europe (e.g., Teschke and Tilly)⁹ and, in particular, to the capitalist epoch. Khaldûn’s analysis of premodern state formation through the geopolitical pressures exerted by nomadic societies on sedentary societies provides fertile ground on which to build a comparative analysis of premodern and modern international systems utilizing UCD. Matin argues that “those studies which dealt with the extra-European world have either pursued macro analysis of ‘international systems’ without offering in depth analysis of any particular state (e.g., Buzan and Little),¹⁰ or they have focused on the changing configuration of anarchical and hierarchical relations within and between western and non-western international systems or geo-cultural areas.”¹¹ As Teschke asserts, what is required is a “general and systematic attempt to elevate the international from the start to a constitutive component of any theory of history.”¹² Indeed, it is one of the theoretical contributions of UCD to do precisely this in “positing the international (uneven totality of social reality) hence the multilinearity of historical development of societies”¹³ as the ontological beginning of social inquiry.

Background to Ibn Khaldûn’s thought

Wali ad-Din ‘Abd-ar-Rahman Ibn Khaldûn¹⁴ was one of the greatest Arab thinkers and philosophers of Islamic history in the premodern world.

He has been called the Arab Montesquieu, a Renaissance Italian, the last Greek or the first Annalist.¹⁵ As Salama argues, "almost all modern Arab intellectuals... argue that Ibn Khaldûn is the father of the science of history, of sociology, and even Marxism *avant la lettre*."¹⁶

Khaldûn's ancestors were from southeastern Yemen, they first settled in Seville and finally in Tunis, where Khaldûn was born. In his youth he experienced a cosmopolitan culture with Jewish, Christian and Muslim influences.¹⁷ He was versed in the Qur'an, Hadith and jurisprudence, Arabic poetry and grammar. He became involved in court politics under different rulers, served as a counselor and judge, held high office, including that of ambassador. Khaldûn offered his services to various Marinid rulers in the midst of intense political intrigues and joined a peace mission to King Pedro I of Castile. The most significant event in his autobiography was his meeting with Tamerlane (Timurlenk) in 1401, just as Tamerlane was besieging Damascus. Sultan al-Nasir sent Khaldûn to negotiate with Timurlenk, who took not only Damascus but also Baghdad after diplomacy had failed. After withdrawing from public life Khaldûn went to Egypt, where he died.

In the 14th century Maghreb was at the center of trade in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and capitalism in Europe was in its incipient stage. The period from 1347 to 1357 was a time of great political turmoil in the region, with a prolonged conflict between the Marinid and Hasid dynasties. Khaldûn witnessed the Christian reconquest of the Iberian peninsula and the decay of Arab civilization in North Africa, after more than five centuries of Muslim hegemony. Therefore, from both an intellectual and a social background Khaldûn was in a good position to write about the historical significance of the period.

The *Muqaddimah*,¹⁸ or *Introduction*, to his book *Kitâb al-ibar* (*History of the World*), is Khaldûn's most significant work. The *Kitab al-Ibar* is more of a narrative history of the period compared to the *Muqaddimah*, which contains Khaldûn's social, political and cultural explanations. The full title of the book is *Kitâbu l-'ibar wa Diwânu l-Mubtada' wa l-Habar fî tarikhi l-'arab wa l-Barbar wa man 'Āsarahum min Āwā Ash-Sha'n l-Akbār* (*Book of Lessons, Record of Beginnings and Events in the History of the Arabs and Berbers and their Powerful Contemporaries*), in which he develops a theory of history and a cyclical model of state formation that went far beyond the traditional analysis of history in his day.¹⁹ Although the focus of his analysis was medieval Islam, Khaldûn provides a more general analysis of historical development and social dynamics. The British historian Arnold J Toynbee referred to the *Muqaddimah* as "undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place."²⁰

The question of social change in IR

Within the framework of IR theory the most important aspect of Khaldûn's work is his analysis of social change. IR theory has mostly been concerned with explaining *order* not *change*. The many existing accounts of change on the other hand are based on historical states derived from the European experience and its uniqueness. As recent historical sociological analyses have demonstrated,²¹ this conception is based on a linear progressive understanding of history and ignores the interactive and mutually constitutive nature of development between European and non-European societies. It is not that attempts to conceptualize change have not been undertaken but they have been analyzed as a change *within the existing order* and do not aim to alter that order or understand the sources of change. In other words, although many works emphasize the importance of change, change is neither properly defined nor theorized and is mostly used within a *traditional state centric framework*.

Liberal theories of change are presumed to be progressive in terms of envisaging an alternative future cosmopolitan society, but their understanding of progress is based on an Enlightenment ideal of progress towards liberal democracy and, therefore, it is deeply Eurocentric. This is also true of other theories that are supposed to be more sensitive to change, such as the British School, where it is conceptualized in terms of changes in rules and norms. The notion of international society used by the British School is based on Western norms and reflects Eurocentric assumptions about the uniqueness of Western civilization. Therefore, despite their claims to historicity, these approaches are *ahistorical* in the sense that they either take the Westphalian system for granted, ignoring its historical origins, or raise issues of change without raising substantial questions concerning the material and social basis of change.

In other words, many works do not problematize the complex mutual determinations between the economic, the social and the political to develop a more adequate understanding of the international. More often than not this is due to unstated political preferences, which are based on Cox's terminology of a problem solving rather than a critical concern, interested in changing unsatisfactory social relations.²²

When I refer to social change, I have in mind a different conception of the social compared with that of the constructivists. For constructivists the social is defined as *intersubjectivity* derived from interactionist sociology and theories of communication. It is only with the recent revival of *historical materialist sociology* that change has been given a historical

and structural understanding based on *social relations* and the dynamics of *intersocietal existence*. Therefore, what is missing in most of the positivist, and in some of the post-positivist, approaches is a *social conception of change* based on historical social structures/relations which, as I argue below, can be found in the works of Khaldûn. His work can therefore be seen as confirming many of the assumptions of contemporary international historical sociology, as well as shedding light on a different historical period of international development.

Against this background, the interest in Khaldûn's work can be traced to three developments within current IR theory. The first concerns the Eurocentrism not only of the mainstream but also of critical forms of IR theorizing and the often mentioned need to develop a non-Eurocentric study of IR.²³ The second is related to the development of a historical sociology of IR that foregrounds the constitutive impact of intersocietal existence, on internal processes of social change, or in Matin's terms "as an ontological property" of IR.²⁴

The historical sociology of IR has been trying to overcome the timelessness of the concept of anarchy in understanding the dynamics of interstate relations by incorporating a *social and historical* dimension to the study of international change. On one hand this can be achieved by *denaturalizing*, *historicizing*, and *socializing anarchy* and on the other by *internationalizing the historical and the social*. The first task has been undertaken by that recent historical sociological work which has tried to overcome *methodological internationalism*, while the second has been realized by classical sociology cognizant of the effect of the international on the dynamics of social change, thus trying to avoid *methodological nationalism*. The combined effect of these two tasks has been the development of an international historical sociology in which the domestic and the international are taken as irreducible parts of the same totality of social relations.

The third major development is related to the place of historical materialism in the discipline of IR. It is commonly acknowledged that a historical materialist theory of IR international relations is missing due to the absence of a theoretically developed analysis of geopolitics in classical works of Marxism. In addition, historical materialism, and in particular Marxism, is seen as covering a domestic society irrelevant to the concerns of IR. However this criticism is based on a misconceived ontological distinction between the domestic and the international and, more specifically, the social and the international. Furthermore, it also has a deterministic and reductionist understanding of Marxism (e.g., Waltz)²⁵ which has long been invalidated by Marxist scholarship.

Khaldûn's work is relevant to all the three current discussions within IR theory. His analysis of the dynamics between nomadic and sedentary societies can be interpreted as a non-Eurocentric historical sociology of the premodern world, which contains a critique of internalist and unilinear/ homogeneous conceptions of development and social change.²⁶ In this sense Khaldûn's work fits Hobson description of the aim of international historical sociology in which "international factors are juxtaposed, conjoined and interrelated with domestic processes, with the aim of finding patterns that explain important historical processes."²⁷ Unlike the structuralism of neorealism, Khaldûn's approach historicizes social ontologies and geopolitical practices, it contextualizes social action and avoids the asociological and ahistorical forms of mainstream IR.²⁸

Finally, Khaldûn's theory of history also fills the absence of historical materialism as a social scientific tool of analysis within IR theory by analyzing interrelations between tribal and sedentary societies with reference to their production structures. He refers to the way societies provide their subsistence and the relations this creates, not only within societies social and political structures, but also with other units with which they interact. Khaldûn's work thus represents a unique example of a historical sociological analysis of IR combining history and sociology.

"From history comes insight into the importance of events, contingencies, and local particularities; from sociology comes understanding of how relatively fixed configurations of social relations (structures) affect these micro processes; and from IR comes the realization of the central role played by 'the international' in this dynamic."²⁹ Indeed, all these components of social transformation can be seen in Khaldûn's attempts to outline the transformation of *'umrân badawî* (primitive culture) to *umrân hadarî* (urban culture) or from *bâdawah* (bedouin culture) to *hadarah* (urban culture).

Ibn Khaldûn and history

Yves Lacoste argues that if Thucydides is the founder of history, Khaldûn's work presents history as science.³⁰ This is one of Khaldûn's most important contributions, especially in relation to recent disputes concerning the meaning of history and the concept of the historical in IR.³¹ Theory building and history have generally been counterpoint to each other, the former dealing with abstractions and generalizations and the latter with events, conjuncture, and narratives. Khaldûn also offers illuminating insights into this "eternal divide"³² between theory and

history. Although there is no space here to deal with this issue to the extent it deserves, some general evaluations on Khaldûn's contribution can be presented. First, it is necessary to comprehend Khaldûn's understanding of history since his methodology is the basis of his analysis of social change.

In the *Muqaddima* Khaldûn has the ambition to provide "an exhaustive history of the world."³³ However, he believes that history should be studied scientifically. In addition, he does not consider history to be a series of events, but sees society in all its aspects as part of history. He calls this understanding of history a new science of culture, or *Ilm Al-'Umran*, premised on the idea Khaldûn declares was contained in Aristotle's thesis that man is a social being, therefore any analysis of history has to start from that concept. That historical analysis begins in the social brings Khaldûn close to analyses by classical and contemporary historical sociologists.

This can be seen particularly in Marx's main idea that "the premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can be made... They are the real individuals, their activity and their material conditions of life including those which they find already in existence and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be established in a purely empirical way."³⁴ Marx also added to Aristotle's definition of man: "Man is in the most literal sense a *zoon politikon*, not merely a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society."³⁵

From this starting point Khaldûn developed his theory of history based on man's social nature. This conception differs from an empiricist historiography, which takes events merely as narratives, and brings him to what Hobson et al. call historicist historical sociology. Khaldûn brings together history and the social, the event with the social relations of production. As Hobson et al. argue, historicist historical sociology pays attention "to micro developments that are often governed by contingency, but taking care to place these within broader patterns of historical development."³⁶

Epistemologically, historicist historical sociology "stands between the mainstream macro approach at one extreme and the micro approach of deconstructionist radical historicism and traditional history on the other."³⁷ Unlike radical historicists, historicist historical sociologists believe that history is knowable and they attempt to discover the causes of events and general patterns in history. However, like traditional historians, these sociologists do not accept transhistorical truths and attempt to locate history within a certain time and place. Historical sociology,

in other words, focuses on the empirical richness of history, as well as emphasizing relations of causality and “specifying how patterns, configurations, and sets of social relations combine in particular contexts in order to generate certain outcomes.”³⁸

This description of historical sociology fits well with Khaldûn’s historical approach. First, he argues that “history refers to events that are peculiar to a particular age or race” and that “discussion of the general conditions of regions, races and periods constitute the historian’s foundation.”³⁹ So, unlike traditional historians, Khaldûn is not satisfied with the mere analysis of events but sees historical processes as part of the general pattern of continuity and social change.⁴⁰ Muslim historians only provided information about political events and traditional historians overlooked “the inner meaning of history,” which “involves speculation and an attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things and deep knowledge of how and why of events.”⁴¹ *Kitab-al-İbar* is, therefore, a way of looking at history by understanding its essence.

Khaldûn argues that “historians, Qur’an commentators and leading transmitters” did not check events “with the principles underlying such situations,” nor did they “probe with the yardstick of philosophy, with the help of the nature of things or with the help of speculation and historical insight.”⁴² Khaldûn states that “it takes critical insight to sort out the hidden truth.”⁴³ Anticipating Marx’s distinction between the essence and the appearance of things, he differentiates between *zahir*, the external appearance of things, and *batin*, their internal logic. Khaldûn makes a further distinction between *khurâfa* (legend) and *târikh* (history). History is not only an *akhbâr* (accounts, news, events) but is subject to *nawâmîs al-asabiyya* (laws of causality). Marx would agree; as he argued “science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and essence of things coincided.”⁴⁴ According to Khaldûn historians “disregarded the changes in conditions and in the customs of nations and races that the passing of time had brought about... thus they presented historical information about dynasties and stories of events... as mere forms without substance.”⁴⁵ This type of knowledge “must be considered ignorance because it is not known what of it is extraneous and what is genuine.”⁴⁶ These historians “neglected the importance of change over the generations in their treatment of [historical material] because they had no one who could interpret it for them.”⁴⁷

In short, Khaldûn grounds historical phenomenon and events not in abstract laws but in specific historically situated social practices. On the basis of this method the focus of his history is “how and why dynasties

and civilizations originated,"⁴⁸ why "various dynasties brought pressure to bear upon each other and why they succeeded each other." (1967 :7) He wants to understand "the fate of the states," how states are formed, and how the founders of states became their rulers.⁴⁹ Khaldûn wants to show "how and why things are as they are and show how the men who constituted a dynasty first came upon the historical scene."⁵⁰ His focus on analyzing the origins and decay of dynasties is through "the history of the Arabs and the Berbers, both the sedentary groups and the nomads."⁵¹

Thus, he develops from the history of the Arabs and the Berbers a general theory of the cyclical forms of rule between the nomadic tribes and sedentary civilizations of his age, showing the political focus of his analysis. Political rule, as described below, is explained through what Khaldûn calls *umran*, or an overview of geographical, economic, and social factors. In other words, he has a *totality* in his mind when he analyzes the rise and fall of civilizations. In other words, his specific contribution to history is to analyze historical events by understanding all the social structures that cause them, as does Marx's historical method. As McCorristor argues, "Ibn Khaldûn's approach aligns with materialist theory in which the social relations of production pattern with the means of production, in this case, the economic and environmental constraints of food production in desert settings."⁵²

Social organization, civilizations and social change

According to Khaldûn "man is a social being" (*al-insân madani bi-'l-tab'*). This implies the necessity of social organization among men, as in Aristotle's "Man is a social animal." "Human social organization is something necessary. The philosophers expressed this fact by saying: 'Man is "political" by nature'. That is he cannot do without the social organization for which the philosophers use the technical term 'town' [polis]."⁵³

Khaldûn has a Hobbesian view of human nature. "Aggressiveness is natural in living beings... Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for man to have the cooperation of his fellow men... Consequently social organization is necessary to the human species."⁵⁴ However, he also comes close to the importance Marx attached to the social nature of man. For Marx, man is not only a social animal but "an animal that can develop into an individual only in society." In his famous "Preface" to the *Critique of Political Economy*, Marx stresses, "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but their social existence that determines their

consciousness. In other words, it is man as a social being that develops his consciousness."⁵⁵ Similarly, Khaldûn considered that, without social organization, "the existence of human beings would be incomplete,"⁵⁶ which is exactly what he means by civilization.

The necessary character of human social organization (or civilization) is explained by the fact that God created and fashioned men in a form that can live and subsist only with the help of food. He guided man to a natural desire for food and instilled in him the power that enables him to obtain it.⁵⁷

Therefore, differences between people's living conditions are the result of the different ways in which they make their living. Again, a reference to Marx is appropriate in relation to his comment that men "begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence, a step which is determined by their physical constitution. In producing their means of subsistence men indirectly produce their actual material life."⁵⁸ Khaldûn goes on to state that social organization is necessary for men to obtain the food they need and that this depends on the technology available for providing this food. He emphasizes the importance of the methods of production specific to each period of civilization:

the amount of food could be obtained only after much preparation such as grinding, kneading, and baking. Each of these three operations requires utensils and tools that can be provided only with the help of several crafts, such as the crafts of the blacksmith, the carpenter and the potter.⁵⁹

Thus, man "cannot do without a combination of many powers from among his fellow beings, if he is to obtain food for himself and for them. Through cooperation, the needs of a number of persons, many times greater than their own number, can be satisfied." ... It is absolutely necessary for man to have the cooperation of his fellow men."⁶⁰ As Marx argues, "in the process of production, human beings do not enter into a relation with Nature. They produce only by working together in a specific manner and by reciprocally exchanging their activities. In order to produce they enter into definite connexions and relations with one another."⁶¹ The necessity of the division of labor thus leads to different modes of procuring personal necessities in different societies, not limited to food but also to protecting oneself and thus the need for

weapons. At this point, Khaldûn slowly introduces the way that dynasties are formed. "When...mutual cooperation exists, man obtains food for his nourishment...and...weapons for his defence."⁶²

Khaldûn is not a determinist nor is his analysis based purely on an agent-centric perspective. His analysis of the dialectics of different social formations is combined with a concrete analysis of the role of agency in historical change. Compared with those approaches whose explanatory ontology is intersubjective relations – as in Cox's world structures approach,⁶³ or communicative critical theory⁶⁴, – Khaldûn's analysis makes it possible to recognize the importance of the "material reality of social life"⁶⁵ in the reproduction and transformation of political structures. This understanding also underlies the fact that although agents reproduce and sometimes transform social conditions, these conditions preexist agents and act as a constraining cause on their actions.⁶⁶

Civilizations are social organizations and there are different civilizations. Khaldûn's substantive explanations are based on the delineation of two forms of universal social order, which he calls '*Umrân badawi* (Bedouin culture in desert places, or nomadic) and '*Umrân hadari* (sedentary cultures, settled civilizations). *Badâwah*, or the Bedouin life, is shaped by blood ties, the relative economic equality of its members, and charismatic leadership. Bedouins restrict themselves to the bare necessities, "in food, clothing, and mode of dwelling, and to the other necessary conditions and customs. They do not possess conveniences and luxuries." "...They are much more disposed to courage than sedentary people. ... They are closer to the first natural state and more remote from the evil habits that have been impressed upon the souls (of sedentary people) through numerous and ugly, blameworthy customs."⁶⁷ Under Bedouin rule, subjects live in a state of anarchy characterized by a lack of *asabiyya*. Bedouin tribes lack the centralization to defend themselves. These are societies in which leaders are not able to force people to accept their power. They represent the most primitive form of *umran*. Khaldûn's description of the Bedouin life resembles Rousseau's peaceful description of a state of nature, in which man is not yet corrupted by civilization, and his concept of the noble savage.⁶⁸

According to Khaldun "only after [man] has obtained the bare necessities does he get to comforts and luxuries."⁶⁹ In other words, transition from *badâwah* to *hadara* involves a change from the production of necessities to the production of luxuries, such that manufacturing techniques are more advanced and the division of labor is wider. It is one of the principles of historical materialism that economic and social order evolves on the basis of the development of production.⁷⁰ Khaldûn

considers that “arrangement of production, social structures, forms of political life, legal arrangements, social psychology and ideologies” are closely linked, which is also one of the features of historical materialist thought. The evolution of economic factors leads to the evolution of civilization as a whole.

Sedentary civilizations are found in cities, villages, towns, and small communities that serve to protect the inhabitants. Sedentary people have become used to laziness and ease, accustomed to luxury and success in worldly occupations, and to indulgence in worldly desires.⁷¹ Their reliance on law destroys their fortitude and power of resistance. There is an important economic reason for the decline of sedentary civilizations in that “labor is the real basis of profit. When labor is not appreciated and is done for nothing, the hope for profit vanishes and no (productive) work is done. The sedentary population disperses, and civilization decays.”⁷²

When Khaldûn was alive the main contradiction in the Maghrib was that between royal (state) authority and tribal structures that struggled against the power of the ruling royal authority, unless they collaborated with it. This contradiction emanated from the emergence of a privileged minority in every dynasty when conquered by another, pitting tribes against each other to influence the ruling dynasty. Every time an attempt was made to establish sovereign rule it was doomed to failure as a result of the antagonism between tribal structures. This led Khaldûn to analyze the dialectical contradictions that existed both between nomadic and sedentary societies, and within each royal dynasty. New dynasties were formed through conquest and but they were incapable of perpetuating their rule. In other words, these were stagnant societies incapable of change. This failure to change was the crux of Khaldûn’s inquiry and he wanted to discover why Arab states could not create stable forms of rule.

According to Khaldûn, “Anarchy destroys mankind and ruins civilization, since... the existence of royal authority is a natural quality of man. It alone guarantees the existence and social organization.”⁷³ This differs from Waltz’s⁷⁴ conceptualization of anarchy and hierarchy within the state system. Waltz assumes that there is hierarchy within and anarchy between states. Khaldûn on the other hand sees anarchy in both unless tempered with *asabiyya* and the formation of royal authority in sedentary civilizations, as explained below.

***Asabiyyah* and royal authority**

The concept of *asabiyyah* forms the backbone of Khaldûn’s theory of social order, historical process, and change, but there is no common

acceptance of its meaning. However most have accepted Rosenthal's translation in which he defines it as group feeling, derived from Mohammed Talbi who defines *asabiyyah* as, "at one and the same time the cohesive force of the group, the conscience that it has of its own specificity and collective aspirations, and the tension that animates it and impels it ineluctably to seek power through conquest."⁷⁵ Cox is of the opinion that *asabiyyah* is the "intersubjective condition for the creation of a higher form of collective existence...the form of intersubjectivity that pertains to the founding of a state."⁷⁶

For Lacoste, "it is a form of military solidarity congruent with the passage from a classless to a class structure."⁷⁷ It refers to the development and intensification of group feelings due to blood ties and kinship relations among the nomadic Bedouin. My understanding of *asabiyyah* is closer to Gramsci's concept of hegemony, although it is subject to many interpretations and disputes over its meaning. Gramsci uses the concept of hegemony to explain how capitalist societies reproduce themselves. This is done not only through force but also consent, the legitimacy afforded to political rule by the people. This is similar to Khaldûn's use of *asabiyyah*. Dynasties are ruled not only by force but also through the existence of *asabiyyah*. The difference lies between the reproductive systems of premodern Islamic and modern capitalist societies. In the former *asabiyyah* legitimizes the rule of royal authority, in the latter it legitimizes the rule of the capitalist classes.

According to Khaldûn "only tribes held together by group feeling can live in the desert."⁷⁸ This is because of man's Hobbesian qualities, his aggressive instinct, fear, diffidence, and search for glory. Khaldûn argues that "leadership over people who share in a given group feeling cannot be vested in those not of the same descent."⁷⁹ In other words, group feeling results "only from blood relationships or something corresponding to it."⁸⁰ What is important about *asabiyyah* is that it forms the basis for what Khaldûn classes as royal authority.

The goal to which group feeling leads is royal authority. " ... Any royal authority must be built upon two foundations. The first is might and group feeling, which finds its expression in soldiers. The second is money, which supports the soldiers and provides the whole structure needed by royal authority. Disintegration befalls the dynasty at these two foundations."⁸¹

A leader, therefore, has to have the support of *asabiyyah* to form a dynasty. "A state exists only in so far as it is held together by the

dynasty; when the dynasty disappears the state collapses.”⁸² Khaldûn uses the word dynasty as equivalent to state or *dawlah*. *Asabiyyah* or group feeling is the main source of political authority (*mulk*) and social institutions.⁸³ “*Asabiyyah* is the motor of development of the state and it is destroyed by the emergence of the state.”⁸⁴ Since the subject under consideration is a Muslim society, prophecy or religion occupy an important place but they are not the determinant,⁸⁵ therefore, *asabiyyah* has a relative autonomy from religion. Khaldûn repeats his Aristotelian understanding of political life in the following manner:

In sum, ...dynasty and royal authority have the same relationship to civilization as form has to matter...One cannot imagine a dynasty without civilization, while a civilization without dynasty and royal authority is impossible, because human beings must by nature cooperate, and that calls for a restraining influence.⁸⁶

Royal authority continues in a nation until its group feeling is broken and exterminated, or until all its groups have ceased to exist.

This can be illustrated by what happened among nations. When the royal authority of ‘Âd was wiped out, their brethren, the Thamûd took over. They were succeeded, in turn by the Amalekites, the Amalekites were succeeded by the Himyar. They, likewise, were succeeded by the Adhwâ’. Then, the Mudar came to power.⁸⁷

Although royal authority and large-scale dynastic power are attained only through a group feeling, once firmly established a dynasty can dispense with it since it is “as if obedience to the government were a divinely revealed book that cannot be changed or opposed.”⁸⁸ As a dynasty cannot replace *asabiyyah* with a new force it has to rely on new external forces to sustain its power. Therefore, blood ties are replaced with new social relations. According to Cox this implies the absence of a class to organize means of production and lead the basic structural transformation of society.⁸⁹

Asabiyyah is particularly important in international relations between tribes since “for fighting one cannot do without group feeling....Once group feeling has established superiority over the people who share in it, it will, by its very nature, seek superiority over people who have other group feelings unrelated to the first.”⁹⁰ This starts the process of Bedouin dynasties taking over sedentary civilizations which have been weakened by their own internal conflicts. As new rulers become accustomed to the

customs and habits of sedentary civilizations a process of decline starts in the conquered civilization. "Wealth, appropriated by the power and desired by the weak, as is inherent in human nature, in effect creates classes, which weakens *asabiyyah*."⁹¹

Therefore, "the authority of the dynasty at first expands to its limit and then is narrowed down in successive stages, until the dynasty dissolves and disappears."⁹² A new dynasty emerges at the "interstitial" periphery, to use Mann's expression.⁹³ One way is for provincial governors to gain control over remote regions where the dynasty has lost its influence. The other is for a rebel from among the neighboring nations and tribes to lead a revolt against the dynasty. The decline of *asabiyyah* and the desire to maintain rule starts a series of measures which ultimately defeats itself and leads to the destruction of the dynasty. Khaldûn gives some of the many causes of this decline as: bribery; resorting to coercion; increased taxes; reliance on mercenaries; buying slaves; and giving administrative positions to collaborators. Therefore, over time, group solidarity breaks down, senility takes hold of the ruling dynasty until a new group asserts itself with a desert attitude and brings with it a new sense of *asabiyyah*.

Sedentary life constitutes the last stage of civilization and the point where it begins to decay. It also constitutes the last stage of evil and of remoteness from goodness. "Clearly the Bedouins are closer to being good than sedentary people."⁹⁴ Like individuals dynasties have a natural life span, as Khaldun explains:

Their duration may differ according to the conjunctions. However, as a rule no dynasty lasts beyond the life span of three generations. A generation is identical with the average duration of the life of a single individual, namely, forty years, the time required for growth to be completed and maturity reached... We have... three generations. In the course of these three generations, the dynasty grows senile and is worn out. Therefore, it is in the fourth generation that (ancestral) prestige is destroyed.⁹⁵

Every dynasty passes through the following stages: (1) success (*tawr al-zfar bil-bughyat*); (2) control and authority (*tawr al-istibdâad*); (3) leisure and tranquility (*tawr al-farâgh*); (4) contentment and peacefulness (*tawar al qunû*); (5) waste and extravagance (*tawar al-isrâf*). Khaldûn does not defend the idea that history is mere repetition, an idea dominant for centuries, and which existed in Christian historiography that identified the motor of history as historical evolution with providential intervention. This conception was later replaced by unilinear conceptions

of history as a consequence of industrialization and the development of capitalism, leading to the idea that all societies were predestined to progress along similar paths of development. However, the irony of this conception is that it takes the history out of history, as historical development is reduced to repetition. This cyclical view of history therefore greatly underestimates the role of agents in affecting historical change and is not defended by Khaldûn.

It should also be noted that both Bedouin and sedentary social forms in Khaldûn's conception are *civilizations*, without any prejudgment as to which is more advanced than the other. Therefore, the transition from *badawa* to *hadara* is not meant to be an *evolutionary progressive change* but signifies the *inevitability of change in society*. This is quite a different understanding from the modernization theories of the 1960s, which conceptualize change from traditional to modern, or from precapitalist to capitalist societies. In this sense, Khaldûn's analysis of the transition from one form of civilization to another does not directly imply a normative stance, as it seems to focus on the *causes* of the formation and collapse of different dynasties.

This form of transition, as described by Khaldûn, fits Trotsky's idea of uneven and combined development (UCD)⁹⁶ used to analyze the dynamics of interaction between developed capitalist societies and underdeveloped regions of the world. The theory of UCD, as first employed by Trotsky, has been incorporated into IR theory in an attempt to understand the links between the international and the processes of combined social development. Development in UCD is considered an aspect of the interaction between different societies that affect each other in space and time, whose development is shaped both by their own social structures and by their coexistence with other societies.⁹⁷ Thus, UCD is an understanding of *the international that includes the social*, or *the social that includes the international* and it underscores the significance of *intersocietal multiplicity and interaction* in conceptualizing the social world. This is similar to the cycle of political development from *badawa* to *hadara*, as described in Khaldûn's theory.

Trotsky's ideas have recently become very popular for analyzing the dynamics of change in IR. UCD has replaced the concept of balance of power in analyzing the structure and dynamics of the international system. Equally, Khaldûn's work can be enlightening to further understand UCD by analyzing the interaction of premodern tribal societies at different levels of development, as Khaldûn did in his analysis of the interactive and heterogeneous processes of *badawa* and *hadara*. The crucial aspect of this concept lies in its analysis of the international,

both in terms of numerical multiplicity and of developmental differentiation of the social, thus overcoming the domestic/international divide. Therefore, Ibn Khaldûn's cyclical theory of history can be seen as a specific instance of "interactive and multilinear"⁹⁸ development, which overcomes the Eurocentric limitations of UCD in its applicability to premodern processes of state formation, which gives further support to some of the transhistorical claims.⁹⁹

Conclusion

Khaldûn wrote in the 14th century and his thoughts did not have much impact on consequence for the Islamic philosophy of his day.¹⁰⁰ Europeans learned of Khaldûn through the translation of the first five chapters of the *Muqaddimah* by Pirizade Efendi in 1730. Then Ahmet Cevdet Efendi translated the remaining sixth chapter. As McCorriston argues, "had his manuscripts been sooner translated from Arabic and integrated into a Western canon, Khaldûn would be fairly judged the founder of sociology some five centuries before the great contributions of Marx, Weber and Durkheim."¹⁰¹ My particular concern in this chapter has been to demonstrate the implications of Khaldûn's thought on the concept of change in IR and the potential contribution his analysis can make to our understanding of international dynamics. His ideas may seem irrelevant to the modern international system, and his work would not be that valuable if it did not allow for a comparison of our current international system with the reproduction and transformation pattern of other state systems. However, Khaldûn's analysis of the dynamics of the transition from nomadic desert to sedentary or urban civilization offers important points of comparison between precapitalist and capitalist social systems. His analysis of the relation between the dynamics of social change and foreign relations is far more developed than the analysis of change provided in either the mainstream or those Weberian approaches which, in principle, have a social reference but do not have a sociological concept of the international.

In summary, it can be argued that Ibn Khaldûn's historical sociology overcomes the shortcomings of rationalist IR by: (1) incorporating an historical understanding of social structures and social forces related to these social structures; (2) incorporating the interactive multiplicity of different political units and thus the international in the formation of different political units; (3) introducing a materialist understanding of social change based on relations of production; and (4) an analysis of foreign relations based on social relations.

Item (2) is particularly important as most of the theories of social change that emerged during the 1960s (e.g., that of Barrington Moore)¹⁰² have been criticized for ignoring the international dimension of social change. The first wave of Weberians introduced the impact of the international on social change, but their understanding of the international system did not go beyond a realist conceptualization of anarchy. As argued in this chapter, this brings Khaldûn's work much closer to historical materialist historical sociology, which is historically sensitive and incorporates historical generalizations. Khaldûn's work can be described as a multi-causal analysis of social change that gives primacy to the social organization of human beings and emphasizes a complex social ontology, relying on international and social processes.

Khaldûn outlines a perpetual cycle of crisis grounded in the inevitability of change. The history of civilizations demonstrates that once a civilization reach the peak of its power, an inevitable cycle of decline starts. Khaldûn's cyclical transformation of civilizations is a structural reality rooted in the social organization of production and a division between social forces. As long as these divisions continue, they inevitably lead to external intervention, conflict and anarchy, and thus to cycles of rise and fall. What differs in Khaldûn's analysis, compared with cyclical theories of hegemonic change in IR, is that the mostly realist theories of cyclical change are premised on *the existence of an unchanging international system* based on sovereign states and the limitations posed by an immutable anarchical structure. In Khaldûn, we see a cyclical theory based on a reality constantly in the process of transformation, however this transformative capacity is arrested by historical social structures. The internally induced whip of necessity combines the development of different societies with each other, albeit unevenly. An example of this is the colonization of Maghreb societies, their exploitation, and underdevelopment. The price of the absence of an internally generated dynamism and an economic class to lead socio-economic transformation have been incorporation into a capitalist system of worldwide inequality in a peripheral economic status.

Khaldûn could not have developed an evolutionary conceptualization of change, given the historical circumstances in which he lived. His theory of cycles is oriented to explain the obstacles to change and the absence of a long-term historical evolution in the Maghreb. In dealing with the issue of cyclical decay, Khaldûn did not find the sources of the problem in God, nor in the influence of external factors, but in domestic social circumstances, which raised the question of why these social structures did not evolve into a stable system. European

societies passed through slavery, feudal, and capitalist modes of production. Those societies which were ruled by, what Marx called, oriental despotism or an Asiatic mode of production stagnated due to the failure to establish a system of private ownership, and were therefore characterized by the absence of a class struggle as the motor of change, similar to what happened in Western Europe.¹⁰³ As Gramsci would say, "the crisis consist[ed] precisely in the fact that the old [was] dying and the new [could] not be born."¹⁰⁴

Lacoste argues that the static nature of these societies, as observed by Khaldûn, were to become the main cause of European imperialism and colonialism, causing their present cycle of exploitation and underdevelopment. If these countries are not able to evolve internally into democratic and modern societies and sustain stable governments this means that there is a need to intervene so that they do not become a threat to regional and global stability. No matter how much he might oppose them, Ibn Khaldûn's observations on dynastic decline concur with these imperial and interventionist ideas. Thus, it is no surprise that his work has been praised by colonialists and criticized by Arab scholars.¹⁰⁵

Colonization destroyed indigenous structures but reproduced underdevelopment, combining old internal structures with new external causes leading to new forms of UCD under the changed conditions of capitalist production.¹⁰⁶ However, it should be noted that this analysis is also tainted by a Eurocentrism which assumes that the state of these societies is because they have not followed a similar pattern to Europe, or that they have not been through the same stages of development. Of course, the *Muqaddima* has its own historicity and Khaldûn could not be expected to predict such implications of his work. As Marx stated, "Mankind always sets itself only such problems as it can solve; since, on closer examination, it will always be found that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation."¹⁰⁷

Notes

1. Kamran Matin, "Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State Formation in Premodern Iran," *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (2007): 419.
2. Matin, "Uneven and Combined Development in World History," 420.
3. Benno Teschke, "Bourgeois Revolution, State Formation and the Absence of the International," *Historical Materialism* 13 (2005): 3–26.
4. Faruk Yalvaç, "The Sociology of the State and the Sociology of International Relations," in *State and Society in International Relations*, in eds. Michael Banks and Martin Shaw (New York/London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 93–113.

5. George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-state," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 20(1978): 2014–35; reprinted in A. Linklater ed. *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, London: Routledge, 2000), 1,340–1,360; A.F.K. Organski and J. Kugler "Power Transition and Great Power from Westphalia to Waterloo" *World Politics* 45 (1992): 153–177; R. Gilpin "The Cycle of Great Powers: Has it finally broken" in *The Fall of Great Powers*, ed. G. Lundestad (Oslo: 1994), 313–330.
6. Michael, Mann (1986), *The Sources of Social Power, Vol 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD1760*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Theda Skocpol (1979) *States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Charles Tilly "Reflections on the History of European State Making," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 3–83.
7. Quoted in John M. Hobson, George Lawson and Justin Rosenberg, "Historical Sociology," Robert A. Denemark (ed.), *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, Vol. VI (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), 3367.
8. Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (London: Pluto Press, 1985); *The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969).
9. Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003); Tilly "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
10. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
11. Kamran Matin, "Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State Formation in Premodern Iran," *European Journal of Sociology*, 13 (2007), 421.
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5

From Tripartite Division to Universal Humanism: Alternative Islamic Global International Relations

Ahmed Al-Dawoody

Introduction

The advent of Islam in Arabia in 610 CE generated a reaction of hostility towards the Prophet Muḥammad (b. 570) and the believers in the new religion because of its monotheistic message, which constituted a major threat to the political and economic power and prestige of Arab polytheists. Due to the mounting persecution and hostility, in 622 CE Muslims were forced to flee their home town of Mecca and found a safe haven in Medina, where they established a state and hence the concept of the Muslim *ummah* (nation) started to develop. However, this does not mean that hostilities came to an end, on the contrary, a series of fights and small wars took place between the new Muslim *ummah* and their enemies. Following the death of Prophet Muḥammad, the caliphs (heads of the Islamic state) initiated a series of *futūḥāt* (literally openings, campaigns) to spread the new religion. Based on these historical precedents and the scriptural sources of Islam, the Qur'ān and the *sunnah* (tradition) of Prophet Muḥammad, on the one hand, and the paradigms of international relations of their times, on the other, Muslim jurists and scholars have interpreted and formulated Islamic theories of international relations.

Since the second Islamic century (8th century CE), classical Muslim jurists have divided their world into two or three: *dār al-Islām* (literally house of Islam), *dār al-ḥarb* (house of war), and *dār al-ṣulḥ* (house of peace). However, the majority of Muslims did not recognize the *dār al-ṣulḥ*. Many scholars are still debating and interpreting the meaning

and impact of this tripartite division, or this classical Islamic paradigm of international relations, in a post-UN world. Shaykh Muḥammad Abū Zahrah (1898–1974), a prolific 20th century jurist and scholar, shaped a modern approach to the subject of international relations in Islam in two volumes, *Al-Mujtama' al-Insānī fī Zill al-Islām* (Human Society in the Shade of Islam) and *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām* (International Relations in Islam). In these two volumes, Abū Zahrah's interpretations of the scriptural sources of Islam provide a universal humanistic Islamic paradigm of international relations. This chapter discusses and compares the theoretical foundations and impact of these classical and modern Islamic paradigms of international relations in our globalized world and attempts to test the hypothesis of the clash of civilizations against them. It argues that Muslim non-state actors will be the main force using and misusing Islam in the arena of international relations.

Classical paradigm of Islamic international relations: tripartite division

Attempts by Muslim scholars to govern and regulate the actions of Muslim individuals and Islamic states in the light of Islamic scriptural sources produced a literature on issues ranging from personal purification to criminal law, constitutional law, and international law. This literature, which was documented in written form during the 8th century, is still the raw material from which Muslims throughout history have investigated and formulated Islamic law, and regulated international relations. It is reasonable to assume that any theory or paradigm of international relations at any point in human history is a reflection of, and a response to, the situation in which it is created. Eighth century Muslim jurists produced a tripartite division of their world that is still being interpreted and debated. Nonetheless, modern Muslim scholars almost unanimously agree that this tripartite division of the world has no basis in the scriptural sources of Islam, the Qur'ān or the *sunnah*.¹ Due to the misunderstanding of this classical division in the writings of some Western scholars and detractors of Islam, regretfully, the message of the religion of Islam is portrayed as hostile and inimical to the rest of the world. But more importantly and catastrophically, Muslim terrorists and extremists have resorted to this classical division to justify terrorist acts, including the attacks on 9/11.²

It is important to recall that, before further discussion of this classical division, firstly, both the concept of the Muslim *ummah* and the Islamic state, as established by Prophet Muḥammad in Medina in 622, emerged in a world where a state of enmity was the norm in international relations

unless a peace treaty had been signed.³ In other words, this division is a theoretical categorization of the different patterns of relations between the Islamic state and the rest of the world of that time. The following brief discussion of the nuances and legal ramifications of this division indicates that it does not sanction a clash, or hostile pattern of relations. Secondly, it should also be stressed that this chapter studies the classical and modern contributions to norms in Islamic international relations. Therefore, this is not a study of how international relations are practiced by contemporary Muslim states. That is because

The secular approach to the conduct of foreign relations has been accepted by almost all Muslim states, whether completely secularized in their internal legal structure, as in the case of Turkey, or still recognizing the *shari'a* as their basic law, as in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen. Scholars who usually objected to the secularization of domestic laws, have accepted marked departures from traditional Muslim law governing Islam's foreign relations.⁴

However, the significance of this study is that the classical Islamic theories of international relations and the bulk of Islamic law was developed by Muslim jurists in the 8th century. Those laws have been used and abused by non-state actors, whether one examines terrorist Muslim groups, who use it to sanction their use of terrorist acts against non-Muslim targets, or by Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim societies to regulate their religious actions.

Dār al-Islām (house of Islam) – also called, among other names, *dār al-salām* (house of peace) or *dār al-'adl* (house of justice) – is interpreted by classical Muslim jurists in three different ways. Firstly, according to the majority of Muslim scholars, *dār al-Islām* is the territory where Islam and Islamic law is practiced.⁵ There are many disagreements regarding the practice and application of Islam and its legal system. Those disagreements range from those scholars who are lenient and label a territory as a *dār al-Islām* if a single Islamic law is applied, or if some Islamic ritual, such as prayers, can be safely performed,⁶ to extremist scholars who would label even a Muslim country as a *dār al-ḥarb* (house of war), or *dār al-kufr* (house of unbelief), if the country does not apply Islamic law, or applies laws that are not compatible with Islamic law. Many Muslim countries apply secular Western law at present. Various extremist groups have labeled Egypt, for example, as a *dār al-Kufr* because Islamic laws are not wholly applied there.⁷ Practically speaking, the lenient group view all the world as *dār al-Islām* because any Muslim can safely practice their faith,

e.g., perform prayers, use Islamic banking, buy Halal food. It is interesting to add here that Muslim minorities in many non-Muslim countries enjoy a degree of religious and political freedom far greater than in their country of origin. Because a part from a handful of Muslim countries who apply solely Islamic law, the rest of the Muslim countries fall under the category of *dār al-ḥarb* for fundamentalist and extremist Muslim movements, for whom, at present, the application of Islamic law is the most overarching criterion for identifying a country as an Islamic state. Hence, many non-violent Islamist movements and political parties have clearly stated that the application of Islamic law in their countries is at the top of their political agenda. While numerous terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by Muslim terrorists in Islamic countries for the same reason. These ongoing discussions and deliberations of what constitutes a *dār al-Islām* indicate that this division is neither geographical nor is it based on the religious affiliation of the country's rulers or population, but that it is determined by the extent of freedom to practice and implement Islamic law.

Secondly, another minority group of Muslim scholars argue that a country is identified as a *dār al-Islām* if it is ruled by Muslims,⁸ on the grounds that if authority is in the hands of Muslims, then they can live in peace and enjoy the freedom to exercise their religion. However, there is a misunderstanding among both Muslims and non-Muslims that Islam calls upon Muslims to go to war with the rest of the world. Hence, jihad as a concept, according to Majid Khadduri (1909–1907) is “the universalization of religion [Islam] and the establishment of an imperial world state.”⁹ A state that is somewhat inaccurately likened to the papacy.¹⁰ The caliphate is portrayed as an imperial¹¹ world state that Muslims are religiously required to establish, in order to conquer the world. This misrepresentation of these Islamic concepts and doctrines shows the relevance of classical Islamic theory and how it is still used to unintentionally support the hypothesis of the clash of civilizations.

Thirdly, as advocated by Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767) – the eponymous founder of the largest school of Islamic law predominant, for example, in Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India – *dār al-Islām* is any territory in which Muslims and *dhimmis* (non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic state) enjoy personal safety and freedom to practice their religion.¹² Abū Ḥanīfah's emphasis on the element of safety, and the inclusion of non-Muslim citizens in his criteria, is revealing because it indicates, first, that his division is not a religious one per se. *Dār al-Islām* does not exclusively refer to the territory of the believers in Islam and that wherever Muslims feel safe is a *dār al-Islām*. Second, understandably, any territory where the lives of the citizens of the Islamic state are in danger is a

hostile place and thus could be a *dār al-ḥarb*. It follows that, according to Abū Ḥanīfah's criterion, the entire world is now a *dār al-Islām*, except for places where Muslims are being targeted.

Therefore, the determination of what constitutes a *dār al-ḥarb* (house of war), also called *dār al-kufr* (house of unbelief), or *dār al-jawr* (house of injustice), varies according to the above three positions. In short, *dār al-ḥarb* is any part of the world where Muslims cannot live and practice their faith in peace. Classical Muslim jurists base this twofold division on the existence, or lack of existence, of peace and religious freedom for Muslims in a given time and place. Muslim jurists' theoretical outlook was influenced by the realities of their world. But more importantly, the compendia of laws formulated in this context addressed the relation between the house of Islam and the house of war to regulate issues such as the jurisdiction of Islamic law, the performance of Islamic religious obligations in non-Muslim territories, and international trade.¹³ The laws regulating the relation between the Islamic state and the, so-called, house of war are not based merely on the name. In other words, the understanding that the Islamic creed commands Muslims to go to war against *dār al-ḥarb*, or the rest of the world, until they accept Islam or fall under its control, is an oversimplification of the classical Muslim jurists' scholarly attempts to theorize and regulate relations with the non-Muslim world, using highly legal, technical, and hermeneutical methodologies based on their world situation. It is unfortunate that such an oversimplification is accepted in Western mainstream scholarship. Writing in 1956, Khadduri claims that: "In theory *dar al-Islam* was always at war with *dar al-harb*. The Muslims were under legal obligation to reduce the latter to Muslim rule in order to achieve Islam's ultimate objective, namely, the enforcement of God's law (the *Shari'a*) over the entire world."¹⁴ Furthermore, there is a common understanding, unfortunately, among large segments of Muslim populations that the lives of non-Muslim citizens are not inviolable and that their property can be taken as spoils. In addition to using these divisions out of context, there is a sharp distinction between *dār al-ḥarb* (an enemy state) and *ḥarbī* (an enemy belligerent), whose life is not inviolable during war, although his person and property cannot be targeted if he becomes *hors de combat*. Although such issues governing the use of force are regulated in great detail in classical Islamic law books, the 9/11 attackers described their heinous acts as a *ghazwah* (raid, the Arabic word used to refer to the battles between the Muslims and their enemies during the Prophet's lifetime). The point here is that the terrorists wrongly appropriated the state of war between the Muslims and their

enemies during the Prophet's lifetime in order to justify their attacks against innocent civilians by claiming that the victims were citizens and taxpayers of the *dār al-ḥarb*, the enemy state.

As for the third division, the *dār al-ṣulḥ*, (house of peace), also called *dār al-'ahd* (house of reconciliation/house of covenant), was devised by al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820), the eponymous founder of the Shāfi'ī Sunni school of Islamic law, the second largest school which is predominant in Yemen, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, among other parts of the Muslim world. It refers to autonomous territories that do not fall under the authority of the Islamic state and which entered into peace agreements/pacts of non-aggression with the Islamic state. Al-Shāfi'ī devised this third division, because, unlike the other three Sunni schools of Islamic law, he formulated the doctrine of offensive jihad against non-Muslims until they become Muslims or fall under the control of the Islamic state, the understanding inaccurately attributed by Khadduri to Islam in general. In other words, al-Shāfi'ī devised a hostile paradigm of international relations against non-Muslims – also adopted by some jurists of the Ḥanbalī school predominant in Saudi Arabia and a few Gulf countries – because he believed that war is justified against non-Muslims and this intermediary division of *dār al-ṣulḥ* is a territory neither inhabited nor ruled by Muslims. But it seems that al-Shāfi'ī acknowledged a state of peace between the *dār al-Islām* and the *dār al-ṣulḥ* because of pragmatic calculations and/or as a temporary arrangement. He opined that the Muslim state is not obliged to wage war against non-Muslims if the Muslim state is weaker than its enemies, and if it concludes a peace treaty with its enemies because of weakness, which should not last for more than ten years following the precedent set by Prophet Muḥammad in the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyah in 628.¹⁵ But the majority of the remaining jurists of the three schools of Sunni Islamic law “did not accept this third conceptual division of *dār al-ṣulḥ*, arguing that, if a territory concludes a peace treaty and pays tax to *dār al-Islām*, it becomes a part of *dār al-Islām* and thus *dār al-Islām* is obliged to protect it.”¹⁶

The above brief discussion of the classical Islamic theory of international relations reflects the classical Islamic juristic mindset. When analysing and evaluating this theory it is important to keep three factors in mind, the nature of international relations of the time, and the objectives and methodologies used in formulating those interpretations:

- 1 The hostile nature of international relations during the 7th and 8th centuries had a direct impact on the development of this theory. Since

Islam is a proselytizing religion, and Muslims are required to preach it to the rest of the world, the theory and the majority of rules developed in that context were a response to an atmosphere of enmity, not only towards the Islamic state but, more importantly, also towards the preaching of Islam and its practice in non-Muslim territories. This explains why the three criteria for identifying *dār al-Islām* versus *dār al-ḥarb* centered on the freedom to practice Islam and implement its laws. As a result, classical Muslim jurists agree that if Muslims were unable to practice their religion without persecution they had to flee to a Muslim state.

- 2 The objectives of Muslim jurists in developing this theory, and the rules and regulations that are still being implemented by Muslim individuals and non-state actors, were to regulate Muslim state practices, and those of Muslim individuals, in accordance with the dictates of Islam and in a manner that serves the best interest of the Muslim state. A study of Islamic international law and the rules of Islamic international humanitarian law shows that Muslim jurists developed them unilaterally without any agreement or negotiation with other parties, showing that Islamic law in this area is self-imposed.¹⁷ That is to say, Muslims are to abide by these rules in order to please the Almighty, regardless of whether or not their enemies or other states abide by them. Due to the religious nature of Islamic law, non-state actors and individual Muslims are still motivated to study and implement the classical rules.
- 3 The classical Muslim jurists employed highly technical hermeneutical and juristic methodologies from the scriptural sources of Islam and precedents set by the Prophet to deduce a pattern of relations with the non-Muslim world. To give an example, since the Qur'ān contains various texts addressing relations with Muslim enemies during the Prophet's lifetime, before and after the flight to Medina, most Muslim jurists employed the controversial theory of abrogation, which means that a subsequent text annuls a previous one(s). Some of them gave an interpretation of the scriptural sources that promotes a permanent state of hostility between Muslims and their enemies and they also overrode the Islamic worldview contained in the Qur'ān, discussed below.

Modern paradigm of Islamic international relations: universal humanism

Twentieth century changes in international society, particularly the establishment of the United Nations on the one hand, and, on the

other, the criticism by Western scholars that Islam is a violent religion that aims to convert non-Muslims via jihad, challenges Muslim scholars to revisit the classical Islamic theory of international relations. As a reaction to Western cultural and scientific hegemony there have been scholarly attempts to analyze Islamic contributions in different fields, including international relations and, more recently, economics and finance. There has also been a growing interest in the role of religion in international relations after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.¹⁸ Islamic international relations have been studied by traditionally trained Islamic scholars and by Muslim scholars trained in international relations. Most modern Muslim scholars shifted from the structured methodological juristic approach of their classical predecessors to focus more on an Islamic worldview; how does Islam view relations with other nation-states, and how does it deal with the prohibition of the use of offensive force?

One of the main questions for Islamic international relations is whether peace or war are the original and permanent state of relations with non-Muslims, according to the dictates of the religion. There are three answers to this question. First, in brief, is that a majority of modern Muslim scholars support the opinion that peace is the original and permanent state of relations with the rest of the world and, following the establishment of the UN and the world's agreement on the prohibition of the use of force (except as an intrinsic right of self-defence). Therefore, the classical Islamic theory of international relations is now obsolete and most of those rules that were developed accordingly are now null and void.¹⁹ Those twofold (*dār al-Islām* vs *dār al-ḥarb*) or threefold (*dār al-Islām*, *dār al-ṣulḥ*, and *dār al-ḥarb*) divisions were not inspired by the theological dictates of Islam, but were the product of the 7th and 8th century world situations characterized by a state of enmity in international relations. Consequently, it is worth adding here, that the bulk of the classical writings on the subject focused on the Islamic *jus in bello* (regulation on the conduct of war) and almost completely disregarded the Islamic *jus ad bellum* (justifications for going to war).

The second answer borrows from the paradigm of international relations addressed by the classical Muslim jurists. Muslim radicals and terrorists argue that war is the original and permanent state of relations with the rest of the world, and therefore non-Muslims are to be fought until they accept Islam or fall under its rule, which is putting them on the same footing as the *kuffār* (infidels, Arab polytheists) who originally persecuted the Muslims and prevented the spread of Islam. So some of the rules on the use of force developed by classical Muslim jurists

are selectively used to sanction acts of terrorism against innocent non-Muslim civilians.²⁰

The third answer from modern Muslim scholars is that neither peace nor war is the permanent and original state of relations with non-Muslims, but that *da'wah* (preaching the religion of Islam)²¹ should always be the object of Islamic relations with the rest of the non-Muslim world. Hence, what determines whether a state of peace or war exists with non-Muslims is their attitude towards the preachers/missionaries for the religion of Islam.²² This third view largely agrees with the first, which supports that peace is the original state of relations with non-Muslims, and is almost unanimous that war in Islam is justified in the following three cases: (1) aggression against Islamic territories; (2) religious persecution of Muslims; and (3) preventing the preaching of Islam. It is worth mentioning that the renowned 14th century scholar "Ibn Taymiyyah [1328] explains that killing (warfare) is not the goal of Islam, but is a means of protecting the faith, and those who preach it, from hostilities."²³ Confirming the same position, Rashīd Riḍā (1935) states that "if preachers are killed or prevented from preaching, Muslims should go to war to protect the mission to preach Islam."²⁴ Thus, modern Islamic theorists share the classical Islamic theory of international relations, because they both focus on non-Muslim reactions to Islam. Apart from radical and terrorist groups who argue for a state of perpetual war against non-Muslims, the classical and modern Islamic theorists of international relations are passive. In other words, these two theories do not offer a positive Islamic worldview that could contribute to making the world a better place, or even a theoretical framework to humanize international relations, a task that Abū Zahrah addressed in the 20th century, as shown below. However, it should be reiterated that classical Muslim jurists did have some success in humanizing both international and domestic armed conflicts.

Abū Zahrah's universal humanism

The current literature on Islamic international relations shows the great impact of Shaykh Muḥammad Abū Zahrah (d. 1974), whose works on the subject shaped the modern Islamic approach to Islamic international relations theory and therefore most current literature is mainly a reproduction of those works.²⁵ Abu Zahrah's work is original because he did not depend on repeating, analyzing, or developing earlier studies or approaches. His intellectual framework made him one of the influential intellectual reformers in contemporary Islamic thought. His courage,

independent thinking, belief in his mission, and – a particularly rare characteristic among Muslim scholars – his deep insight into the present state of affairs, helped him to reshape and modernize certain fields in contemporary Islamic thought, including Islamic international relations theory. He belonged to the reform paradigm that advocated for the revival of Islamic legal heritage instead of importations from foreign legal systems. He also showed a degree of openness to development. His independent thinking and erudite scholarship as a classically trained Azharite scholar and jurist, in addition to having a certain degree of acquaintance with Western legal systems and philosophy, helped him view the subject in an unconventional way.

In his *Al-Mujtama' al-Insānī fī Zill al-Islām* (Human Society in the Shade of Islam), Abū Zahrah emphasizes that the atrocities suffered by humanity are due to the absence of religion. He argues that the Islamic international relations paradigm was the first to be based on the principle of justice between international societies and that it is self-imposed out of a conviction of the need to implement justice for all humanity.

Interestingly, Abū Zahrah uses Islamic theology and its doctrine of monotheism as a sign of unity in the human race since all humans have the same origin and thus they form one nation²⁶ and should worship the same Creator. Islam also unites humanity through the final revelation, the Qur'ān, which includes the essence of all divinely revealed religions with many Qur'ānic texts directed at all humanity (for instance Qur'ān: 4:170, 174; 7:158; 10:57).²⁷ This sense of unity is reinforced in two instances. First, the Qur'ānic text (49:13) indicates God's creation of humankind from different genders, peoples, and tribes, with a call for people to get to know each other, to maintain friendly relations and cooperation, and mutual respect. Second, the Qur'ānic text (4:100; 67:15) calling for migration in search of sustenance and better opportunities also reinforces a sense of brotherhood and cooperation among humankind.²⁸ Abū Zahrah's formulation of this Islamic Weltanschauung, or Islamically based universal humanistic paradigm of international relations, is unprecedented in Islamic history.

Therefore, Abū Zahrah has gone a step beyond merely proving that the permanent state of relations with non-Muslims is peace, not war. He argues clearly that his investigation into Islamic international relations is based on his reading of the scriptural sources of Islam and not on the historical practices of Islamic states, which in many cases were in stark violation of the dictates of Islam.²⁹ He built his proposed framework of the universal humanistic Islamic paradigm of international relations on

the following ten core Islamic principles governing, what he calls, the subject of “human relations/bonds” in times of both peace and war:

1. Human dignity: Qur’ānic texts (17:70; 2:30–33; 45:12–13) reinforce the idea of human dignity since mankind is the vicegerent of God on this earth, endowed with the intellect and power to acquire the knowledge that enables humans to be masters of this universe. All human beings have the same dignity regardless of their race and the only measure of people in God’s sight, according to Islam, is piety, which prevents people from wrongdoing.³⁰ Article 1 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted by foreign ministers at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on August 5, 1990, reiterates the same principle in the following words: “All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. All human beings are Allah’s subjects, and the most loved by Him are those who are most beneficial to His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of piety and good deeds.”³¹ Moreover, the human dignity of the enemy is protected under Islamic law, even during war. For example, according to Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795) the eponymous founder of the Mālikī school of law, it is prohibited to target the face of enemy soldiers or to torture captured enemy belligerents to obtain military intelligence.³² Respecting the dignity of the enemy also includes burying their dead.³³
2. All humans form one nation: according to Qur’ānic texts (4:1; 7:189; 30:22; 49:13) humans belong to the same parents and thus they form one nation. This concept is reinforced in Article 1 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam as follows: “All human beings form one family whose members are united by their subordination to Allah and they all descend from Adam.”³⁴ The influence of Abū Zahrah’s thought is crystal clear in current literature.³⁵ Abū Zahrah explains that differences in color, language, etc., are not a justification for enmity, therefore Islam condemns claims of both ethnic and national superiority, the reasons for much of the injustice and oppression committed against humanity and the atrocities of war that have led to massive bloodshed.³⁶
3. Human cooperation: the Qur’ān (5:2) commands humanity to cooperate in doing good and preventing injustice and aggression. Upon his arrival in Medina, Prophet Muḥammad concluded a cooperation

- treaty with the Jewish tribes living there to promote peaceful cohabitation. Similarly, he concluded peace treaties with Arab polytheists.³⁷
4. Forbearance: Qur'ānic texts (41:34; 7:199; 16:126–127) and the Prophet's practices with non-Muslims are testimony to forbearance, which Abū Zahrah confirms. This policy of forbearance is highly productive, whether one is in a state of war or after victory. The general amnesty given to the Meccan polytheists after the Muslims took over authority in Mecca is a case in point.³⁸
 5. Freedom (liberty): without freedom human character, whether as individuals or in groups, cannot fully develop and therefore the Islamic conception of freedom, as maintained by Abū Zahrah, includes freedom of religion and the right to self-determination. Qur'ānic texts (2:256; 10:99) prohibit religious compulsion and therefore protect the right of non-Muslims to practice their religion freely in Islamic states. Article 10 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam protects freedom of religion as follows: "It is prohibited to exercise any form of pressure on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to force him to change his religion to another religion or to atheism."³⁹ By the same token, Abū Zahrah indicates that the right of self-determination is protected in Islam for both Muslims and non-Muslims and adds that "it is prohibited for an Islamic state to conquer the territories of another country or take by force authority from its people."⁴⁰ However, he did not provide a scriptural basis for this opinion and, to justify it, he argues that conquests by the Islamic state following the demise of the Prophet were just wars and aimed at liberation from Roman and Persian tyranny. What he meant by Muslim self-determination was that Muslim minorities who are unable to practice their religion in non-Muslim territories are required to flee to the Islamic state.⁴¹ As for the prohibition of colonialism and the right to self-determination, Article 10 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam reads: "Colonialism of all types being one of the most evil forms of enslavement is totally prohibited. Peoples suffering from colonialism have the full right to freedom and self-determination."⁴²
 6. Virtue: one of the fundamental Islamic principles in human relations is a commitment to virtue, particularly during war. Abū Zahrah adds that, as dictated by the Qur'ān (2:190; 2:194) and explained above, although defensive war is permitted in Islam, Muslims are not permitted to violate Islamic regulations on the conduct of war, even if their enemies do. For example, if the enemy targets women and children, maltreats Muslim prisoners of war, or mutilates the bodies

of Muslim soldiers, then members of the Muslim army are prohibited from doing the same and are still bound by Islamic rules on the conduct of war.⁴³

7. Justice: in Islam (see Qur'ān 5:8; 16:90; 57:25), as in all divine religions, human relations must be based on the principle of justice, whether in peace or war. Abū Zahrah again focuses on justice during a state of war and reiterates that resorting to war must be justified and its conduct be subject to Islamic rules regulating the use of force.⁴⁴ It is worth recalling here, as pointed out by Khadduri, that the Islamic state implements a self-imposed scale of justice in its relations with the rest of the world.⁴⁵
8. Reciprocity: Prophet Muḥammad said: "Treat people the way you want them to treat you." Thus, in line with, and not in contradiction to, the principles of justice, injustice is stopped by implementing the principles of forbearance, virtue, and reciprocity. Qur'ānic text 2: 251 explains that if defensive wars had not been permitted, the earth would have been corrupted.⁴⁶
9. *Pacta sunt servanda*: one of the ways to maintain the state of peace is to honor treaties and therefore it is a religious obligation that Muslims uphold treaties, as dictated in the Qur'ān (16:91–94).⁴⁷
10. Friendship and preventing tyranny: the bond of brotherhood among all humanity necessitates entering into friendly relations with others, even during a state of war (Qur'ān 60:8–9). In Islam acts of hostility are permitted only against enemy belligerents.⁴⁸ Providing humanitarian aid and friendly relations are permissible in Islam, even with the enemy state. Prophet Muḥammad sent a donation of 500 dinars to Abū Sufyān, a leader of the Meccan polytheists, so that he could buy wheat and distribute it to the poor people of the tribe of Quraysh when they suffered from a calamity that hit the economy, and this is taken as a precedent.⁴⁹ It is also reported that he sent an amount of gold for the same purpose.⁵⁰ But classical Muslim jurists prohibited the selling of certain commodities to the enemy during a state of war lest they strengthen the enemy, such as iron, weapons, or slaves that could be used for fighting.⁵¹

These ten principles are described by Abū Zahrah as the rules that must govern the Islamic model of international relations, both in times of peace and war and, therefore, any violation of these rules is condemned.⁵² This universal humanistic approach is deeply rooted in Islamic scripture, however it took more than 13 centuries for Abū Zahrah to uncover them. The above ten principles that strengthen the

concepts of brotherhood, dignity, freedom of belief, the right to self-determination, and so on, constitute a positive theoretical contribution to the study of international relations theory. Mainstream Muslim scholarship, and both governmental and non-governmental religious institutions, take pride in advocating a universal humanistic Islamic approach in international relations. The articles in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted by foreign ministers at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, are influenced by the ideas mentioned above. Muslims often blame Western scholars for distorting the true image of Islam by propagating that Islam is a violent religion and for supporting a self-fulfilling prophecy of a clash of civilizations. The great benefit here is that, although this contribution is merely a scholarly and theoretical effort, it could serve as a yardstick against which the conduct of Muslim states and Muslim non-state actors should be judged, particularly if such Muslim states adopt Islam as the state religion in their constitutions, or if such non-state actors describe themselves as Muslim.

Conclusion

As discussed above, both classical and modern Islamic writings are the result of Muslim scholars' interpretations of the Islamic scriptures. Since those writings are attributed to the religion of Islam, both Muslims and non-Muslims commonly assume that these opinions provide non-changing doctrinal ordinances about relations with the rest of the world. Therefore, the context of those writings is totally ignored. It is important to note that determining which opinion reflects the true spirit of Islam in the 14 centuries of Islamic history is a very subjective matter. Both Muslims and non-Muslims need to understand which is the true Islamic paradigm that Muslim have to adopt, at least in theory, and particularly in our globalized world; whether it is the classical position of permanent war adopted by al-Shāfi'ī (d. 820) against non-Muslims until they accept Islam or fall under its rule; or if it is Abū Zahrah's (1898–1974) modern universal humanism perspective.

If one examines the assumption by the clash of civilizations theory that the "central focus of conflict for the immediate future"⁵³ is between the West and Islamic states then it is necessary to identify which approach will be used to counter this argument: the classical or the modern. Al-Shāfi'ī's classical position advocates permanent conflict with the whole non-Muslim world. Abū Zahrah, on the other hand, writes about human beings as a family linked by the bonds of fraternity and justice, which, in his view, makes civilizational conflict

in Islam impossible. Muslim states are signatories to the UN charter and accept the prohibition of an offensive use of force. Muslim states also adopt a secular approach to international relations. The current role of Islam in international relations is played primarily by non-state actors. A host of violent radical Muslim groups have committed terrorist acts both inside and outside the Muslim world. The current phenomenon of terrorism perpetrated by Muslims seems unthinkable to classical Muslim scholars not only because the use of force in non-Muslim territories must be conducted under legitimate leadership, but that they must also meet the rest of the conditions of both the Islamic *jus ad bellum* and Islamic *jus in bello*. Although Samuel P Huntington is right in stating that in our world "Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs," violent Muslim non-state actors have recently proven a serious challenge, not only to Muslim societies but also to international society at large. According to a Gallup poll released on February 13, 2015, Americans believe that the terrorist group in Iraq and Syria the Islamic State (ISIS) will pose the gravest threat to the US's vital interests over the next decade.⁵⁴ In conclusion, non-state actors will continue to justify their terrorist acts in Islamic terms and, therefore, the remedy to their misuse of the faith to fix the *dār al-Islām* lies on the inside. Bringing about genuine democracy in the Muslim world and promoting the peaceful message of Islam in the weak educational systems in most Muslim countries is a must. Since Islam will continue to be used by non-state actors, then the antidote to their misrepresentation of Islam is Islam itself. Abū Zahrah's universal humanism paradigm is a great contribution to the study of the international relations theories, in general, and to Muslims, in particular, if they use Islam in the arena of international relations.

Notes

1. Dafer Khidr Sulaiman, "Al-Qismah al-Thunā'īyyah Dār al-Islam wa Dār al-Ḥarb bayn al-Mujīz wa al-Mānī'," *Majallah Abḥāth Kulliyah al-Tarbiyah al-Asāsiyyah*, Vol. 10, No 1, p. 172; 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Ḥāj, "Al-Manzūr al-Fiqhī wa al-Taqsīm al-Qur'ānī lil-Ma'mūrah," *Islāmiyyah al-Ma'rifah*, Issue 45, Summer 2006, p. 69; p. 54;
2. Al-Ḥāj, "Al-Manzūr al-Fiqhī wa al-Taqsīm al-Qur'ānī lil-Ma'mūrah," pp. 65-67.
3. Ahmed Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations*, Palgrave Series in Islamic Theology, Law, and History, Vol. 2, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 141.
4. Majid Khadduri, "Islam and the Modern Law of Nations," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 50, No. 2, April 1956, p. 370. The same idea is reinforced by Maurits Berger in the following words: "although Islam

- plays a dominant role as the authoritative discourse in domestic policies in Muslim countries, it hardly does so in the international arena." Maurits Berger, *Religion and Islam in Contemporary International Relations*, *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers*, No. 27 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2010), p. 2.
5. See, for example, Sulaiman, "Al-Qismah al-Thunā'iyah Dār al-Islam wa Dār al-Ḥarb bayn al-Mujīz wa al-Mānī," p. 167; Muhammad Ali Saleem al-Hawwari, "Tabī'ah 'Alāqah al-Muslimīn bi-Gahyrihim min al-Umam," *Majalah al-Jami'ah al-Islamiyyah*, Vol. 19, No 2, June 2011, p. 387.
 6. See, for example, Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/eighth to the Eleventh/Seventh Centuries," *Islamic Law and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994, pp. 161 f.; A. Abel, "Dār al-Ḥarb," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., Vol. II, p. 126.
 7. "Salafiyūn Jihādiyūn: Miṣr Diyār Kufr wa 'Mursī' Yaḥkum bi-al-Tāghūt," www.elwatannews.com/news/details/69242, accessed March 3, 2015.
 8. Majid Khadduri, "The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance," in J. Harris Proctor, ed., *Islam and International Relations* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 25.
 9. Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), p. 51.
 10. Graham E. Fuller, "Who's Afraid of the Caliphate," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/isis-caliphate-meaning_b_5562600.html, accessed January 23, 2015; Khadduri, "Islam and the Modern Law of Nations," p. 358.
 11. See, for example, Khadduri, "Islam and the Modern Law of Nations," p. 358; <http://www.moonofalabama.org/2014/09/the-caliphates-anti-imperial-dualism.html>, accessed January 23, 2015.
 12. Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, *Mawsū'ah al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa al-qaḍāyā al-Mu'āṣirah* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2010), Vol. 7, p. 194; Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p. 93.
 13. See al-Zuhaylī, *Mawsū'ah al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa al-qaḍāyā al-Mu'āṣirah*, Vol. 7, pp. 202–210; 'Abd Allah Ibrāhīm Zayd al-Kilānī, "Al-Ru'yah al-Islāmiyyah lil-'Ālam wa Atharuhā fī Taḥdīd al-Siyāsah al-Kharijiyyah," *Islāmiyyah al-Ma'rifah*, Vol. 45, Summer 2006, p. 61; Fātimah Kassāb, "Al-Ru'yah al-Mu'āṣirah lil-Taqsīm al-Islāmī lil-Ma'mūrah: Murāja'ah li-ba'ḍ al-Adabiyyāt," *Islāmiyyah al-Ma'rifah*, Vol. 45, Summer 2006, pp. 184 f.
 14. Khadduri, "Islam and the Modern Law of Nations," p. 359.
 15. See Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī, *Al-Umm*, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifah, 1973), Vol. 4, p. 189; al-Zuhaylī, *Mawsū'ah al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa al-qaḍāyā al-Mu'āṣirah*, Vol. 7, p. 671; Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p. 81.
 16. Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p. 94.
 17. See 'Uthmān Jum'ah Ḍumayriyyah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām: Madkhal li-Dirāsah al-Qānūn al-Dawlī wa Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah Muqārannah bi-al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-Ḥadīth* (Sharjah: Sharjah University, 2007), p. 53.
 18. See Thomas F Farr, "The Intellectual Source of Diplomacy's Religion Deficit," *Oxford Journal of Law and Religion*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, p. 273.
 19. See, for example, 'Umar Aḥmad al-Firjānī, *Uṣūl al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām*, 2nd ed. (Tripoli, Libya: Dār Iqra', 1988), pp. 29–50; Muḥammad 'Alī Salīm al-Hawwārī, "Tabī'ah 'Alāqah al-Muslimīn bi-Gahyrihim min al-Umam," *Majalah al-Jami'ah al-Islamiyyah: Silsilah al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyyah*, Vol. 19, Issue 2, June 2011, p. 403.

20. See al-Kilānī, "Al-Ru'yah al-Islāmiyyah lil-Ālam wa Atharuhā fi Taḥdīd al-Siyāsah al-Kharijiyyah," p. 60.
21. See, for example, Ḍumayriyyah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 71 f.; al-Kilānī, "Al-Ru'yah al-Islāmiyyah lil-Ālam wa Atharuhā fi Taḥdīd al-Siyāsah al-Kharijiyyah," pp. 61 f.; Kassāb, "Al-Ru'yah al-Mu'āṣirah lil-Taqsīm al-Islāmī lil-Ma'mūrah: Murāja'ah li-ba'd al-Adabiyyāt," pp. 176–181; al-Hawwārī, "Ṭabī'ah 'Alāqah al-Muslimīn bi-Ghayrihim min al-Umam," pp. 395 f.
22. See Ḍumayriyyah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, p. 71 f.
23. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, "Islamic Rulings on Warfare," <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=588>; accessed February 9, 2015, p. 24.
24. Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p. 68.
25. See, for example, 'Abd Allah Ibrāhīm Zayd al-Kilānī, "Al-Ru'yah al-Islāmiyyah lil-Ālam wa Atharuhā fi Taḥdīd al-Siyāsah al-Kharijiyyah," pp. 25–63; al-Firjānī, *Uṣūl al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*.
26. Abū Zahrah, *Al-Mujtama' al-Insānī fi Zill al-Islām*, p. 10.
27. Abū Zahrah, *Al-Mujtama' al-Insānī fi Zill al-Islām*, pp. 31–33, 43.
28. Abū Zahrah, *Al-Mujtama' al-Insānī fi Zill al-Islām*, pp. 36 f., 39.
29. Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1995), p. 19.
30. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 20 f.
31. See <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html>; accessed February 2, 2015.
32. Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p. 139. On investigative torture under Islamic law see, Sadiq Reza, "Torture and Islamic Law," *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 21–41.
33. 'Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Sa'īd ibn Ḥazm, *Al-Muḥallā* (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, n.d.), Vol. 5, p. 117.
34. See <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html>; accessed February 2, 2015.
35. See, for example, al-Firjānī, *Uṣūl al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 51–66; al-Kilānī, "Al-Ru'yah al-Islāmiyyah lil-Ālam wa Atharuhā fi Taḥdīd al-Siyāsah al-Kharijiyyah," pp. 36–46.
36. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 21–25.
37. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 25 f.; Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, *Tanzīm al-Islām lil-Mujtama'* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, n.d.), p. 46.
38. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 26–28.
39. See <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html>; accessed February 3, 2015.
40. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, p. 32.
41. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, p. 32.
42. See <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html>; accessed February 3, 2015.
43. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 34 f.
44. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fi al-Islām*, pp. 36 f.; Abū Zahrah, *Al-Mujtama' al-Insānī fi Zill al-Islām*, pp. 139–135.
45. Majid Khadduri, *Mafhūm al-'Adl fi al-Islām* (Damascus: Dār al-Ḥaṣād, 1998), p. 192. See also Zayd ibn 'Abd al-Karīm al-Zayd, *Muqaddimah fi al-Qānūn al-Dawlī al-Insānī fi al-Islām* (N.p.: Comité International Genève, ICRC, 2004), pp. 23, 75 f.

46. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām*, pp. 38–41.
47. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām*, pp. 42–44.
48. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām*, pp. 44–46; Abū Zahrah, *Tanẓīm al-Islām lil-Mujtama'*, pp. 51–53. On the Islamic principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, see also, for example, Abū Zahrah, *Tanẓīm al-Islām lil-Mujtama'*, pp. 41–43; Javaid Rehman, *Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism: A Critique of the 'Clash of Civilizations' in the New World Order* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 46; Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara McLaughlin "The International Court of Justice and the World's Three Legal Systems," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 400 f.
49. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām*, p. 44.
50. See 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī al-Dunyā, *Makārim al-Akhlaq*, ed. Majdī al-Sayyid Ibrāhīm, (Cairo: Maktabah al-Qur'ān, 1990), Vol. 1, p. 121.
51. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām*, p. 45; Majid Khadduri, *The Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study in Muslim International Law* (London: Luzac & Co., 1940), p. 80; Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Shawkānī, *Al-Sayl al-Jarrār al-Mutadaffiq 'alā Hadā'iq al-Azhār*, ed. Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm Zāyid (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1984), Vol. 4, p. 563.
52. Abū Zahrah, *Al-'Alāqāt al-Dawliyyah fī al-Islām*, p. 48.
53. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, Vol. 72, No. 3, p. 48.
54. See Art Swift and Andrew Dugan, "ISIS, Terrorism Sees as Graver Threats tan Russia, Ukraine," <http://www.gallup.com/poll/181553/isis-terrorism-seen-graver-threats-russia-ukraine.aspx>, accessed February 14, 2015.

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6

Democracy and Secularism: The Binary Divide between Faith and Reason

Deina Abdelkader

In the wake of the Arab uprisings that started in 2010 popular will across the board expressed an interest in an Islamically informed government. However, Western liberal democracies were fearful of the implications of an Islamist political platform. This chapter examines the relationship between church and state in De Tocqueville's and Rousseau's writings as authors who shaped the ideology of one of the strongest Western liberal democracies, the United States of America, with a focus on their respective views of the role of religion in public life. Thus the chapter analyzes whether post-enlightenment Western European liberal thought excludes religion from the public arena. The implication of negating this binary divide between church and state is important because it allows room for variation and an indigenous look at democracy and what it means. Questioning the universality of Western liberal democracy and its rigid attachment to Enlightenment ideology and how this relates to Islam and Islamically oriented governments is the focus of the chapter.

Introduction

In the wake of the popular revolutions in the Middle East in 2010–2011, most elected regimes were Islamically oriented: in Tunisia, in Egypt, to some extent the opposition forces in Syria, in Libya, and so on. However, due to many factors those free and populist elections did not succeed in transitioning their respective countries into democratization. One of the variables that largely affected the transition and democratization was the rhetoric and impressionistic nature of the discourse between the West and the Muslim world about democracy. Not only were the West and

the state of Israel suspicious of the elected governments, but academicians and the media also started repeating the same concerns that were expressed twenty years ago with the cancellation of elections won by the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) in Algeria in 1991: that Islamic parties will stay in power forever; that Islam is not compatible with democracy; that Islamic parties mean one man, one vote, one time; and so on.

With the passage of time, free elections in the Middle East have reflected the population's interest in having an Islamically oriented government, yet time and time again domestic "liberal" secular forces and international powers have disagreed with the elected officials because of their religious nature. As has also been the case in Turkey since Atatürk's time, where the struggle between liberal and religious trends in society is alive and well, especially with Necmettin's experience as co-prime minister with Tencu Ciller.

The enigma and bottleneck that those countries and populations are going through goes back to our contemporary understanding of Western liberal democracy. The focus of this chapter, therefore, is whether Western liberal democracy necessitates the separation of church and state theoretically, let alone in praxis. My argument is that we need to go beyond the European Enlightenment's binary divide between faith and reason. A post-Enlightenment Islamic discourse needs to address this binary divide in order to allow a true democratic ethos to evolve in Muslim countries, including the MENA region. It is quintessential that we reflect and cross-analyze the concept of separating Church and State, or Faith and Reason, to further the theoretical discourse on Islam and democracy.

This chapter is composed of three interconnected sections. The first focuses on the importance of Islamic law to Muslims in general, it then addresses and researches a particular principle in Islamic law that serves as the connection between governance and the law, namely the principle of public welfare. The second section researches and connects ideological common ground between Islamic and Western political thought. It compares St. Thomas Aquinas and al-Shatibi, and tests the common roots between Islam and, what is known today as, "Western" liberal democracy. Finally, the chapter defines the contemporary impasse at academic level, which misrepresents faith, and particularly Islam, as inimical to Western liberal democracy. This complex paradigm is the greatest obstacle to research that addresses the common ground previously mentioned. The research thus changes the question from the conventional query, Is Islam compatible with democracy?, to Did Islam contribute to the theoretical underpinnings of democracy?

A. The role and importance of Islamic law (*Shari'a*) and jurisprudential thought (*Fiqh*)

1. *The Place of Shari'a in Muslim Societies*: The Shari'a is recognized by all Muslims as the set of rules and mores decreed by the Qur'an and the Prophet's *sunna*h. Even though some Muslims might argue for secularism and a separation between religion and state, they would still recognize the Shari'a as an embodiment of Islamic codes and regulations.

In describing the importance of the Shari'a to Muslim society, Charnay (1971: 77–78) states:

In Islam, the law aims at providing guidance; but not as a mere instrument. It has a much more far-reaching vocation. It creates a mode of living and tends to regulate all human activity, or to qualify it with respect. If not to an ethics, at least to a law, transcending not only the individual, but all humanity. Furthermore, Muslim law is not only pragmatic. Over and above the striving for efficaciousness and security, it constitutes an act of piety in its application.

Schacht also describes the place of the Shari'a and *fiqh* in Muslim societies: "it is impossible to understand Islam without understanding Islamic law." (Schacht, 1964: 1)

2. *Usul al-Fiqh, Sources of Islamic Law and Their Role in Theory and Practice in Muslim Societies*: The sources of Islamic law, or *usul al-fiqh* in Islamic legal terminology, are divided into two categories. One category comprises *al-Nass* (the Text), i.e. the Qur'an and *sunna*h. The other constitutes human judgment in several forms, e.g. the consensus of the legal scholars (*ijma'*), and analogical reasoning (*qiyas*). Therefore, theoretically, there are two issues in Shari'a: the first deals with the definitive rules (*qati'iyat*); rules that are not changeable in Islam, for example prayer times, fasting, almsgiving. The second deals with doubtful issues (*zaniyat*), issues that allow for speculation because they are not clearly or specifically addressed in the texts. Those issues are open to interpretation (*ijtihad*), they change with time and place, especially those pertaining to interpersonal relations, including the relationship between governments and peoples. Therefore, interpretation or the extrapolation of legal principles is admissible, if not encouraged.

3. *The Exegesis of the Public Good and the Goals of Islamic Law: al-Maslaha and al-Maqasid*: In my research I emphasize the role of public interest (*istislah*), since the goals of Shari'a are part and parcel of the public welfare in a Muslim society. By public interest I mean the sociopolitical

ethos of what Muslim societies expect from their respective governments. Thus, a clarification of *istislah* and *maqasid*, and their theoretical weight among religious scholars needs to be addressed and brought to the forefront. *Istislah* is a conjugated word that shares the same root with *maslaha*: *saluha*, meaning to be good, suitable, or befitting.¹ The different kinds of *maslaha* are commonly categorized as follows:

- (a) Contemporary/recognized public welfare (*maslaha mu'tabarah*): the public welfare issue has been clearly stated in the Qur'an and *sunnah*, or has gained consensus among religious scholars (*ijma'*).
- (b) Nullified *maslaha* (*maslaha mulgha*): the *maslaha* that is in clear contradiction to the Qur'an and the *sunnah* and did not gain consensus from religious scholars.
- (c) Conveyed *maslaha* (*maslaha mursalah*): the *maslaha* that has nothing directly related for or against it in terms of consensus (*ijma'*) or in the Qur'an and *sunnah*.

The concept of nullified *maslaha* created a split between the different schools of religious interpretation (*fiqh*). Some religious scholars thought it was incorrect to give *maslaha* an equal footing with the primary sources of law, the Qur'an and *sunnah*. The kind of *maslaha* considered here is *maslaha mursala*. Some might argue that the notion of legal goals (*maqasid*) is part of the first kind of *maslaha*, *maslaha mu'tabara* (recognized *maslaha*).² *Maslaha* is an important notion in Muslim legal thought because it is the general formula that ties the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence together, as is illustrated further on.

4. *The Difference between Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence on the Specifics of Public Welfare, Their Genesis and Reason:*³ The differences that existed in early Islamic jurisprudential writings are almost impossible to discern in this day and age. However, for the purpose of this chapter, it is necessary to justify the choice of a certain legal notion (*maqasid*) by stressing its importance and commonality to the four schools of Muslim legal thought. The differences that existed between religious scholars were basically related to the degree of conservatism or liberalism in the interpreter of the text (*nass*). Not only did religious scholars differ in their perceptions of the text, but they also had different methods of deducing and inducing law.

The four Sunni schools of law are the Maliki, the Hanafi, the Shafi'i, and the Hanbali. The Malikis and Hanafis were the founders of religious schools in later stages of school development. Malik was a contemporary of Abu Hanifah and lived in Hijaz from the year 93 AH to the year

179 AH. Abu Hanifah lived in what is now Iraq from the year 70 AH to 150 AH. Malik and Abu Hanifah did not write down their practices, but their students documented their teachings later on. Al-Shafi'i, the third leader of the four legal schools, was the first to write down religious legal interpretation (*usul al-fiqh*) in his books *al-Risalah* (*The Message*), and later, *al-Umm* (literally mother, but in this context *The Origin*).⁴

Malik and Abu Hanifah both left their mark on religious scholars to come. Malik was the founder of the Ahl al-Hadith school, which preached the practice and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his relatives who lived in Hijaz. Meanwhile in Iraq Abu Hanifah founded Ahl al-Ra'y school (people of persuasion). The former school was more conservative in its interpretation of the Hadith, especially the practice of the Prophet's family. The latter did not enjoy the privilege of having direct access to the relatives or friends of the Prophet. Therefore, their tendency was to discuss the traditions of the Prophet and his next of kin, which is why they are called "people of persuasion" (Alwani 1988).

As I show further on, the difference between Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ra'y is indicative of the first signs of divergence in the religious tradition because it laid the theoretical grounds for different religious scholars' interpretations of what Islamic law is and how the text (*nass*) should be interpreted. Another difference, mentioned earlier, is the methodology used in analyzing the text (*nass*): there were the Shafi'is and the Ahnaf.⁵ The first school was generally followed by Shafi's, Malikis, Hanbalis, and Mu'tazilites; the latter was followed mainly by Hanafis. In interpreting the text, the Shafi'i school went from general rules to the specific, while the Hanafis went from the specific to the general. Thus the Shafi'is deduced the rules of Islamic law, while the Hanafis induced them.

This general introduction to some of the differences between legal scholars in Islam will aid in focusing on how the four schools of religious interpretation (*madhahib*) conceptualized public welfare and the goals of Islamic law. As explained earlier, all four legal schools agreed that there are four sources of Islamic law; two of them dependent on the others. That is, consensus and analogical reasoning (*ijma'* and *qiyas*) are dependent on the Qur'an and *sunnah*. The differences between religious scholars stemmed from their perception of Islamic law: (1) how conservative they were in interpreting the text (*nass*), i.e. whether they took into account both the spirit and the word of the law; and (2) the degree to which they viewed public welfare as tantamount to the other sources of the law.

In order to illustrate these points further, I consult and analyze some secondary sources on legal interpretation (*usul al-fiqh*). First, in

comparing Malik and Abu Hanifah, Abu Zahra (1952) writes that both schools take *istihsan* as an equivalent alternative to analogical reasoning (*qiyas*). That is to say, they both perceive *istihsan* as a strong source of law commensurate with analogical reasoning (*qiyas*). Abu Zahra stresses, however, that Malik did not perceive *istihsan* to be, in itself, a legally binding rule. Abu Zahra proposes that Malik saw it as a legal principle used when needed to make exceptions to the rules of Islamic law (Abu Zahra 1952: 353).

The second main difference between Malik and Abu Hanifah is that Malik used *istihsan* as a source of law when he found that analogical reasoning (*qiyas*): (1) did not befit the culture or tradition of a society; (2) did not fit a preferred public good (*maslaha*); and (3) did not help in avoiding hardships and providing basic needs. For Abu Hanifah *istihsan* meant that he had to choose from two competing analogical reasonings (*qiyas*) to decide on a legal judgment. That is, he treated *istihsan* as a part of analogical reasoning (Abu Zahra 1952: 355). Before comparing the other legal schools, Abu Zahra makes an important distinction concerning the individual religious scholar's perceptions of public welfare (Abu Zahra 1952: 391). He identifies four theoretical stands:

1. The Shafi'is took public welfare into account when there was evidence in the text to support it. Public welfare (*maslaha*) was dependent on analogical reasoning (*qiyas*).
2. The Hanafis took public welfare into account, seeing *istihsan* as an equivalent source of analogical reasoning (*qiyas*).
3. Some more radical religious scholars claimed that public welfare could override the text. One famous religious scholar, al-Tufi (of the Hanbali sect), was accused of being a Shi'ite for subscribing to this opinion.
4. The moderate view was represented mostly by the Malikis, who considered public welfare only when it was conveyed (*mursala*), i.e. neither prohibited nor permitted in the text.

The distinction Abu Zahra draws here is important, because it stresses that the differences of opinion regarding the weight given to public welfare was a theoretical rather than a sectarian issue. That is, it was not based upon the four legal schools' divisions. The distinction Abu Zahra draws here is important, because it stresses that the differences of opinion regarding the weight given to public welfare was a theoretical issue rather than a sectarian one based upon the four legal schools' divisions.

However, in the case of al-Tufi, this did not restrain him from giving precedence to public welfare over the text, which was viewed as heretical and is still unacceptable among modern Islamic scholars.⁶

Even though sectarian differences did not play an important role in the division of opinion on public welfare (*maslaha*, *istihsan*, and *maqasid*), al-Shafi'i's strong negation of Malik's usage of it is particularly relevant since he is the head of one of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudential thought.

Al-Shafi'i, Malik's student in Hijaz,⁷ was the first to write about the sources of Islamic law, and one of the few legal scholars who documented both his theory and practice in writing.⁸ Al-Shafi'i refused to take *istihsan* as an independent source of law because it did not restrain itself to the basic religious sources like the Qur'an and *sunnah*, religious consensus, or analogical reasoning. Rather *istihsan* seemed to Shafi'i to be a concept totally dependent on human reasoning, which separated it from religion altogether (al-Buti 1966: 377). In a primary source, al-Shafi'i writes:

Whoever gives his legal opinion with no restraint or analogical reasoning, is in fact saying: I do what I please, even if it is against my belief – thus going against the Qur'an and *sunnah*. I have not seen an incident where the people of knowledge (religious scholars) allowed the people of reason to give their legal opinions, since the people of reason have no knowledge of analogical reasoning from the Qur'an and *sunnah* or consensus and the usage of analogical reasoning. (Al-Shafi'i n.d: 273)

Al-Shafi'i also writes:

The essence of religious interpretation (*ijtihad*) on an issue comes only after the consultation of the texts and issues of consensus. But if any of those sources provide an answer, their *ijtihad* is not called for. (Al-Shafi'i n.d: 303)

Thus al-Shafi'i was more conservative in his conception of *istihsan* and *maslaha*, for he feared its encroachment on the importance of the basic sources of the law. The last quote, however, indicates that if there are no answers to a specific issue from the text and the consensus of religious scholars (*ijma'*), one should exercise one's own judgment.

The classification of the kinds of public welfare mentioned earlier might shed light on the position of different legal scholars. Al-Shafi'i, for example, equated conveyed PW with recognized PW,⁹ since he believed

the text to be all inclusive of people's welfare. Therefore, al-Shafi'i could not conceive of a legal issue that would transpire outside the boundaries of the text. Malik took *istihsan* as an exception to the rule.

Therefore, although he was misunderstood by many (especially his student al-Shafi'i), he did not call for taking up *istihsan* on the basis of the nullified *maslaha*. Malik called for practicing *istihsan* when there was no reference point in the text concerning the issue at stake. That is, Malik took PW as an alternative only when the text and consensus do not provide an answer. This, in essence, is in agreement with al-Shafi'i's teachings. Since a comparison of Abu Hanifa and Malik was presented earlier, the only school of jurisprudence that remains to be addressed is the Hanbali. Ibn Hanbal takes PW as a subsidiary source of law that branches off from analogical reasoning, and as an extension of the aims and end goals of Islamic law (al-Buti 1966: 369). Many of Ibn Hanbal's followers wrote about public welfare. One of the leading Hanbali legal scholars Ibn Taymiya notes in his book, *al-Manar*:

If one is in doubt as to whether an issue is prohibited or permissible, one should consider its consequences, its aims and its harm. If the consequences are harmful (as opposed to public welfare), it is impossible that such an issue is ordained by God, therefore, it becomes prohibited. (Ibn Taymiya n.d.: 679)

Ibn al-Qayim al-Jawziya (a Hanbali) in *I'lam al-Muwaqi'in* (n.d.: 288) writes: "Human interactions should be guided on the basis of necessity, need and public welfare so that the judge is always in need of such principles." Last, al-Tufi (also a Hanbali) took the extreme view that the text could be overridden if it contradicted public welfare (Abu Zahra 1952: 391). The above citations are an indication of: (1) Ibn Hanbal's more moderate acceptance and practice of the notion of public welfare; and (2) the degree of divergence within one school. This further proves that the difference of opinion on public welfare fell along a conservative versus liberal divide rather than a sectarian or school of religious interpretation dichotomy. The Hanbali, like the other schools of Islamic jurisprudence, agreed on public welfare as a legal principle. The theoretical issues that caused the previously mentioned differences were due to the fact that:

the religious scholar's differences were not related to whether they accepted public welfare as a source of law or not. Rather their differences stemmed from their degree of using reason alone to acknowledge public welfare without considering the text. (Abu Zahra 1952: 404)

Al-Buti also indicates three reasons for those differences: (1) religious scholars did not clearly define the reasons for considering or avoiding public welfare in their discussions and arguments; (2) religious scholars did not verify and test the allegations made about Malik's views and his account of what public welfare meant, to the degree that he was accused of heretically disregarding rules set forth by God (by overriding those rules with what he deemed to be good for the people); (3) al-Shafi'i totally rejected Malik's *istihsan*, by paying little attention to Malik's efforts to keep within the goals of Islamic law. This total rejection consequently led to the belief that Malik was against public welfare (which is not true in his writing or practice). This perception of al-Shafi'i is also related to the very fine line that distinguishes between public welfare and choosing the best judgment for the people (*istihsan*) (al-Buti 1966: 401, 405).

It is important to note that differences of opinion in considering public welfare were related to the interpretive stance of the legal scholar rather than to the whole school ideology. Al-Shafi'i was Malik's student, but this did not stop him from rebelling against his teacher. Meanwhile, al-Tufi, a Hanbali (one of the most conservative schools), went to the extreme of writing that public welfare could supersede the text.

Al-Shafi'i is said to be the forefather of religious interpretation since he wrote the very first publication that relayed the practices of other religious scholars and their analyses. Al-Shatibi is the first legal scholar who dedicated his writing to the issue of public welfare in his book *The Treatise (al-Muwafaqat)*. Even though the concept of public welfare was part and parcel of jurisprudential thought and practice, al-Shatibi wrote four volumes of *The Treatise* to demonstrate the essence of Islamic law (Masud 1977: 225). Obligations in Islamic law concern the protection of the end goals of the law, which in turn aims to protect public welfare. Therefore, in al-Shatibi's discussion of public welfare, this and the goals of Islamic law become interchangeable terms in reference to obligation.¹⁰ However, al-Shatibi was not the only religious scholar who observed the goals of Islamic law, even though he is considered to be an authority because he was the first to thoroughly analyze and expose the essence of the concept.

5. *The Development of the Goals of Islamic Law (Maqasid) as a Principle in Islamic Legal Thought*: The differences separating the four main legal schools mentioned earlier became less distinct with the passage of time, to the extent that scholars from the same school disagreed on certain issues. In order to clarify the works of legal scholars and to verify their agreement on the goals of Islamic law, I cite different works that represent each legal school. The agreement of the legal scholars on the goals

is proof of the prevalence of the concept among them.¹¹ Evidence in *Origins of the Law* by Abu al Ma'ali al Juwayni, a Shafi'i who died in 478 AH (1085 CE):

Our main consideration is to refer to their end goals and purposes. The person who dismisses the goals from our practices could not apprehend the totality of Islamic law. (Part 1, 294–295)

Islamic law is composed of (1) what we are decreed to do which is mainly part of worship, and (2) what we are prohibited from doing. Islamic law therefore preserves blood (meaning life) by punishing the killer, preserves posterity and property. (Part 2, 1150–1151)¹²

Evidence in *The Eclectic Source of the Origins of the Law* by al Ghazali, a Shafi'i who died in 505 AH (111 CE):

A matter that is not observed by Islamic law through the text should be considered in the light of public welfare, keeping in mind its degree of importance (whether it is a necessity, a need, or an amenity). Let me first explain public welfare. Public welfare originally means the protection of what is beneficial and the avoidance of all corruption, which in turn means the protection of those goals. The way to protect the goals could be summarized in five issues: the protection of religion, life, the mind, posterity, and property. (Part 1: 286–287)

Protecting those five elements is part of every faith and every legal statute that observes the well-being of humankind. (Part 1: 288)

Public welfare (*maslahah*) is not a fifth source of the law,¹³ since public welfare is defined in terms of protecting the goals of Islamic law (*maqasid*) and those goals are observed in the text and in consensus with other religious scholars. Public welfare means the protection of the goals of Islamic law, which is well defined in the Qur'an, *sunnah*, and the consensus of religious scholars (*ijma'*). Thus if we equate public welfare with the goals of Islamic law there should be consensus in observing it as a resource when making a legal decision. (Part 1: 310–311)

Evidence in *The Harvest of the Origins of the Law* by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, a Shafi'i who died in 606 AH (1209 CE):

Public welfare has to be part of Islamic law, because the goal of all statutes ordained by God is to preserve and protect public welfare. (Part 6: 165)

Whether we consider public welfare through reason or through the text and consensus, the goals of all statutes of law are to preserve public welfare. (Part 6: 167)

Evidence in *Mastering the Origins of the Law* by Sayf al-Din al-'Amidi, a Shaf'i who died in 631 AH (1233 CE):

The five goals that exist in all faiths and in all legal statutes ordained by God are: the preservation of religion, life, the mind, posterity, and property. (Part 3: 394)

Evidence in *The Rules for Perfecting the Interest of the People* by Izz al-Din al-Salmi, a Shaf'i who died in 600 AH (1261 CE):

The Shari'a is composed of public welfare: it either prohibits corruption or encourages public welfare. If you listened closely to the Qur'an whenever a verse starts with "Ye who have faith," what follows is always the prohibition of evil and the encouragement of what is beneficial to the people. (Part 1: 9)

Evidence in *Revising the Details of the Origins of the Law* by al-Qarafi, a Maliki who died in 684 AH (1285 CE):

What is just and appropriate could be divided into: necessities, needs, and their amendments. The necessities being the preservation of five elements: life, religion, lineage, the mind, property. (A Collection of Original Works: 66)

Al-Qarafi also indicates: "I consider public welfare as a source of law, and if one is diligent one would find that it is common in all schools of law." (A Collection of Original Works: 67) Evidence in *A Collection of Legal Opinions* by Ibn Taymiyah, a Hanbali who died in 728 AH (1327 CE):

Islamic law came to ensure public welfare and to avoid corruption. (Part 20: 48)

The main notion in this chapter is to know the best public welfare. This knowledge could be gained through: (1) knowing the end goal of ruling; (2) knowing the means to the goals of Islamic law. (Part 28: 260)

Others who write about the origins of the law have considered public welfare in two ways: (1) one is related to the afterlife which is connected to disciplining oneself; and (2) the other is related to this

world which is in turn connected to the preservation of life, property, posterity, the mind, and religion. (Part 32: 234)

Evidence in *Seeking Sanctuary* by Abu al Ishaq al-Shatibi,¹⁴ a Maliki who died in 790 AH (1388 CE):

The conveyed *maslaha* (public welfare) means taking into account reasonable judgment that is not referred to in legal sources. Malik, as well as Shaf'i and the Hanafis, gave precedence to the spirit of the law; however, it has to be close to what the text offers; this is in agreement with Imam Juwayni also. (Part 2: 351)

Evidence in *The Treatise*, also by al-Shatibi:

The Muslim community and all faiths have agreed that legal statutes are there to protect the necessary basics: religion, life, posterity, property, and the mind. (Part 1: 15)¹⁵

Evidence in *Advice to the Religious Scholars* by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah, a Hanbali:¹⁶

The foundations of Islamic law are based upon the public welfare of its followers in this life and the afterlife: it is thoroughly just, thoroughly merciful, it thoroughly looks out for the public good, and it is full of wisdom. Therefore, what neglects the boundaries of what is just, merciful, wise and what leads to public welfare is not part of Islamic law. (Part 3: 5)

Evidence in *A Treatise on Public Welfare (al-Masalih)*, by Najm al-Din al-Tufi, a Hanbali:¹⁷

Out of nineteen sources of law, the text and consensus are the strongest sources, but they either agree or disagree with protecting public welfare (*maslaha*). If they coincide with public welfare, then there is no conflict on the issue. If the text and consensus are discordant to public welfare then public welfare should be given priority. (*A Collection of Essays on Original Legal Works*: 46–47)

The Text and consensus agree on five basic necessities in need of protection: life, property, posterity, the mind, and so forth. But if there is disagreement between the Text, consensus and public welfare, public welfare should be given precedence, because public welfare is

the goal of governing, and since all decision making is a means to an end, the goals of Islamic law should be given priority over the means. (*A Collection of Essays on Original Legal Works*: 64–65)

The primary sources cited are in support of my argument that, despite some differences between legal scholars, public welfare and the goals of Shari'a are considered by the text as recognized public welfare. In other words, there is substantial convergence between theory and practice of the basic principles. The importance of public welfare to Islamic law was emphasized in all the writings, especially the stress on the fact that all faiths and statutes exist to provide humanity with the five goals of Islamic law in pursuit of public welfare. Not only was public welfare emphasized as a source of law, but Muslim societies also emphasize its importance in today's world:

The Shari'a depends on the Islamic legal concept of *masalih* (preservation of the *maqasid*) as a source of law. Therefore, the Shari'a is capable of fulfilling the needs of the state and the Islamic *ummah* at large, regardless of time and place – this in itself constitutes the testimony for the Shari'a's eternity. (Darini 1982: 8)

If we make *al-maslaha* and the goals of Shari'a the basis on which we make decisions, it would exemplify the realistic relation that exists between Shari'a and our everyday life, regardless of place and time. Public welfare means the protection of the needs and wants of individuals, as well as of states. Therefore building decisions upon public welfare is the only solution for ensuring the protection and the realistic implementation of such needs. (Darini 1982: 275)

Thus far this chapter has proved that for Sunni scholars there is consensus on the importance of public welfare and the goals of Islamic law¹⁸ as the quintessential foundations for an Islamic state. This chapter will now turn to how the concept of public welfare traveled across cultures, and how it influenced the definition of Western liberal democracy in general by analyzing and comparing St. Thomas Aquinas and al-Shatibi, and how they both viewed public welfare.

B. Saint Thomas Aquinas' common good and al-Shatibi's public welfare

The concept of public welfare was always part of Islamic jurisprudential thought, however it was developed and thoroughly researched by

al-Shatibi, as previously discussed. The fact that Thomas Aquinas was influenced by Maimonides' ideas, and that Maimonides might have influenced al-Shatibi could explain the resemblance between Thomas Aquinas' common good and al-Shatibi's public welfare. The ideological and theoretical connection thus has many implications because it sheds light on historically shared democratic values in the Western and Muslim worlds. First I would like to clarify the historical lineage of theoretical works that were influenced by Aristotle's ideas (384 BC–322BC). Aristotle's works were revived and brought to the fore again by Averroes (1126–1198). Averroes was known to have influenced Maimonides (1135–1204) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). Averroes also influenced the ideas of al-Shatibi (d. 1388) in Xativa, southern Spain, who was, by deduction, born at least 14 to 20 years after the death of St. Thomas Aquinas. This historical transfer of ideas between Averroes and St. Thomas Aquinas is explained by Thomas Gilby:

The introduction spread first from Toledo on the Christian frontier with Islam. Mingled with the teachings of the schools of Baghdad and Cordova, the Latin texts of Aristotle were taken from the Arabic. Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) translated the *de Coelo et Mundo*, *de Generatione et Corruptione*, and the first three books of the *Meteorologica*... The texts were ill-translated. They were presented together with interpolations from the great Arab philosophers, Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198) – the first an earlier and more persuasive influence though not in political thought, the second more pointed and controversial and ventilated opinions unwelcome to Christian belief and sentiment. The result was that a provincial council at Sens (1210) forbade public and private lectures at Paris on the natural philosophy of Aristotle and his commentators. (Gilby 1963: 79)

In Europe, the reaction to St. Thomas Aquinas was total rejection by the Church. This is again historically evidenced by Gilby:

By then Oxford and the Papal Court had become the chief centers of an Aristoteleanism less perturbed than in Naples by civil war and in Paris by controversies about whether the reason could go its own way without reference to the truths of religion.

The situation was complicated by those who mistook Averroes for Aristotle. Their teaching on human responsibility, personal immortality and God's particular Providence could not be reconciled with

the truths of religion and they seemed to be laying the foundations of a purely secular culture in defiance of the Christian social tradition.

The threat offered by these Latin Averroists, as they came to be called, was one of the reasons why St. Thomas was posted in 1269 by his Master General from the Papal Court to Paris. The distinction he drew, together with St. Albert, between the proper reading of Aristotle, which of course he thought was his own, and that of Siger of Brabant, usually regarded as the leading Parisian Averroist, eventually came to be accepted, but not before he had been condemned in council in 1277 by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris. Kilwardby and Peckham, Archbishops of Canterbury, followed the same tenor in dealing with Thomist teaching at Oxford, though less solemnly. Peckham noted that even among the Dominicans Thomas's position was pungently debated, the Franciscans at their General Chapter held at Strasbourg in 1284 forbade the circulation of the *Summa Theologica* except among lecturers who were *notabiliter intelligentes*. (Gilby, 80–81)

Therefore the contemporary assumption that Christian civilization has departed from irrational religiosity is part and parcel of the fear indicated above when St. Thomas was deciphering and discussing Aristotelian ideas through the works of Averroes (Ibn Rushd). The discussion about how Muslims should separate between reason and faith in order to develop, modernize, and democratize, is a mirror image of the opposition the West itself was going through when the transmission of ideas took place historically. The "Latin Averroists" then were causing upheaval because they were perceived as "secularists" who are "in defiance of the Christian social tradition" (Gilby, 80). After the Enlightenment era in Europe, there seems to be historical amnesia because it was then that the West turned the tables in the mid-19th century (specifically the late 1840s) when Ernest Renan started attacking Islam for its inability to reconcile faith with reason.

Although I differ with the late Edward Said and his concept of Orientalism, I concur that the questioning of faith and reason started in the late 1840s and has not yet ended (Said 1994: 6). The binary division between reason versus faith has continuously represented the strongest point of contention between Western and Islamic thought. The Islamists' call for a return to Islamic law or, following the days of *al-Salaf al-Salih* (the righteous predecessors), has been assumed to mean a return to a historical golden age. An idea that reeks of romanticism,

the arch opponent of rationalist thought and the very symbol of irrationality. Roxanne Euben's *Enemy in the Mirror* critiques Western theoretical discourse for its total disregard of the relevance of metaphysics in contemporary political life.¹⁹ Euben states:

For the reflex to dismiss fundamentalism as irrational or pathological is not merely a product of the almost habitualized prejudices and fears operative in the relationship between "the West" and "Islam" but, as I have argued, is also a function of the way a post-Enlightenment, predominantly rationalist tradition of scholarship countenances foundationalist political practices in the modern world. (Euben 1999: 14)

She indicates that scholars have intentionally refused to analyze Islamic political theory because of a Western aversion to all things Islamic. This rejection stems from the aversion also to anything religious, as opposed to our contemporary Cartesian Enlightenment "truths." First, the relationship of a hegemon to satellite countries exemplifies the Foucaultian notion that knowledge is tied to power.²⁰ If we accept this, knowledge is subservient to maintaining the status quo. Thus, the control of defining knowledge and its components is ultimately held by the hegemon. As Bernard Lewis comments in *What Went Wrong?*:

Today, for the time being, as Atatürk recognized and as Indian computer scientists and Japanese high-tech companies appreciate the dominant civilization is Western, and Western standards therefore define modernity. (Lewis 2002: 150)

European/Western historical memory includes two critical junctures at which rejection of the "rational" retarded science and threatened moral values. Whether we analyze medieval Catholic control and dictatorship in the West or the horrors of Nazi Germany, the Western psyche was rightfully doubtful and troubled by any movement or idea that transcended the, so-called, "rational" realm. Enlightenment Europe embraced scientific advances that translated into new forms of human productivity, including colonialism as entrepreneurs sought raw materials and markets in newly accessible lands. Social scientists and popular writers applied the insights of such heroes of rationalism as Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer to legitimize occupation and colonization beyond Europe, including Muslim countries.

History merely revealed the eternal immanence of Reason in the universe. So it came to pass that Europe regulated the world, and in the mouth of Hegel, revealed the meaning of history: Reason, in other words God, had spoken. (Hentsch 1992: 141)

The divide continues between reason and faith in contemporary discourse on modernity and democratization in the Muslim world. In light of the history of Aristotle's ideas mentioned earlier, and in relation to enlightenment arguments that brought about individualism and utilitarianism in liberal democratic theory, I would like to discuss the common good according to St. Thomas and public welfare according to al-Shatibi.

St. Thomas and the common good

First, the roots of the common good stem from Nicomachean Ethics (NE). NE explain that the individual strives to be virtuous and that is how leaders and society all share in this pool of goodness. It was easy for Averroes to link these ideas to NE and for St. Thomas to link it to the common good.²¹ According to St. Thomas the common good was an overarching principle that far superseded a local/national context. St. Thomas was well aware that *bonum commune* far transcended *res publica*:

For the common good of the political community was a humbler affair altogether. It was sufficient if the social decencies were observed.

...the State, while it should impede no human decency, lacks the ability to promote every virtue. (Gilby, 130)

Thus, among many philosophers before and after St. Thomas, individuals have ultimate control over their virtue. That is to say, no government or system of law could be effective unless the people upholding the law are willfully virtuous. As a philosopher, St. Thomas expanded on Aristotle's legal/organizational perception of the polis to a more ethical/moral understanding of the common good. Thus legality was secondary to his all-encompassing idea: "both earthly and heavenly, enfolding the polis." (Gilby, 189) Therefore, according to St. Thomas:

apart from the Common Good taken in the widest sense – namely the universal good shared by all who live with God, a theological

value which moralists expected to be upheld, or at least not to be attacked, whatever the system of government – two lesser and more local conceptions began to be distinguished. One was Greek in inspiration, the social health of the whole community translated as the *bonum commune* or *communis utilitas*; the other was more legal and Roman, the *res publica* or *unitas juris*. (Gilby, 190)

In St. Thomas' writing the form of government and its legal branch could vary according to place/circumstance, but what was central to his thought was the more general idea of the *bonum commune*. It is necessary to note here that St. Thomas' ideas in this respect might have been influenced by Averroes' interpretation of Aristotelian concepts. That is to say, the idea that the type of rule and the legal aspects are secondary in comparison to morality and communal welfare²² is also part and parcel of Islamic thought because it lends itself to universality. St. Thomas was more of a "social moralist"²³ than a legalist but he also thought of *bonum commune* as a concept that does not distinguish private from public, that is, the parts add up to make the sum. Therefore there is no distinction between a private and a public good.²⁴

In other words the notion of Common Good in the argument was not that of a well-ordered mass of citizens composing an order within themselves, nor even, from a religious point of view, the *urbs Jerusalem beata vivis ex lapidibus*, but an end outside the group, so beloved that men will suffer deprivation and death rather than disown it. The transcendence was more evident a quality of the *bonum divinum* than of the *bonum civitatis*, (Gilby, 248)

In *Summa Theologica*, as edited by Anton C. Pegis (1948), St. Thomas writes:

Hence to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is happiness or beatitude, as we have stated above. Consequently, law must needs concern itself mainly with the order that is in beatitude. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect, and since one man is part of the perfect community, law must needs concern itself properly with the order directed to universal happiness.

Consequently, since law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good. (Pegis, 612)

Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good. (Pegis, 613)

Therefore, as noted by Gilby (1958) above and as Keys²⁵ (2007) also recognizes, according to St. Thomas law is subservient to the *bonum commune*. Law is seen as an instrument to ensure beatitude – the highest form of happiness and contentment. According to St. Thomas, the reason for law is to serve and regulate the welfare of the community rather than solely protect individual interests. Thus St. Thomas' emphasis on the common good and how it relates to the law (and how it relates to the state and its organizations) is important because it explains how the *bonum commune* was the crown to all actions and the way that man orders his life. St. Thomas represents the ideas of his day and age by combining Nicomachean Ethics with Averroes' ideas. That is to say, he combines the ethics of Aristotelian thought with the religious and philosophical ideas of Averroes. Averroes, as noted earlier, connected Aristotle's writings to Islam and formed an amalgam that influenced his disciples, including St. Thomas Aquinas.

Al-Shatibi and public welfare

Al-Shatibi is a recognized Muslim jurisconsult (*faqih*). He lived most of his life and received most of his education in Granada, Spain. His date of birth is not known. However, he died in 1388. Al-Shatibi lived in an age of political turmoil caused by two circumstances: (1) the Muslims were losing power in Andalusia; (2) there was a lot of fighting for power in Granada and, specifically, the city of Jativa (from which al-Shatibi gets his name) had signed an agreement with King James so that it became semi-sovereign under its Muslim leader. Along with this unrest came the instability of political life, even though the advent of people from Andalusia created a thought-provoking milieu. At the time, the arrival in Granada of Andalusians and North Africans led to a lively cultural exchange, in the midst of which al-Shatibi grew and learned from a variety of religious scholars and linguists traveling specifically to Jativa

because of its well-known paper production. This rich cultural and intellectual milieu surrounded al-Shatibi in the 1300s.²⁶ Among those who taught and influenced al-Shatibi were scholars from Andalusia, Loja, Granada and many from Talmecen in North Africa. One of the major influences on al-Shatibi's thought and methodology was the philosopher Averroes (Al-Raysouni 199: 98).

Al-Shatibi's Works:

1. *Al-Muwafaqat*: Al-Shatibi's most famous contribution was in this book (*The Agreements or The Agreed Upon*). The name, according to al-Shatibi (*al-Muwafaqat*: Part I, p. 24) was suggested by one of his contemporaries who felt that Muslim jurisconsults from different *madhahib* (Muslim legal schools) would agree on what al-Shatibi had to say. *Al-Muwafaqat* gained him notoriety up until the present day because it is in this book that he writes about the sources of Islamic law and links to the theory/principle of *maqasid* (the end goals of shari'a).
2. *Al-Itisam*: focused on the issue of heresy (*al-bida*) according to Islamic law. It draws extensively on legal principles such as *maslaha* (public welfare) and *istihsan* (a principle that is part of *qiyas*, analogical reasoning).
3. *Al-Ifadat wa-l'Inshadat*: a literary book, al-Shatibi was a poet and therefore he published part of his poetry and literary works in it.
4. *Kitab al-Majlis*: Al-Shatibi's only book on *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). It explains the application of Islamic law in property contracts.

Al-Shatibi also wrote *al-Jalil* and *Sharh al-Alfiyah*, which both dealt with Arabic grammar and linguistics.

As an historical figure in Islamic jurisprudence, al-Shatibi's fame and acknowledgment as a true scholar were dependent upon his methodology and his constant discussion and refutation with his contemporaries in Spain and North Africa, before he wrote any of his books. It is because al-Shatibi was so meticulous in gathering his legal information and discussing issues that he was not as prolific an author as his contemporaries (Al-Raysouni 1981: 99).

The relevance of *Al-Muwafaqat*

Having briefly introduced al-Shatibi's intellectual and cultural milieu, we move on to focus on the contribution that he is still recognized for to the

present day, namely, his book *Al-Muwafaqat* (*The Agreements*). Its importance stems basically from its emphasis on *maslaha* (public welfare)/*maqasid* (the end goals of Shari'a).²⁷ His contribution in this text is mainly to legal theory (*usul al-fiqh*). The sources of Islamic law, or *usul al-fiqh*, are divided into two categories. One category is comprised of *al-Nass* (the Text) i.e. the Qur'an and the *sunnah*. The other constitutes human judgment in several forms, e.g. *ijma'* (the consensus of the fuqaha), *qiyas* (analogical reasoning). Theoretically, therefore, there are two kinds of issues in shari'a: *qatiyat* and *dhaniyat*. Issues that deal with *qatiyat* (definitive rules) are rules that are not changeable according to Islamic law, for example, times of prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and so on. The second type deals with *dhaniyat* (doubtful issues), those issues that allow for thought and speculation, which are open to *ijtihad* and which change with time and place – especially those pertaining to inter-human relationships.

Al-Shatibi's influence on Muslim Spain is recognized in the legacy that he left to his students, like Abu Yehya Ibn Asim, Abu Bakr al-Kady, and Abu Abdallah al-Bayani (Abu Al-Ajfan, 1984: 40) His observance and stress on public welfare also led the people to question elements of habitualized practices that were detached in spirit from their faith. His scrutiny on certain public practices was met with resistance; however his theoretical contribution to the sources of Islamic law (*usul al-fiqh*) activated religious inquiry in Muslim Spain and still continues to engage contemporaries.²⁸

Therefore, the binary division between faith and reason were not part of Muslim understanding and ethos. Rather, faith and reason seen as complementary to each other is what Al-Shatibi seems to argue in his contributions to the sources of Islamic law (*usul al-fiqh*).

As a scholar, Al-Shatibi's inputs in the 14th century were relevant in his lifetime, after his death, and up to this day. In an article in the *Boston Review*, Khaled Abou el-Fadl writes about the compatibility of Islam and Democracy, using notions reminiscent of Al-Shatibi's works. In response to Abou el-Fadl's article, John Esposito writes:

Modern reformers in the twentieth century began to reinterpret key traditional Islamic concepts and institutions: consultation (*shura*) of rulers with those ruled, consensus (*ijma'*) of the community, reinterpretation (*ijtihad*), and legal principles such as the public welfare (*maslaha*) of society to develop Islamic forms of parliamentary governance, representative elections, and religious reform. Reformers in the twenty-first century, like Khaled Abou el-Fadl, continue the process in diverse ways. (Esposito 2003, bostonreview.net)

Al-Shatibi's legacy and contribution to Muslim Spain did not end with his death. His ideas and principles still provide researchers and reformists with a wealth of tools to analyze, examine and finally apply Islamic law in our day and age. Al-Shatibi was the first legal scholar to dedicate his writing to the issue of *masalih* (public welfare) in his book *The Agreements (al-Muwafaqat)*. Even though the concept of *maslaha* has always been a part of Islamic legal thought and practice, he is considered to be an authority on the topic because he was the first to analyze the concept thoroughly and to dedicate most of his research to it. Al-Shatibi wrote four volumes of *The Agreements* to demonstrate the essence of Islamic law. According to al-Shatibi Islamic law is there to protect public welfare (*masalih*), therefore "end goals" and "public welfare" are used interchangeably.

Al-Shatibi's work is still considered to be most seminal in the area of Islamic legal thought. His importance lies in his choice of public welfare instead of focusing on the literal words of the Texts (the Qur'an and *sunnah*). It is thought that because of Averroes' influence al-Shatibi made an "epistemological"²⁹ leap in Islamic legal thought because he stressed and utilized the end goals of Islamic law and the principle of public welfare to enhance Islamic legal thought as a field. In discussing St. Thomas and al-Shatibi, I found that their ideas are congruent. Firstly, Averroes has influenced both thinkers. The idea that individuals and societies should be virtuous, as mentioned earlier, according to Aristotle's NE is at the heart of St. Thomas' and al-Shatibi's writings. Secondly, the concept of the common good in St. Thomas' writing and al-Shatibi's public welfare are almost identical in spirit. Thirdly, and more importantly, St. Thomas and al-Shatibi agree that law serves the common good and public welfare. Both theorists agree that morality and virtue are part of individual and communal practice so that the welfare of humanity at large should not stress legal and organizational conformities, rather that the law itself should serve to benefit the common, or public, welfare.

C. The impasse, the hegemony of the rationalist paradigm, the dialogue of the deaf

The similarities between St. Thomas' and al-Shatibi's thought and their common references undermine the idea that Islamic and Western civilizations are mutually exclusive. St. Thomas' ideas of the *bonum commune* fostered and led to the growth of concepts that influenced, and continue to influence, political thought. Al-Shatibi's ideas are also currently being revived in Muslim intellectual circles. Both thinkers stress the welfare of communities and how it ties in to morality and virtue. They also

emphasize the importance of analyzing laws and regulations to protect human and communal welfare. Both authors exemplify how faith and reason are not mutually exclusive. As indicated earlier, thinkers like St. Thomas and al-Shatibi, as well as many contemporaries, challenge our current obsession with the concept of rationality. As Keys indicates:

Yet concerns remain that concepts of the common good, especially if they comprise concrete ethical norms and substantive accounts of human goods and virtues, are inextricably bound up with particular religious convictions that have no place in the civic forum of a liberal democracy. (Keys 2007: 5)

Keys recognizes that contemporary liberal theory emphasizes utilitarianism and she also emphasizes the limitations that are set by the divide between faith and reason:

Again, in this context we need to be open to the possibility of “faith and reason” approaches, not just paradigms of “faith versus reason”, if we are to understand what Aquinas is up to and give his thought fair consideration. (Keys, 24)

As Foucault writes:

I think that, just as we must free ourselves from the intellectual black-mail of being for or against Enlightenment we must escape from the historical and moral confusionism that mixes the theme of humanism with the question of the Enlightenment. (Rabinow 1984: 45)

Those divisions lead us also to reconsider and evaluate the definitions of modernization and democracy, since they are both rooted in Western liberal thought. However, it is necessary to note that voices are rising against the hegemony of the rationalist paradigm. Not all Western theorists have thought that the “Great Separation,” as Mark Lilla refers to the faith/reason dichotomy in his 2007 book *The Stillborn God*, is necessary to the existence of democracy. Even Jean Jacques Rousseau – the father of the French and American revolutions – was radical in his belief that religion plays an important public role in democratic political life. In *Emile*, he imagines the education of a young boy and the documentation of the boy’s life by his mentor. Lilla notes: “The Tutor guides this education behind the scenes, much the way a puppeteer manipulates marionettes.” (Lilla 2007: 116) In many ways this imagery is reminiscent

of the “Allegory of the Cave” in Plato’s *Republic* in which the person being educated does not realize that he is being secretly indoctrinated. Although in Emile’s case it is a lot more subtle than in Plato’s *Republic*.

Emile eventually needs to interact with society as a young man seeking courtship. It is then that he has to call on a code of mores to guide him in his relationships with others. Emile, at that point in his life, cannot rely only on his self-knowledge and his individual experiences to guide him through social interactions. Emile’s mentor, therefore, relays to him the story of the Savoyard vicar, built on the belief that: “there is a creating will in the universe; that this will is intelligent, good and powerful; and that man is free.” (Lilla 2007: 121) The vicar’s ideas about the “creating will,” and its intelligence and power, all relate to the vicar’s perception of God.

The moral of Emile and the vicar’s story is that Rousseau was extremely aware of the outrage he could face by re-introducing faith into the public arena in Europe at the time. In fact, the publication still aroused rage in Europe so that his book was burned and he was forced to live the rest of his life in asylum. Lilla’s depiction of the story of the vicar explains why Rousseau’s ideas were so revolutionary: “The vicar’s faith is not the Christian faith. But neither is it opposed to Christianity.” (Lilla 2007: 126)

Distancing himself from a dogmatic understanding and practice of faith, the vicar stresses the universal role of human conscience. This is precisely why Orthodox Christians would feel threatened by his ideas because they are universal in nature (Lilla 2007: 128). Rousseau ends the vicar’s story by advising Emile to: “take up again the religion of your fathers. Follow it sincerely, since it is simple holy and can be made consistent with both morality and reason.” (Lilla 2007: 130)

In fact, the rigid constructs and dichotomy between faith and reason, and also between liberal democratic practices and religious mores, are critiqued by Rousseau, De Tocqueville and many contemporary political theorists, e.g. Mark Lilla and Cheryl Hall. Lilla shows that when Enlightenment philosophy broke away from the Church and its authority, the result was an absolute distancing of divine revelation from public policy. Lilla argues that this decisive blow to “political theology” was and continues to be a challenge in Western societies.³⁰ Lilla criticizes the Western political-ideological fixations that result from the separation of politics and theology:

These (*stories*) are legends about the course of history, full of grand terms to describe the process supposedly at work – modernization,

secularization, democratization, the “disenchantment of the world”, “history of the story of liberty” and countless others. These are the fairy tales of our time.

Lilla writes that: “The *Stillborn God* is not a fairy tale. It is a book about the fragility of our world, the world created by the intellectual rebellion against political theology in the West.” (Lilla 2007: 6) Furthermore, Lilla stresses the failure to recognize the political-theological connection in Western thought. He says that the separation of religion from politics depends on “self-restraint,” and: “That we must rely on self-restraint should concern us. Our fragility is not institutional, it is intellectual.” (Lilla 2007: 7–8) Lilla’s “great separation” between politics and theology is the very threat that so concerns even liberal Islamists like Ghannouchi, Qaradawi, and Yassin. Lilla points out that not only is this rigid separation relatively new in the West but also, and more importantly, that the founders of liberal democracy never intended for that great separation or dichotomy to happen. Rousseau’s allegory of the vicar, to substantiate his claim as the father of liberal democracy and one of the main “social contract” theorists, was not for the rigidity of the liberal intellectual milieu.

In agreement with Lilla, I also wish to emphasize that Rousseau’s student and the father of the world’s “ideal” liberal democracy (the United States), Alexis de Tocqueville, agreed with his mentor. In de Tocqueville’s second essay on America, part 1, chapter 4, he writes:

In my opinion, I doubt whether man can ever support at the same time complete religious independence and entire political freedom and am drawn to the thought that if a man is without faith, he must serve someone and if he is free, he must believe. (Bevan 2003: 512)

De Tocqueville warns against the danger of abandoning faith because total equality between men also has the adverse effect of awakening “dangerous instincts... It exposes their souls to an excessive love of material enjoyment.” (Bevan 2003: 512) De Tocqueville believed that excessive equality must be controlled or checked by religion in a democratic society. In describing American religiosity he wrote that they:

practice their religion without shame or weakness but one generally observes at the heart of their zeal something so calm, so methodical, and so calculated that the head rather than the heart leads them to the foot of the altar. (Bevan 2003: 615)

Discussions and arguments about the public role of religion has continued into contemporary political thought, whether one refers to post-modernists, or feminists, or even earlier historically to the Romantic era in European thought, that gave us intellectuals like Nietzsche, Bergson, Sorel, Durkheim and Pareto. Contemporary examples of intellectuals who challenge the theoretical *status quo* include Roxanne Euben, in her work *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (1999) and Jurgen Habermas, a student of the Frankfurt School. In his debate with Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) Habermas argues that: "secular knowledge cannot disregard and dismiss religion as 'irrational'." (McNeil 2006: 50–1) It is interesting that in this debate, the Pope recognizes that:

The Islamic cultural sphere, too, is marked by similar tensions. There is a broad spectrum between the fanatical absolutism of a Bin Laden and attitudes that are open to a tolerant rationality. (McNeil 2006: 74)

That is to say, the Pope recognizes the tolerant discourse of what I define as the liberal/moderate trend in modern Islamic thought. The work of Cheryl Hall, *The Trouble with Passion: Political Theory Beyond the Reign of Reason*, exemplifies a feminist critique of the great divide between reason and passion. Hall establishes a connection between liberal theory and "Western political structures, processes, and cultures," and criticizes their influence on public life. The underlying argument of her book is that "passions" have a positive role to play in society. If this positive role is not recognized, she warns of "the perpetuation of gender inequality in politics and the stifling of political innovation." (Hall 2005: 36)

Hence – after examining Rousseau, de Tocqueville, Foucault, Euben, Lilla, Habermas, and Hall – there is agreement from different fields of study on the importance of religion in public life. Rousseau and de Tocqueville are of particular importance, since in many ways they have laid the theoretical foundations of Western liberal democracy. As founders of liberal democratic theory, as emphasized in their works, they were careful not to exclude religion/faith from political realms, which constitutes my first critique of rational/liberal contemporary political theory. This critique also undermines the argument that secularization is imperative to democratization, i.e. Muslim societies do not have to abandon the public role of faith because, given Rousseau's and de Tocqueville's arguments, this dichotomy in politics is not called for in a democratic society. Accordingly, the link between secularization and democratization is frail.

Finally, and more importantly, if we examine and trace the history of ideas and the theoretical common grounds that al-Shatibi and St. Thomas exemplify we will find that they were influenced by the same theorist, and that they developed very similar ideas regarding the perception and understanding of the role the public played in a given society. The perception that Islam is ideologically not conducive of democratization and that the faith is in direct contradiction to modernity is an argument that justifies the rejection of the Other. It is an argument that does not know or recognize the ideological ties that are historically shared by the Western liberal and Muslim worlds.

Glossary of Arabic terms

Ayah/Ayat (plural): verses from the Qur'an.

Fiqh/Fuqaha: inferring Islamic law from the Qur'an and *sunnah* by religious scholars. The fuqaha are the religious scholars who carry out this process of inference.

Hadith/Ahadith (plural): words spoken by the prophet and taken as part of the textual sources that make up Islamic law.

Hasan: the root of the words: *istihsan*, *ahsan*, *muhsin*. It means better or best.

Ijma': the agreement of religious scholars on a ruling, which is also taken as precedence and as a source of Islamic law.

Istihsan: a legal principle that is invoked in the absence of a clear textual reference, similar and equal to public welfare (*maslaha*) and the goals of Islamic law (*maqasid al-Shari'a*).

Istislah: a legal principle that applies public welfare as a guideline for legislating Islamic law.

Madhhab/Madhahib (plural): a legal school of law. The main four Sunni schools are: Maliki, Hanafi, Shaf'i, and Hanbali. The most commonly known Shiite school is the Ja'fari.

Al Maqasid: the goals of Islamic law, used interchangeably with *istislah*. It is observing the goals of Islamic law in the absence of textual sources to infer and carry out public welfare. The spirit of Islamic law. The five goals are: preserving religion, the self, the mind, posterity and property.

Maslaha/Masalih (plural): public welfare sought, decided and based on the guiding principles and in the spirit of and guided by the goals of Islamic law.

Mujtahid: making the effort in this context to study and infer from the spirit of the text to legally legislate an issue that is not clearly stated in the text.

Nass/Nusus (plural): the Text, in this context the Qur'an and the *sunnah*.

Qat'yat: plural of *qat'ii* and the opposite of *zanii*, which in the Islamic law context means that the issue is clearly addressed in the textual sources.

Qiyas: a method used by religious scholars in Islamic law to extrapolate legal reasoning by analogy. For example: if it is stated clearly that alcohol is prohibited in the text, then by extrapolation drugs should also be prohibited, because the same reasoning (*hujja*) for prohibiting alcohol applies to drugs.

Sunnah: the sayings (*ahadith*: plural of *hadith*) of the Prophet and his actions that were recorded by his friends, family, and followers during his lifetime.

'Ulama: plural of *'alim*, which means scholars, in this context it is used interchangeably with *fuqaha* (plural of *faqih*), religious scholars.

'Urf: local customs that do not contradict the text and are taken into account when legislating Islamic law as one of the sources of analogical reasoning (*qiyas*).

'Usul al-Fiqh: the foundations of Islamic law. According to Islam this is based on the primary sources of the Qur'an and *sunnah*, and the secondary sources of the consensus of the religious scholars (*ijma'*) and analogical reasoning (*qiyas*).

Zanniyat: plural of *zanni*, which in the Islamic legal context means a doubtful issue, one open to debate that is not clearly addressed in the textual sources of the law.

Notes

1. *Istislah* is conjugated on the pattern of *istif'aal* (to impose the act of doing on a verb), while *maslaha* is conjugated as *maf'ala*; therefore the role *fi'l* is s.l.h. For example, when the expression *istislah aradi* is used to mean reclaiming land; therefore *istislah* in general Arabic terms means bettering or making good.
2. Some religious scholars have quoted verses from the Qur'an and Hadith to prove that *maslaha* is considered and recognized in the main two sources of legislation. Other religious scholars might be more conservative in their arguments and prefer to view *maslaha* as a conveyed notion, i.e. an indirectly addressed notion.
3. See Diagrams 2 and 3 for a graphical presentation of these differences.
4. Alwani 1988.

5. Al-Shafi'i was the first to address Islamic legal interpretation and was later followed methodologically by the Malikis and the Hanbalis.
6. Al-Tufi was an exception in the Hanbali tradition. Most of the Hanbalis were conservative in their legal interpretations.
7. Abu Hanifa's teaching methods were strikingly different from Malik's. Abu Hanifa allowed his students to question his opinion and thought; thus he allowed his students some independence. Malik illustrated the logical steps to his deductions, but did not allow his students (during his lifetime) to exercise their reason or to question his opinion (Abu Zahra 1952: 433–434).
8. Neither Malik nor Abu Hanifa wrote of their theoretical arguments or practices. Their schools of thought were maintained by their respective students, who afterwards documented their theoretical views and practices.
9. PW is short for public welfare.
10. Thus public welfare and the goals of Islamic law will be used interchangeably herein.
11. Since all the citations agree on the five goals of Islamic law, they will be arranged chronologically, by title, name of author, legal school, and the year the author died.
12. Most of the cited literature in this segment of the chapter is very old, publication dates and other bibliographic details are not available.
13. Al Ghazali is a Shafi'i. In accordance with his teachings, he stresses the importance of the text.
14. The first religious scholar to write about the goals of Islamic law (*maqasid*) and public welfare in depth; i.e. other religious scholars mentioned it in their usage and understanding of the legal concept, but al-Shatibi was the only religious scholar who dedicated four volumes to public welfare, as well as part of his second book, *Seeking Sanctuary*.
15. The specifics of which goal should be given priority over the other and the citation of many legal cases where the notion of public welfare (*maslaha*) was used to make up the body of al-Shatibi's second part of *The Treatise*. This is the reason al-Shatibi is regarded as the forefather of the goals of Islamic law (*maqasid*).
16. The author's date of death is unknown, therefore his contribution is placed at the end of the chronologically arranged citations.
17. Al-Tufi was accused of being a Shi'i imam owing to his extreme position in taking public welfare as a legal source even it was in direct contradiction to the word of the text.
18. The goals of Shari'a are the preservation of religion, the self, the mind, posterity, and property.
19. Euben, 1999: 4.
20. Euben captures this: "The pleasant trope of 'conversation' must be invoked in the study of Islamic fundamentalism with caution, for in a postcolonial world such 'dialogues' across culture often take place under conditions of radical inequality among and between regions, economies, and cultures." (Euben 1999: 13).
21. "Among the Arabic philosophers of the East, Alfarabi did not discuss its contents, and Avicenna, though he devoted two summary chapters to political science at the end of his *Metaphysics*, made no mention of it. Among the Arabic philosophers of the West, Averroes had an active career as judge and

- physician; the Politics was not available to him, but his paraphrase of Plato's Republic showed the influence of the Nicomachean Ethics" (Gilby, 83).
22. "Whether the government was controlled by one, or few or many, determined whether the laws were conceived monarchically, aristocratically or democratically; what was much more important, they held, was the effectiveness of laws for promoting the Common Good" (Gilby, 197).
 23. Gilby, 217.
 24. Gilby, 218–227.
 25. Mary M. Keys, 2007: 144–145.
 26. Al-Shatibi's date of birth is not certain but it is thought that he was born before 1318 (Abu Al-Ajfan, 1984: 32).
 27. The end goals of Shari'a (*al-maqasid*) are five: preservation of religion, preservation of the mind, religion, self, posterity and wealth. However, preserving those five elements is part and parcel of the more encompassing principle of public welfare (*maslaha*) in Islamic law.
 28. Most Islamic activists stress the importance of the "end goals of Islamic law" e.g. al-Qaradawi, Ghannouchi, Abdel Salam Yassine, and Turabi. Also Esposito, Sardar, Rabb, Abdelkader, Ramadan are some of the scholars who have stressed the concept's importance and relevance to our times.
 29. Abdel-Aziz, 2007: 8.
 30. "By attacking Christian political theology and denying its legitimacy, the new philosophy simultaneously challenged the basic principles on which authority had been justified in most societies in history. That was the decisive break. The ambition of the new philosophy was to develop habits of thinking and talking about politics exclusively in human terms, without appeal to divine revelation or cosmological speculation. The hope was to wean Western societies from all political theology and cross to the other shore... Our experiment continues, though with less awareness of why it was begun and the nature of the challenge it was intended to meet. Yet the challenge has never disappeared." (Lilla 2007: 5).

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Part III

Contemporary Muslim Insights on Muslim Governance and International Relations

Nassef Manabilang Adiong

For more than 1,400 years before decolonization Muslims had practiced various political systems, such as the caliphate, sultanate, and imamate. Sometimes the leader had both spiritual and temporal authority, often-times the roles were separated, depending on particular needs. Indeed, Muslims experimented widely with their governmental systems by borrowing, emulating, and adapting from foreign practices (mostly from the ancient Persians, Greeks, and Indians), but with a spirit of creativity and innovation. However, after destruction by Mongolian invasion and colonialization by European Christendom, Muslim civilization never fully recuperated, and the sickness of fundamentalism, radicalization, and intellectual stagnation emerged within its communities. The spirit of creativity, innovation, and intellectualism gradually faded away and remained dormant. Consequently, nation-state system was abruptly adapted by most of the contemporary Muslim countries. Nation-state's elements such as citizenry, territoriality, authority, constitution, and sovereignty configured the whole system of Muslim governance.

Muslim political expressions

The spread of Islam was done through missionary (sometimes propaganda) work, diplomacy, and conquest.¹ Prophet Muhammad² brought in a new kind of community beyond Arab kinship, in which non-Arabs and non-Muslims took part in the formation of polity. This new polity would soon be guided by shari'ah to regulate people's beliefs, rituals, leadership, families, business, morals, etc.³ In Fazlur Rahman's understanding, the inception of the Muslim community was connected with

three events: "the declaration that all Muslims must undertake the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Makkah, that *jihad* (struggle in the way of Allah) is obligatory, and that the *qiblah's* direction is changed from Jerusalem to the *Ka'bah* in Makkah."⁴

After the demise of the Prophet in 632, his succession became a political question. There were three political groups contending the leadership: the *Ansar* (with the majority of Muslim soldiers); the *Muhajirin* (who raised the issue that a leader must be from the tribe of Quraysh); and the Banu Hashim (who stood for hereditary succession).⁵ The establishment of an absolute political religious authority, according to Talal Asad quoting Bashir, must be "seen primarily as political reaction, on the part of the trading city of Mecca, to the threats posed to its commercial interests by external powers in the Middle East, as well as by internal tribal anarchy."⁶ When the rule of the *Rashidun* Caliphs (or rightly guided caliphs)⁷ ended, it was the start of dynastic monarchies in the guise of caliphates, most notably the Umayyads⁸ (661–750) and the Abbasids (750–1258).⁹

With dynastic monarchies, the leadership of *dawlah* (state), according to Davutoğlu, can be seen in two ways: by perceiving the Prophet as state leader; and/or as religious head of a community prior to subsequent socio-political formations.¹⁰ The term *dawla* evolved over time to mean:¹¹ (1) a change of political power or the victory of one dynasty over another; (2) used for continuity and for the ultimate political authority and structure; and (3) it occurred after the political supremacy of the Western international system based on individual nation-states.

Islamic sources (the Qur'an and *sunnah*) had very few political stipulations and thought processes, so Muslims had to borrow, improvise and innovate to devise their political systems, which were usually inspired by shari'ah, Arab tribal systems, and the lands they conquered (especially Persian and Byzantine polities).¹² Kaminsky contends that in the 10th century there was a clear lineage of political thought running from late Greek antiquity to Islamic scholars, e.g., al-Farabi, acquired due to necessity.¹³ Thus, Muslim political traditions were a mixture of pre-Islamic Arab tribal systems, Persian statecraft, and political philosophies from the Greeks and Indians.¹⁴

In the 16th century, Muslim governance/polity was divided into several divisions and subsets which were "consolidated by the trends of political development within Islam as well as by its relationships with the Christian world. The Islamic universal state became transformed into an Islamic state system, following a long process of decentralization and break-up, just as Western Christendom was transformed from a universal

into a European state system.”¹⁵ Consequently, Muslim governance, according to Farhang Rajaee, attained its maturity and sophistication in the 9th century, where the formulation of shari’ah regulated Muslims and set rules regarding foreign relations, especially with non-Muslim regimes.¹⁶ However, Muslim encounters with European modernity in the 18th century suffered a major setback that gave birth to radical Islamic movements in response to, as they saw it, the threat of modernity to pristine Islamic life.

Fred Halliday claimed that the 1878 Treaty of Berlin brought dramatic change to the Ottoman Empire and that it was the “formative period of state formation”¹⁷ in the region¹⁸ as, from 1918 to 1922, the empire was partitioned by colonial powers. After World War I Sharif Husayn of Mecca declared himself caliph; only Iraq, Hijaz (present-day Saudi Arabia), and East Jordan recognized his position, while Muslims in India and Egypt rejected his caliphate because they saw him as a British agent.¹⁹ He connived with the British colonizers to revolt against the Ottomans and promised an Arab nation that would extend from Hijaz to Egypt and Iran. But he was later betrayed by the Sykes-Picot secret agreement in 1916, which strengthened British and French control of oil in the region.²⁰ Another embarrassment for Sharif Husayn was the UK’s Balfour Declaration of 1917, which favored the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This showed that Britain’s real intention was to use dissenting Arab voices and nationalism against Ottoman “attempts to erode Muslim loyalty in the Empire at the opening of World War I.”²¹

Throughout the decolonization period and the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, the abolition of the caliphate in the earlier years of the Turkish republic left an indelible impact on Muslims worldwide. Notable Muslim figures expressed diverse reactions to the removal of the office of the caliph in Turkey in 1924.²²

- Rashid Rida²³ (b. 1865, d. 1935) protested against the Turkish decision and called for urgent reestablishment of the caliphate, combining spiritual and political authority.
- Ali Abdel Raziq²⁴ (b. 1888, d. 1966) contested Rida’s call in 1925 by advocating the separation of Islam and politics and argued that Islam had never prescribed a system of government. Paradoxically, this position was also supported by the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (b. 1935, d. 2010), who argued that Islam “was not revealed in order to establish a state as an end, but to spread a message based on which a state would come into existence only as a subsequent means toward achieving this goal.”²⁵

- Abul A'la Maududi²⁶ (b. 1903, d. 1979), a prominent Islamist²⁷ thinker, urged for the establishment of a Kharijite-inspired Islamic state²⁸ (which calls for an absolute divine sovereignty) and the enforcement of Islamic law on all aspects of human activity. He was a staunch opponent of Western nationalism and democracy.
- Hassan al-Banna²⁹ (b. 1906, d.1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, called for a superior Islamic nationalism and believed that Islam is both a religion and a state.
- Sayyid Qutb (b. 1906, d. 1966), the foremost and most influential Islamist thinker and activist, advanced the idea of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of divine guidance) which, for him, covered not only the pre-Islamic era but also contemporary times, including Muslim communities. He also urged for the establishment of a Maududi-inspired Islamic state.³⁰
- Out of all the Islamists, only Ruhollah Khomeini³¹ (b. 1902, d. 1989) was able to put his theory of Islamic state into practice by imposing his concept of *velayat-e faqih*³² (guardianship/providence of the jurist), a theocratic polity ruled by jurists.

Muqtedar Khan³³ has an interesting view of political thinkers in Islam; he distinguished them by dividing them into two camps: the Islamic theoreticians of the state (e.g., al-Farabi, al-Mawardi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Khaldun) and the theoreticians of the Islamic state³⁴ (e.g., Afghani, Maududi, Qutb, Khomeini, and Taqiuddin al-Nabhani³⁵).

In contrast with Ali Abdel Raziq's claim, Yusuf Qaradawi demonstrated that there are two verses revealed in the Qur'an that says something about the state: "God doth command you to render your trust to those to whom they are due; and when ye judge between men, that ye judge with justice. Verily how excellent is the teaching which He giveth you! For God is He Who heareth and seeth all things. O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves refer it to God and His Apostle, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day. That is best, and most suitable for final determination." (Qur'an 4:58-59)

He interpreted the first verse as "directed to governors and rulers: to preserve trust and to judge with justice, because wasting trust and justice inevitably leads the ummah to destruction and ruin."³⁶ And the second verse as addressed to "believing subjects: to obey the rulers stipulated that they are from among themselves."³⁷ Ironically, Hallaq argued that "postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of power they had inherited from the colonial experience and that, as a rule and after

gaining so-called independence for their countries, they often aggressively pursued the very same colonial policies they had fiercely fought against during the colonial period."³⁸ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr agreed that the Muslim world inherited its "machinery of government, ideologies of modernization, views on social engineering, and political control were all handed down from the colonial era."³⁹

The increasing call for the establishment of Islamic states or movements must be seen "in a broader historical process, following on the pan-Islamic movement, the national movements, the restructuring of Muslim societies after independence, and the establishment of international Islamic organizations."⁴⁰ According to Fred H Lawson, there are "three broad dynamics generated the states-system that took shape in the Middle East during the first half of the twentieth century: (1) the end of the imperial institutions of governance that had structured regional politics over the previous 600 years; (2) the rise of local nationalist movements in Cairo, Tunis, Baghdad, Damascus, and other major urban centers; and (3) the appearance of narrowly self-interested, territorially bounded, mutually antagonistic states."⁴¹ Nation-states had reconfigured the entire course of Muslim governance, and below are discussions by selected thinkers regarding socio-political ways of how Muslim societies and nations must adapt to the Westphalian state system.

The chapters

Sayyid Qutb (b. 1906, d. 1966), a prominent Islamist thinker and leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, advocated using political theory in the study of social justice for Muslims. Carimo Mohamed shows Qutb's political thinking as a way to make sense of the world rather than succumbing to a pre-Islamic state of ignorance (*jahiliyyah*). His understanding of Qutb's corpus rejects Western modernity, with its focus on a material progress which leaves out the significance of a moral and ethical religious order. Thus, Qutb promoted an interwoven inclusion of both spiritual and material values in the development of human beings. In his idea of an Islamic system, communal structures percolated through welfare services between ruler(s) and ruled, which are guided by *shari'ah* principles (solely legislated by divine authority). Qutb was influenced by Mawdudi's idea of God's sovereignty, which guarantees absolute justice of the Islamic order, and in which adherence to this order is a prerequisite for a coherent integration of the Muslim community (*ummah*). Consequently, Qutb's political system is based on an

egalitarian society that is guided and represented by Islam throughout the ages. Thus, Islam is impermeably and infinitely divided from the rest of the world (i.e., the non-Islamic world).

Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), a famous contemporary theologian of Islam and leader of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, tried to formulate a world order based on the principle of *wasatiyyah* (moderation). Rodolfo Ragonieri, claims that Qaradawi always tried to position himself in the middle way, or a balance, between two extremes: Islamic radicalism and Western political secularization. That is, by avoiding too strict an interpretation of what is forbidden in Islam, and of excessive freedom due to Western influence on secular thinking. Qaradawi's discourse on moderation acknowledges the individual's commemoration of Islam's spiritual (and intellectual) past and the need to live in the present that is characterized by widespread ethical development and material progress. The universal manifestation of his, principally, moderate society may be empirically shown through the significance of *ummah* (Muslim community), marked by juristic division between the abodes of Islam and of war, and of collective security through his ideas of defensive and offensive jihad. However, his presentation of his ideas on world order is rather inconsistent, especially when it comes to the Palestinian Question.

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (b. 1939), prime minister of Malaysia from 2003 to 2009, introduced the concept *Islam hadhari* (civilizational Islam) to the world. According to Muhamad Ali, it was conceived as a result of Malaysia's domestic politics that were relatively successful in exporting ideas to the OIC, particularly in Muslim-dominated societies in Southeast Asia. However, it was not successful in influencing the behaviors (local and foreign policies) of OIC member states because of intransigent competition from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, etc. *Islam hadhari* was viewed as a middle ground between Islamic ethos and Euro-American modernity, through the adoption of the Westphalian state system while following the tenets and historical empiricism of Islam and Muslim civilization. Badawi saw it as an opportunity for Muslims to adapt and live within the confines of modernity without jeopardizing their belief system in order to attain both spiritual and material progress. It was seen as laying the foundation for commonalities between Islam and the West through the promotion of justice, ethics, rule of law, democracy, equality before the law, and so on, in order to address the poverty and underdevelopment besetting the Muslim world. Badawi and his cohorts aimed to clean up the international reputation of Islam,

which also included uplifting the spiritual and intellectual confidence of Muslims by looking back to the glory of their historical past while living as modern individuals.

Notes

1. Kennedy, Hugh. *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century*. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 2004, p. 45.
2. The Prophet also appointed political positions such as the *wali* (the guardian) and judges to settle disputes. (See: An-Nabhani, Taqiuddin. *The Islamic State*. London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 1998, pp. 118–120.)
3. Black, Antony. *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present*. New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 9.
4. Rahman, Fazlur. "The Principle of Shura and the Role of the Ummah in Islam." In *State Politics and Islam*, edited by Mumtaz Ahmad, 87–96. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, 1986, p. 87.
5. Iqbal, Justice Javid. "The Concept of State in Islam." In *State Politics and Islam*, edited by Mumtaz Ahmad, 37–50. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, 1986, p. 42.
6. Asad, Talal. "Ideology, Class and the Origin of the Islamic State." Review of *Sulayman Bashir's The Balance of Contradictions: Lectures on the Pre-Islamic Period and Early Islam* (1978). *Economy and Society* 9, no. 4 (1980): 452.
7. They are Abu Bakr (r. 632–634), Umar (r. 634–644), Uthman (r. 644–656), and Ali (r. 656–661).
8. Fred Donner argued "that a state certainly can be said to have existed from the time of the caliph 'Abd al-Malik (685–705), and that a state probably existed back into the time of Mua'wiya ibn Abi Sufyan (661–680)." (See: Donner, Fred M. "The Formation of the Islamic State." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 106, no. 2 (1986): 283. doi:10.2307/601592.)
9. Ahmad, Mubasher. "Khilafat and Caliphate." *Al Islam: The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community*: p. 7. <https://www.alislam.org/topics/khilafat/khilafat-and-caliphate.pdf>.
10. Davutoglu, Ahmet. *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1994, p. 191.
11. Davutoglu, 1994, p. 192.
12. Ayubi, Nazih. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 6–8.
13. Kaminski, Joseph J. "A Theory of a Contemporary Islamic State: History, Governance, and the Individual." 2014. MS, PhD Thesis, Purdue University, p. 50–51.
14. Berkey, Jonathan Porter. *The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–1800*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 62.
15. Shaybani, Muḥammad. *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*. Translated by Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, p. 61.
16. Rajae, Farhang. "Paradigm Shifts in Muslim International Relations Discourse." *Studies in Contemporary Islam* 1, no. 1 (1999): 2.

17. It is important to note that Hinnebusch stated that "state formation is coterminous with a contested process of identity construction, whether a state's boundaries satisfy or frustrate identity shapes its foreign policy role." (See: Hinnebusch, Raymond A. *The International Politics of the Middle East*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 74.)
18. Halliday, Fred. *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 2005, pp. 79–80.
19. Enayat, Hamid. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, p. 70.
20. Andrea, Mounecif Radouan. "The Territoriality of the Islamic State." Université Paris, Département De Relations Euro-méditerranéennes, Monde Maghrébin, pp. 5–7. https://www.academia.edu/10872599/The_territoriality_of_the_Islamic_State.
21. Oliver-Dee, Sean. *The Caliphate Question: The British Government and Islamic Governance*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009, p. 166.
22. Ayubi, Nazih N., Nader Hashemi, and Emran Qureshi. "Islamic State." *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*. 2009. Accessed April 22, 2015. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0394>.
23. "Rashid Rida | Biography – Islamic Scholar." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 05, 2015. <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Rashid-Rida>.
24. "Abd Al-Raziq, 'Ali | Biography – Egyptian Scholar." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 05, 2015. <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Abd-al-Raziq-Ali>.
25. Sabet, Amr G. E. "The Islamic Paradigm of Nations: Toward a Neoclassical Approach." *Religion, State and Society* 31, no. 2 (2003): 191. doi:10.1080/09637490308284.
26. "Mawdudi, Abu'l-A'la | Biography – Journalist and Muslim Theologian." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 05, 2015. <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Abul-Ala-Mawdudi>.
27. Boroujerdi said that "scholars like Abdullahi An-Na'im and Bassam Tibi argue, the ideology of Islamism and the concept of the Islamic theocratic state whose sole purpose is implementation of the shari'a are but modern and postcolonial phenomena in the Middle East." (See: Boroujerdi, 2013, pp. 15–16). An-Na'im and Tibi's position was also similar to Maximilian Lakitsch's. He argued that "Political Islam and its synonym 'Islamism' is a specific modern interpretation of Islam. It has its roots in social conflicts: the establishment of autocratic monarchies in the newly independent Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s gave rise to social justice demands which these regimes did not meet." (See: Lakitsch, Maximilian. "Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the Disenchantment with Political Islam." In *Caliphates and Islamic Global Politics*, edited by Timothy Poirson and Robert Oprisko, p. 15. E-International Relations, 2014.)
28. Bassam Tibi claimed that "the model state presented by Islamic fundamentalism is basically a form of totalitarian rule, even though some writers perceive it as an Islamic pattern of democratic state-making." (See: Tibi, Bassam. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 158.)
29. "Hasan Al-Banna' | Biography – Egyptian Religious Leader." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 05, 2015. <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Hasan-al-Banna>.

30. "Sayyid Qutb | Biography – Egyptian Writer." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 05, 2015. <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Sayyid-Qutb>.
31. "Ruhollah Khomeini | Biography – Iranian Religious Leader." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed August 05, 2015. <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Ruhollah-Khomeini>.
32. Boroujerdi presented that "dissenting voices like those of Mahdi Ha'iri Yazdi (1923–1999), Mohsen Kadivar (1959–), Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistari (1936–), and Abdulkarim Soroush (1945–) have complained that the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* is destroying the sacredness of Islam as jurisprudence and theology have become intertwined with state power, material interest, and political considerations." (See: Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. *Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and the Theory of Statecraft*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2013, p. 15)
33. Khan, Muqtedar. "The Islamic State." *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*. Edited by Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. London: Rout, 2004, pp. 226–227.
34. Mohd's narrow view insists that "Islam is composed of the 'aqidah' (doctrine) and a collection of laws emanating from it, the Islamic State must derive its entire constitution from the Islamic aqidah." (See: Mohd, Nasran Mohamad. "The Concept of Islamic State." *Grande Strategy*. Accessed April 17, 2015. <http://www.grandestrategy.com/2009/03/4484848491219the-concept-of-islamic.html>.)
35. Al-Nabhani (b. 1909, d. 1977) was an Islamic scholar from Jerusalem who founded the Islamist political party *Hizb ut-Tahrir*.
36. Qaradawi, Yusuf. *State in Islam*. Cairo: El-Falah, 1998, p. 12.
37. Qaradawi, 1998, p. 12.
38. Hallaq, Wael B. *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 12 (kindle version)
39. Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 9.
40. Waardenburg, Jean Jacques. *Islam: Historical, Social and Political Perspectives*. Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 2002, p. 358.
41. Lawson, Fred Haley. *Constructing International Relations in the Arab World*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 1.

7

“The Parting of the Ways”: A Qutbian Approach to International Relations

Carimo Mohomed

Introduction

Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement.

The Indian philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) wrote these words in 1934, some five years before the Second World War, which would be the continuation of the European Civil War of 1914–1918, and the concluding chapter of a story which had begun with the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871.

In the last chapter of his book *Social Justice in Islam*, first published in 1949, Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) asked about the direction the world was, and wished, to go in after two world wars. He also considered that the real struggle was between Islam and the combined camps of Communist Russia (Soviet Union) and the West (Europe and America). From Qutb's point of view, Islam was the true power opposing the strength of materialistic philosophy and which possessed a universal theory of life that could be offered to mankind, a theory whose aims were a complete mutual help among all men and a true mutual responsibility in society.

More than 60 years after the first edition of his seminal work, the world is a different place with the Soviet Union no longer existing, although Russia continues to be an important power, the Arab world going through profound changes, the West becoming parochial, and the Rest asserting itself. Using Sayyid Qutb's political theory, this chapter assesses how a new, and different, international relations practice could

become viable and surpass the anachronistic world order established after the end of the 1939–1945 war.

Considered by some as one of the fathers of radical Islam(ism), the figure and thoughts of Sayyid Qutb are much more complex and can only be understood if properly contextualized. This chapter begins by analyzing Sayyid Qutb's political theory and then assessing his vision and how it can contribute to international relations as political practice.

Brief biography of Sayyid Qutb¹

Born in 1906, near Asyut in Upper Egypt, Sayyid Qutb joined, in 1929, the Dar al-'Ulum in Cairo, a teacher training college. On graduating in 1933, he was appointed to teach at the institution, and a few years later he entered the service of the Egyptian Ministry of Education. Sayyid Qutb was an active member of the opposition Wafd Party, and he became a prominent critic of the Egyptian monarchy, which brought him into conflict with his superiors at the Ministry of Education. In 1947 Sayyid Qutb sought anew to emancipate himself from government employ by becoming editor-in-chief of two journals, *al-'Alam al-'Arabi* (*The Arab World*) and *al-Fikr al-Jadid* (*New Thought*). He lost his position with the former as a result of editorial disagreements, and the latter, which sought in a hesitant way to present the model of an Islamic society free of corruption, tyranny, and foreign domination, was proscribed after six issues.

In 1948, the ministry sent him on a study mission to the United States, and Sayyid Qutb's impressions of America were largely negative, and, according to Hamid Algar's assessment (Qutb, 2000: 1–10), may even have been decisive in turning him fully to Islam as a total civilizational alternative. While noting American achievements in production and social organization, Sayyid Qutb laid heavy emphasis on materialism, racism, and sexual permissiveness as dominant features of American life. His sojourn in the United States coincided, moreover, with the first Palestine war, and he noted with dismay the uncritical acceptance of Zionist theses by American public opinion and the ubiquity of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim prejudice. After completing a master's degree in education, Sayyid Qutb decided to forego the chance to stay in America to earn a doctorate and returned to Egypt in 1951.

One of the most widely read of all Sayyid Qutb's books, *al-'Adalat al-Ijtima'iyyah fi'l-Islam* (*Social Justice in Islam*) had been published during his absence in America. With its attacks on feudalism and an emphasis on social justice as an Islamic imperative, it earned the approbation of

leading figures in the Muslim Brotherhood, with whom Sayyid Qutb began to cooperate almost immediately after his return from America, although his formal membership of the organization may not have begun until 1953. This new allegiance marked a turning point in his political and intellectual life. He had quit the Wafd on the death of its founder, Sa'd Zaghlul (1859–1927), and joined the breakaway Sa'dist Party in 1938, which claimed a greater degree of fidelity to the original ideals of the Wafd. He was also involved in the activities of al-Hizb al-Watani (The Patriotic Party) and Hizb Misr al-Fatah (The Young Egypt Party).

In 1951, Sayyid Qutb began writing for Muslim Brotherhood periodicals, such as *al-Risala* (*The Message*), *al-Da'wa* (*The Summons*), and *al-Liwa' al-Jadid* (*The New Banner*), and finally realized his ambition of resigning from the Ministry of Education and formally joining the Brotherhood. He was made editor-in-chief of *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, the organization's official journal, which was banned in January 1954.

In the meantime, on July 23, 1952, the Egyptian monarchy had been overthrown in a *coup d'état* mounted by a group of soldiers who styled themselves the Free Officers, formally led by General Muhammad Najib (Naguib) (1901–1984), but it soon became apparent that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser) (1918–1970) was the driving force behind the group. Although the *coup* was widely popular, the Free Officers lacked any organized political base of their own, turning, therefore, to the Muslim Brotherhood, with whom some of their members had already been in contact, for the effective mobilization of popular support. There thus ensued a period of collaboration between the Muslim Brotherhood and the new regime. Sayyid Qutb was prominent among the members and associates of the Brotherhood who collaborated with the Free Officers. He was appointed cultural advisor to the Revolutionary Council, established by the Free Officers, and was the only civilian to attend its meetings. Before long, however, differences arose between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military rulers of Egypt and, on January 12, 1954, the Revolutionary Council decreed the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sayyid Qutb entered jail for the first time. He was released in March and rearrested in December 1954. He was ill at the time of his arrest, but this did not prevent his jailers from torturing him, in accordance with the still-observed norms of Egyptian justice.²

While in jail, Sayyid Qutb was able to complete a number of his most important writings, above all the Qur'anic commentary *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an* (*In the Shade of the Qur'an*) he had begun in 1962 (Qutb,

2003–2004). Clearly inspired by the circumstances of daily struggle and confrontation in which he lived, this commentary is radically different from traditional exegeses, with their verse by verse attention to philological and historical detail and their extensive citation of previous authorities and variant opinions. Several passages in this commentary reflect the radical theoretical insights inspired by his experience of prison, which forced him to conclude that a regime unprecedented in its ruthlessness had come to power in Egypt; that the primary problem was no longer overt foreign rule or the absence of social justice, but was the total usurpation of power by force intensely hostile to Islam, with the result that society was fixed in the non-Islamic patterns into which it had gradually fallen as a result of decay and neglect. Drawing on the terminology and theories of two Indian Muslims, Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979) and Abu'l-Hasan Nadwi (1913–1999), although ultimately on the *Qur'an* itself, Sayyid Qutb decided that Egypt, together with the rest of the contemporary Islamic world, was strictly comparable to pre-Islamic Arabia in its disregard for divine precepts, and that its state could be therefore rightly be designated by the same term, *jahiliyyah*.³

The term *jahiliyyah* occurs only four times in the *Qur'an* (3:154; 5:50; 33:33; and 48:26) but assumed a central significance for Sayyid Qutb, “encapsulating the utter bleakness of the Muslim predicament and serving as an epistemological device for rejecting all allegiances other than Islam.” (Algar in Qutb, 2000: 8) According to Sayyid Qutb, this new *jahiliyyah* had deep historical roots, and it was moreover fostered and protected by all the coercive apparatus of a modern, authoritarian state; it could not, therefore, be easily remedied in the short term. What was needed was a long-term programme of ideological and organizational work, coupled with the training of a dedicated vanguard of believers who would protect the cause in times of extreme danger (if necessary, by recourse to force) and preside over the replacement of *jahiliyyah* by the Islamic order once circumstances had matured.

In December 1964 Sayyid Qutb was released from jail and, in the meantime, a slim volume entitled *Ma'alim fi'l-Tariq (Milestones)* (Qutb, 2006) had been published and met with instant success; during the first six months of 1965, it went through five further editions. It consisted of some of the letters Sayyid Qutb had sent from prison and key sections of *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an*. On August 5, 1965 Sayyid Qutb was rearrested and condemned to death on May 17, 1966, for plotting the assassination of the Egyptian President Nasser. He was hanged in Cairo on August 29, 1966.

Social justice, an Islamic concern after 1945

A quotation from Mustafa al-Siba'i (1915–1964), a leading figure in the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, will be illustrative of the effects of the two world wars on Islamic intellectuals:⁴

The evidence is not far to seek. The impressions and record of the cruelties of the western nations in the two world wars and their morals and deeds in the Islamic Middle East serve as clear evidence that in governance and in the battlefield their conduct has been extremely tyrannical and a model of barbarism. Their hypocritical policy is now no more any secret that in international meets they let loose loud propaganda of their civilization and culture, philanthropy and love and affection. But in their wars, in their dominions and colonies they openly demonstrate their barbarism and blood-thirstiness. Some people put up the excuse for this mode of action of the western nations that during the middle ages they were not so civilized and cultured that any other behaviour could be expected of them. But a very pertinent question is that now that they are civilized, rather, they claim to hold the monopoly of civilization and benefiting the whole world with sciences and arts and the new inventions, are they any better? The real position is not that. According to our way of measuring them, the problem really is about their true temperament which overwhelms every effort of theirs at affectation and hypocrisy. The fact of the matter is that the western nations still have those traits and habits of the days of their barbarity and idolatry in their entirety. During the middle ages these traits and habits took the shape of religious prejudice. So religion had to bear the brunt of their barbarity. And today the same cruel and barbaric habits are at work under the garb of civilization. So peace and security and civilization have to bear the burden of their hard-heartedness and inhumanity. In fact in every period these nations have been mischief-makers, cruel, blood-thirsty, lovers of power and authority and bigoted and barbaric. How then dare they tell tales of our hard-heartedness under Islamic victories, (quite apart from the fact that it is a bundle of blatant lies) and present their despicable colonialism as a mercy and kindness (Siba'i, 1984: 129–130).⁵

According to Hamid Algar (Algar in Qutb, 2000: 11–13), *Social Justice in Islam* should be evaluated as a document of the first post-war decades in which Islamic movements and personalities were striving to demonstrate

the imperative relevance of Islam to concrete socioeconomic problems. For Sayyid Qutb, one valuable aspect, post-Second World War, was that "[t]he great Western civilization has led the world into two global wars within a quarter of a century; after the second of these it has led it to a complete division into two blocs, an Eastern and a Western, and to the constant threat of a third war. It has brought about disturbances in every quarter, it has produced starvation and destitution and adversity throughout three-quarters of the world. It should be pointed out also that the world order today is in that state of insecurity and instability where it must look for new foundations and search for some spiritual means of restoring to man his faith in the principles of humanity." (Qutb, 2000: 278)

His book attained its fame both because of its relative brevity and because of the general interest and relevance of its subject matter. It has been translated into numerous languages, and it is the earliest, as well as most influential, of a cluster of works that have been devoted to the same subject. Sayyid Qutb can thus be seen to have articulated for the first time a major and widely felt concern of the Muslim world. *Al-'Adalat al-Ijtima'iyyah fi'l-Islam*, first published in 1949, was followed two years later by *Ishtirakiyyat al-Islam (The Socialism of Islam)*, a work by Mustafa al-Siba'i, which is similar in content to Sayyid Qutb's work, although the evocation of socialism in its title contravenes Sayyid Qutb's insistence on the uniqueness and autonomy of Islam as a socioeconomic system, defying all comparison with other ideologies or systems.⁶ Also in 1951, Hamka (1908–1981), a prominent Indonesian Muslim thinker, published *Keadilan sosial dalam Islam* in Jakarta, the exact Indonesian equivalent of the title Sayyid Qutb had given to his book. In Iran, the late 1940s and early 1950s saw the activity of Ayatullah Abu'l-Qasim Kashani (1882–1962), the most politically engaged 'alim of the period; like his counterparts elsewhere in the Muslim world he frequently evoked the theme of social justice in the numerous declarations he delivered. Temporarily allied with Kashani was the organization known as the *Fida'iyān-i Islam*, members of which had both personal and ideological links to the Muslim Brotherhood. The most substantial treatment of the subject of social justice in Islam appeared a decade later with *Iqtisaduna (Our Economics)*, the first publication of the Iraqi Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1931–1980). The only one among the authors mentioned to have had a formal and rigorous training in the religious sciences, al-Sadr is the most precise in his philosophical argumentation and the best able to correlate general precepts of social justice with the detailed provisions of Islamic jurisprudence. Nonetheless, there is no mistaking

his debt to Sayyid Qutb for the term *al-takaful al-ijtima'i* (social solidarity) of which he makes frequent use.

Sayyid Qutb's political theory

According to Sayyid Qutb (Qutb, 2000: 113), in the principles laid down by him when discussing the nature of Islamic social justice, any discussion of social justice in Islam has necessarily to include a discussion of political theory in Islam since it has to embrace all aspects of life and all varieties of endeavor; similarly, that it had to include both spiritual and material values, since these were inextricably interwoven. Political theory was concerned with all of this, and the more so because in the final resort it was concerned with: the implementation of religious law (*shari'a*); with the care of society in every respect; with the establishment of justice (*'adl*) and equilibrium in society; and with the distribution of wealth according to the principles accepted by Islam.⁷

Normally translated as Islamic Law, *shari'a* (شريعة) means, in Arabic, street, path, way. In a legal context, the word *shari'a* refers to the way or the path a Muslim would follow for what God wants us to do. Traditionally, Muslim scholars take primary source material – the *Qur'an* as well as accounts from the life of the Prophet Muhammad, referred to as *hadith* – and derive laws based on their interpretations of these texts. These laws pertain to two different areas of life, either religious observance (prayer, fasting, and almsgiving) or civil and criminal issues (marriage, family law, business transactions, taxation, and warfare). As will be obvious to anyone, the ways in which someone derives laws from his or her interpretation of what God wants us to do varies according to time and place. So, it is also critical to point out that translating the word *shari'a* simply as Islamic law is not sufficient. *Shari'a* includes scores of moral and ethical principles, from honoring one's parents and helping the poor to being good to one's neighbor. It is incorrect to equate *shari'a* with criminal punishments. If we understand it as the idealized path to God, then what constitutes a moral and legal course to the divine is a subjective, and ever-changing, interpretation of Islam's sacred texts, interpretation made by human beings.⁸

For Sayyid Qutb, the Islamic political system was based on two fundamental conceptions, both of which originated in its general idea of the universe, of life, and of man. One was the idea of the equality of mankind as a species, in nature, and in origin; the other was the belief that Islam represented an eternal system for the world throughout the future of the human race. The fact that the Islamic political system was based on

these two conceptions has had its effect on the nature and methods of that system. It made it operate through laws and exhortations, through political and economic theory, and through all the other systems which it included. Thus, it did not legislate for one race or for one generation, but for all races and for all generations; it followed universal and comprehensive principles when it laid down its laws and its systems of government; it laid down only general principles and broad fundamentals, leaving the application of these to the process of time and to the emergence of specific problems. This reliance on general principle was most clearly perceptible in the field of political theory in Islam, which rested on the basis of justice on the part of the rulers and obedience on the part of the ruled, and consultation between rulers and ruled. These were the great fundamental features from which all the other features arose (Qutb, 2000: 117–119).

Firstly, there had to be justice on the part of the rulers, which referred to that impartial justice which was absolute and which could not be swayed by affection or by hatred; the basis of this justice could not be affected by love or by enmity. Such justice was not influenced by any relationship between individuals or by any hatred between peoples. It was enjoyed by all the individual members of the Muslim community, without discrimination arising from descent or rank, wealth or influence. In the same way, such justice was enjoyed by other peoples, even though there may be hatred between them and the Muslims, which was, according to Qutb, a high level of equity to which no international nor any domestic law had so far attained.

Secondly, there had to be obedience to the ones who held authority on the part of those who were ruled, obedience which was derived from obedience to Allah and the Messenger. The ruler in Islamic law was not to be obeyed because of his own person, but only by virtue of holding his position through the law of Allah and His Messenger; his right to obedience was derived from his observance of that law and from nothing else. If he departed from the law, he was no longer entitled to obedience, and his orders no longer needed to be obeyed. Sayyid Qutb considered it important to make a distinction between the fact that a ruler derived his authority from his implementation of religious law and the theory that a ruler drew his authority from religion. For him, no ruler had any religious authority direct from Heaven, as some rulers had in ancient times. The ruler occupied his position only by the completely free choice of all Muslims, who were not bound to elect him by any compact with his predecessor, nor was there any necessity for the position to be hereditary. In addition to this he had to derive his authority from his continual

enforcement of the law. When the Muslim community was no longer satisfied with him his office had to lapse. Even if they were satisfied with him, any dereliction of the law on his part meant that he no longer had the right to obedience.

Thirdly, there had to be consultation between ruler and ruled. Consultation was one of the fundamentals of Islamic rule, although no specific method of administration had ever been laid down – its application had been left to the exigencies of individual situations. No ruler could oppress the souls or the bodies of Muslims, infringe upon their sanctity, or touch their wealth. If he upheld the law and saw that religious duties were observed, then he had reached the limit of his powers (Qutb, 2000: 119–124).

For Sayyid Qutb, no renaissance of Islamic life could be effected purely by law or statute, or by the establishment of a social system on the basis of Islamic philosophy. Such a step was only one of the two pillars on which Islam had always to stand. The other was the production of a state of mind imbued with the Islamic theory of life, to act as an inner motivation for establishing that form of life and to give coherence to all social, religious, and civil legislation. Social justice was an integral part of Islamic life, and it could not be realized unless that form of life was first realized, and it could not have any guaranteed permanence unless that form of life was built upon a solid foundation. In that it was similar to all other social systems; it had to have the support of public belief and confidence in its merits. Failing that, it would lose its spiritual foundation and its establishment would depend on the force of religious and social legislation, a force only obtained so long as evasion was impossible.

Hence Islamic legislation relied on obedience and conviction; it depended on religious belief. So it was always important to keep in mind the necessity for a renaissance of the religious faith, which it had to cleanse of all accretions, such as alterations and arbitrary interpretations and ambiguities. Only then could it support the necessary social legislation that would establish a sound form of Islamic life, dependent upon legislation and exhortation, those twin fundamentals of Islam for the achievement of all its aims (Qutb, 2000: 285).⁹

For Qutb, the limitation of Islamic government to *shari'a* essentially militated against the possibility of human dictatorship, despotism, autocracy, monocracy, and similar labels. In an Islamic system, family structure and individual rights of all members of the state were integral to *shari'a*, and constituted a comprehensive defense mechanism against oppression, which meant that *shari'a* functioned as a protective shield

in defense of the rights and liberties of the citizen against arbitrary power. By its nature, Islamic *shari'a*, according to Qutb, was distinct from *fiqh* (jurisprudence), and they were not equal in their source and argument. The *shari'a* comprised the clear cut commands and prohibitions conveyed through the *Qur'an* and explained in the *sunnah* of the Prophet, which was not the case for *fiqh* (Khatab, 2002: 160–163).

As Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (Haddad, 1983b: 70–71) asserts, Sayyid Qutb, while maintaining the eternality of the *shari'a* as God-given and relevant at all times and in all places, affirmed that the *fiqh* (law as it developed from man's application of the *shari'a*) was the arena of change, the means through which Muslims could reinterpret the eternal prescripts so they would be relevant to modern life, its needs, and problems. While the *shari'a* was legislated by God, was eternal and unchanging, *fiqh* was made by man to deal with specific situations. Thus the original model of Islamic society, the unique Qur'anic generation,¹⁰ the true Islamic generation of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, "[wa]s not the final vision of this society ... there [we]re visions ever new." The uniqueness of the Islamic vision was that it was fashioned by the *shari'a* which created it, while other legal and social systems were a response to local, temporary needs. The *shari'a* was not restricted to legal injunctions or to principles of government. It included the principles of faith, administration of justice, morality, and human behavior, as well as the principles of knowledge. It also included instructions concerning all social, economic, political, ethical, intellectual, and aesthetic aspects of life (Haddad, 1983b: 89).

The eternal and unchanging nature of the *shari'a* guaranteed that the new *fiqh*, relevant to the events of the day, was genuine and authentic. Sayyid Qutb warned against accepting modern culture and Islamicizing it. Law had to be a barrier to human indulgence and desire. The necessity of keeping new interpretations in line with the *shari'a* was to keep excesses out. A truly Islamic society could only be established according to the tenets of the *shari'a*, which alone could guarantee freedom and justice to all believers. As long as there was a group of people legislating for others, equality and absolute dignity could not be realized. In the final analysis Lordship had to belong solely to God. The sovereignty of God guaranteed not only the victory of the believers, but also the absolute justice of the Islamic order. Thus the adherence to the vision of God's order provided a coherent integration of the *ummah*. It brought forth a new social order justified by transcendental criteria that impinged directly on the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of life.¹¹ Unlike posited systems that were doomed to failure due to innate contradictions generated within them, the Islamic order could unleash the

dynamic processes that guaranteed equity and justice for all believers, if they paid attention (Haddad, 1983a: 21–22).

In all of his writings, Qutb did not offer any specifics about the form of an Islamic state. He emphasized that it had to be democratic, based on the Qur'anic principle of *shura* (consultation). However, since the *shari'a* did not specify a particular method – whether it was to be the opinion of all Muslims or that of the informed leadership – Sayyid Qutb left the method of arriving at such a consensus to be determined by the needs of the age. The principle that Muslims should participate in managing their affairs was inviolable. As for the ruler, he received his power and authority from one source, which was the will of the governed. His role was not to legislate or improvise new ways of government; rather, he was restricted to supervising the administration of the *shari'a*. Only then was he to be obeyed. That was a covenant with those governed – obedience contingent on the faithfulness of the governor to the *shari'a*. If he deviated, their duty of obedience ceased. The *Qur'an* insisted that anyone who did not govern by God's revelation was a *kafir*, to be disobeyed and fought by committed Muslims. In that manner Islam guaranteed individual dignity by ascribing governance to God, who was the master and the only ruler, who alone legislated. There could be no other despot since all men, ruler and ruled, were equal before God. Thus a nation based on religious law granted complete freedom from all bondage on earth (Haddad, 1983b: 91–92).

A Qutbian approach to international relations

Sayyid Qutb saw no necessity for having a single Islamic nation, though he felt it very important for all Muslim nations to form one bloc. In his tentative proposal, he suggested that the Islamic system had room for a wide range of manifestations, correlated to the natural growth of society and the necessities of modern life, possible as long as they were within the circle of Islam. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that, according to William Shepard (Shepard, 1992: 215–216), a more revolutionary attitude is reflected in the changes to the final chapter of his book *Social Justice in Islam*. In the first edition he argued that the differences between communism and capitalism were superficial and that, in fact, the Western world would in time go communist since this was the logical culmination of its materialism.¹² The only real alternative was Islam, and that Muslims would have to choose between Islamic and communists ways. He closed on a note of hope, alluding to the birth of Indonesia and Pakistan and the awakening of the Arab world. In the second and third editions he

added to this a few sentences expressing the hope that an Islamic bloc, distinct from the other two, would come into existence on the international scene and contribute to world harmony.¹³ The seventh edition was radically revised. Although he still insisted that there was no essential difference between communism and capitalism, the prediction that the West would go communist was eliminated, as were the references to Pakistan, Indonesia, Arab awakening and an Islamic bloc. Instead, we are confronted with a stark choice between Islam and all other systems in a world where East and West are united in warfare against Islamic revival. The important thing was for Muslims to recognize that it was a matter of returning Islam to existence and not to be deceived by claims that the present conditions were in any way Islamic. The result of the first choice would be to put themselves in the position that Muhammad himself was in, with its attendant trials and eventual success. The result of the second choice would be to put Islamic banners over the camps of depravity and decay. He closed by affirming that "Our hope in God is great that He will open people's vision to the truth and their eyes to reality and God it is who guides, and gives aid and success" (Shepard, 1992: 216).

In fact, for Sayyid Qutb, the Muslims had primarily to rid themselves of the ways of Western thought and choose the ways he considered as native Islamic thought in order to ensure pure, rather than hybrid, results. However, he was careful to stress that he was not defending a position of isolationism in regard to thought, education, and science; all these were a common heritage of all the peoples of the world, in which Muslims already had a fundamental part and continued to take their rightful part in the furthering of those things, even if it appeared that they were far from exerting any influence. For him, mutual influence among all the nations of the earth was a permanent reality, and isolation from the human caravan was not his aim; on the contrary, what he sought was to build up a characteristically Islamic theory of life and to renew it, when it was apparent, even to some of the more enlightened Occidentals, that the philosophy of materialistic Western civilization was a danger to the continued existence of man, because it bred in human nature a ceaseless anxiety, a perpetual rivalry, a continuous strife, and a degeneration of all human qualities. And this in spite of all the triumphs of science that could have contributed to human happiness, peace and contentment had it not been that the Western philosophy of life had a purely materialistic base and hence was unsuitable to guide men along the path to perfection (Qutb, 2000: 286).

Sayyid Qutb concludes his book by asking in what direction people were then going. He considered that they had to pause for a moment

and ask themselves that question, in order to direct their lives in the direction that they wished. The world then, after two wars in close succession, was divided into two main blocs, communism in the East, and capitalism in the West. That was what appeared on the surface, and what everyone said and thought. But for Qutb that division was superficial rather than real; it was a division based on interests rather than on principles; it was a fight for goods and markets rather than for beliefs and ideals. For him, the nature of European and American philosophy did not differ essentially from Russian philosophy, because both depended on the supremacy of a materialistic doctrine of life, and he warned his readers not to be deceived by the apparently hard and bitter struggle between the Eastern and Western camps. Neither of them had anything but a materialistic philosophy of life and in their thinking they were closely alike. There was no difference between their principles or their philosophies; the only difference between them lay in their worldly methods and their profitable markets, which were the Islamic world (and/or the Third World).

So, the real struggle was between Islam on the one hand and the combined camps of East and West on the other. Islam was the true power that opposed the strength of the materialistic philosophy professed by Europe, America, and Russia alike. It was Islam that stood for a universal and articulated theory of the universe, life, and mankind, and which set up the idea of mutual responsibility in society in place of the idea of hostility and struggle. It was Islam that gave life to a spiritual doctrine to link it with the Creator in the heavens, and to govern its direction on earth; and it was Islam that was not content to allow life to be limited to the achievement of purely material aims, even though gods and production activity was one of the Islamic modes of worship.

For Qutb, Islam based its social system on the foundation of a spiritual theory of life that rejected all materialistic interpretations; it based its morals on the foundation of the spiritual and moral element, and it rejected the philosophy of immediate advantage. Thus it was very strongly opposed to the materialistic theories that obtained in both Eastern and the Western camps, raising life to a level higher than such "petty standards as those that claim observance in Europe, America, and Russia." (Qutb, 2000: 315–317)

Conclusion

As Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal argue, international relations theories are all animated by the question, how should we act? And all

have important empirical and normative dimensions, and their deep interconnection is unavoidable; every international relations theory is simultaneously about what the world *is* like and about what it *ought* to be like (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2010: 4–6).

Sayyid Qutb can be considered as a utopian but, until it is put into practice, everything is *utopian*. Some of his assertions are still relevant, especially at a moment like now. From Qutb's point of view, Islam was the true power that opposed the strength of materialistic philosophy and possessed a universal theory of life which could be offered to mankind, a theory whose aims were a complete mutual help among all men and a true mutual responsibility in society. More than 60 years after the first edition of his seminal work, the world is a different place with the Soviet Union no longer existing, although Russia continues to be an important power, the Arab world is going through profound change, the West is becoming parochial, and the Rest are asserting themselves. Using Sayyid Qutb's political theory and his ideas on mutual cooperation between nations and human beings, it is high time that a new, and different, International Relations practice becomes viable and overtakes an anachronistic world order established after the end of the 1939–1945 war, a conflict which occurred because of Europe's internal ghosts.

As Danilo Zolo has shown (Zolo, 2009), the post-1945 criminalization of war has not yielded a coherent system of international law but only a legalistic cover for the interests of the great powers, and sees the United Nations, whose authority rests on an oligarchic Security Council made up of great (or formerly great) powers, as the latest reincarnation of the Holy Alliance of 1815. Following the critique of Carl Schmitt regarding the League of Nations, Zolo does not consider the criminalization of war as an advance towards world peace but as a regression to the age of the Wars of Religion, when the pope gave divine sanction to wars against heretics and other lesser beings – if the enemy can be declared an infidel, outlaw, or terrorist, the way is clear for unrestrained violence. Any country failing to toe the line laid down by the powers becomes a “rogue” state, against which military violence can be righteously unleashed.¹⁴

For Sayyid Qutb, the Islamic political system was based on two fundamental conceptions, both of which originated in its general idea of the universe, of life, and of man. One was the idea of the equality of mankind as a species, in nature, and in origin; the other was the belief that Islam represented the eternal system for the world throughout the future of the human race. We cannot talk about an Islamic political system as a universal model, because such a thing does not exist. However, we can talk about ideals and it is in this sense that Sayyid Qutb's thought is still

important. He was careful to stress that he was not defending a position of isolationism in regard to thought, education, and science; all these were a common heritage of all the peoples of the world. For him, mutual influence among all the nations of the earth was a permanent reality, and isolation from the human caravan, then, was not his aim; on the contrary, what he sought was to build up a characteristically Islamic theory of life and to renew that form of life, since it was apparent, even to some of the more "enlightened Occidentals that the philosophy of materialistic Western civilization" (Qutb, 2000: 286) was a danger to the continued existence of man, because it bred in human nature a ceaseless anxiety, a perpetual rivalry, a continuous strife, and a degeneration of all human qualities. And this in spite of all the triumphs of science that could have contributed to human happiness, peace and contentment, had it not been that the basis of the Western philosophy of life was purely materialistic and hence unsuitable for guiding men along the path to perfection.

Muhammad Iqbal, in 1934, said that humanity needed three things: a spiritual interpretation of the universe; spiritual emancipation of the individual; and basic principles of a universal significance directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe had built idealistic systems on those lines, but experience showed that truth revealed through pure reason was incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone can bring. That was the reason why pure thought had influenced men so little, while religion had always elevated individuals, and transformed whole societies. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result was a perverted ego, seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies, whose sole function was to exploit the poor in the interests of the rich (Iqbal, 1934: 170).

The world is now experiencing profound changes, not unlike the situation in the 1930s. Europe is becoming irrelevant and, in some cases, a dangerous place again, with many having difficulty accepting and coping with that. The United States and Russia are, once again, at loggerheads. Fortunately, there are no more colonial empires and the danger of a new world war because of European and/or Western internal demons, is out of the question. Perhaps the time has come for different people in different places to work together to pursue a more peaceful and just world. For those insisting on using only material interests to advance their foreign policy agendas, the Rest should respond by building a system based on cooperation and the idea of the mutual responsibility of society in place of the idea of hostility and struggle.

Notes

1. This section is mainly drawn from Hamid Algar's Introduction (Qutb, 2000: 1–10). Also useful, and for more details on Sayyid Qutb's life, are Calvert, 1993 (especially pp. 88–98 and pp. 152–219); Calvert, 2010; Carré, 2004; Haddad, 1983b (especially pp. 67–69); Moussali, 1992; Musallam, 1985 (for the period between 1952 and the year of Qutb's execution); Musallam, 1990 (for the period until 1938); Qutb, 2004 (an autobiographical account of Qutb's life between 1912 and 1918, and originally published in 1946); Qutb, 2006 (especially pp. 7–19); Shepard, 1989 (especially pp. 31–32); Shepard, 1992 (especially pp. 196–199); Shepard, 1996; and Syahnna, 1997 (especially pp. 6–15).
2. We get a glimpse of what Sayyid Qutb, an Islamist, might have suffered while in prison by reading Sonallah Ibrahim's two novels *That Smell* and, especially, *Notes from Prison*, although they were written by a Marxist (Ibrahim, 2013). For further details on how this experience radicalized Sayyid Qutb's political thought, see Shepard, 1992, 1996, and 2003. Also useful is Syahnna, 1997.
3. For further details on *jahiliyyah* and Sayyid Qutb's conception of it, see Khatab, 2002, and, especially, Shepard, 2003.
4. Mustafa al-Siba'i was head of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brothers and editor of their publications, *al-Manar* (Damascus) and *al-Muslimin*. He studied at al-Azhar University and later taught at Damascus University, where he became dean of the Shari'a College. In 1949 he was elected to the Syrian parliament.
5. These words by Siba'i might be considered as rather harsh, but when reading and hearing some politicians, intellectuals, scholars and pundits lecturing, and bullying, other peoples about Western values, modernity and the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, one really has to wonder if Nazism, Fascism, or Apartheid ever happened, if the Holocaust and colonial atrocities against "inhumans" and "savages", with their casual massacres of civilians and organized slaughter, were ever perpetrated, if two World Wars, with their massive aerial bombardments of civilians and the rounding up of millions into concentration camps, ever occurred, if napalm was ever used against civilians, or if Guantánamo, extraordinary renditions, extrajudicial killings and drone warfare against "unlawful" combatants, with collateral damage, or the current debates on immigration in Europe, are just figments of the imagination. To better understand why they (the Rest) hate us (the West), Jean Ziegler's book is a very good starting point (Ziegler, 2008). For a fine critique of Steven Pinker's nonsensical *The Better Angels of Our Nature: the Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes* (Pinker, 2011), please see Gray, 2011. On the roguish behavior of the US when it comes to human rights, see Blau, Brunsma, Moncada, and Zimmer, 2009. For the darker side of Western modernity, see Mignolo, 2011.
6. For more details on Islam as a system in the writings of Sayyid Qutb, see Shepard, 1989.
7. It should be emphasized that we are dealing here with Sayyid Qutb's political theory and not with the political theory in Islam. Different authors and thinkers, especially in contemporary debates, have used a reified and essentialist idea of Islam to legitimize, or to delegitimize, and justify different political conceptions and systems. As social scientists and historians we should be concerned with those debates and ideas, trying to understand and

problematize the ways in which Islam is used, and not with the futile and shallow aim of trying to know what Islam is – that is the field of theologians, ideologues, and philosophers. So, when Sayyid Qutb and others say that Islam, as a religion or as a system, "is essentially a unity, worship and work, political and economic theory, legal demands and spiritual exhortations, faith and conduct, this world and the world to come, all these are related parts of one comprehensive whole," (Qutb, 2000: 113) an effort should be made so we can understand the discourse and contextualize it, without accepting it at face value.

8. For a very brief introduction on this and other topics regarding *shari'a*, please refer to Masud, 2001.
9. For further details on the development of Sayyid Qutb's political thinking concerning justice in different editions of his book *Social Justice in Islam*, see Shepard, 1992 (especially pp. 218–236), and Shepard, 1996. For Sayyid Qutb's conception of *hakimiyya* and *jahiliyyah*, please refer to Khatab, 2002.
10. For further details on the uniqueness of the Qur'anic generation, see Qutb, 2006, pp. 29–35, and Nayed, 1992.
11. It would be interesting to compare Sayyid Qutb's political theory with the political theology of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), and even with the political thought of Johann Baptist Metz and other Catholic activists belonging to the liberation theology movement. For further details on this see Schmitt, 2006 and 2008.
12. Let us see what will happen with the current financial and economic crisis in different parts of the Western world...
13. The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (formerly Conference), established in 1969, can be considered as a kind of Islamic Bloc but, and as can be seen by the different political choices in international relations, the rivalries between different countries, the civil wars in some places, and the level of violence perpetrated by Muslims against other Muslims, we can hardly talk about it as a single, or even an Islamic, bloc.
14. For a review of Zolo's book, and his conception of International Relations, please see Madar, 2010.

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8

Constructing an Islamic Theory of IR: The Case of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, *Ummah*, *Jihād* and the World

Rodolfo Ragionieri

Over the last thirty-five years, the issue of Islam, international relations, and IR theory emerged in more than one context: the Iranian revolution and its impact on Gulf and global politics; the role of Islam in Afghan politics from the Soviet intervention up to the Taliban regime and beyond; the attitude of Muslim countries with respect to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and diplomatic process; the Gulf crisis (1990–1991) and its management over the following decade; the attack on the Twin Towers and the rise of *al-Qaʿidah*; the “Arab spring” and the – so far ephemeral – electoral success of Islamic movements in Tunisia and Egypt; and, last, the apocalyptic turn of the jihadist neo-caliphate (Wood 2015).

However, and despite many different stances with respect to international politics, it is not at all clear whether an Islamic theoretical – descriptive and prescriptive – approach to IR has been developed. Attempts in this direction have been outlined, for example, by Sayyid Quṭb in *World Peace and Islam* (Quṭb 1951) and proposed by Boutaleb (1995). This chapter focuses on Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī’s contribution, drawing from his tremendous amount of books and writing. The objective is to evaluate whether we can draw from his thought a consistent theory of international or global politics, be it descriptive, or explanatory, or normative, or at least glean some hints in that direction.

Why should we focus on Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī? His life and work will begin to answer to this question. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī¹ was born in 1926 to a humble family in the Egyptian countryside in the Nile delta. His father died when he was just a child, but he managed to study first at the Azhar Institute in Ṭanṭā and later at the Faculty of Theology at the al-Azhar University in Cairo. In the meantime, after hearing a speech

by Ḥasan al-Bannā, he entered the Muslim Brotherhood. He graduated from al-Azhar in 1953 and worked at the Ministry of Religious Endowments and in the Cultural Department of al-Azhar University. His first important book, among his most famous, *al-Ḥalāl wa'l-ḥarām fi'l islām* (*Lawful and Prohibited in Islam*, 1960), was written during his time at the university after his graduation, when he cooperated with the, then *shaykh*, Mahmūd Shaltūt, reputedly a reformist, who wanted Qaraḍāwī at al-Azhar. He was arrested twice under Nasser and, in 1961, he was sent by al-Azhar University to Qaṭar, where he has lived ever since, to organize the Qaṭari branch of al-Azhar. He received his doctorate in 1973.

We must also take into consideration the different reasons for his quite unique position within Arabic, and more generally Islamic, public opinion, which dates to before his programme on the *al-Jazīrah* satellite channel, *ash-Sharī'ah wa'l-hayāt* (*Sharī'ah* and life). This is due not only to his enormous body of writing, but also to his ability to connect to different roles and organizations. For example, as we have seen, he became a member of the Muslim Brotherhood at quite a young age, and “is never reported to have had any connections outside the mainstream” (Tammam 2009, 69). Even though he distanced himself from the statements of Ḥasan al-Bannā (for example, on the role of women), and Sayyid Qutb (on the issue of *takfīr*),² and from the harshness of Qutb's *jihād* theory, he never made a real break from these major figures of the Brotherhood. This is because he has always tried, as we shall see in more detail, to position himself on the middle ground within the Islamist movement and ideology, i.e., avoiding both the most extreme currents and any kind of concession to secularist thinking. On the other hand, he is a distinguished graduate of al-Azhar and he has managed to be a respected Azhari throughout his life. He always reiterate his credentials from the Azhari University as a source of legitimacy for his background in *'ulūm ad-dīn* (religious sciences or theology) and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), and, implicitly, his legitimacy to state fatwas. At the same time, he has always been either a member of the Brotherhood or, more recently, very close to its position. Simultaneous characteristics which are uncommon. While it is said that “there is no room in the Brotherhood for soldiers or Azharis” (Tammam 2008, 57), Qaraḍāwī has always managed to be an Azhari reputed to be very close to the Brotherhood.

However, his fame reached its peak when he fully understood the power of new media, satellite TV and the Internet. His *al-Jazīrah* broadcasts on *ash-Sharī'ah wa'l-hayāt* and his website *qaradawi.net* have been the

most important means for the wide diffusion of his thought. His books (some of them uploaded on the website) have gained a very wide audience. Thus, Qaraḍāwī, defined as a global mufti and as *shaykh al-ummah* (Skovgaard-Petersen 2009, 51),³ is deemed an authority on what is to be thought genuinely Islamic in many Arab and Muslim countries. Moreover, in the West he is reputed to represent the mainstream Islamist approach to politics and society. Therefore, we can conclude that the importance of Qaraḍāwī's stance on every spiritual and personal aspect of Islamic religion relies on many factors: his being related to important institutions or organizations like al-Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood; his "reformist" middle way between strict or extreme interpretations and the rejection of tradition; his extremely broad written corpus concerning all aspects of Islam; and, finally, his role in the contemporary transnational Arab, and also Islamic, media. He sustains this role thanks to his extensive knowledge not only of the traditional sources of revelation, the *Qur'an* and *sunnah*, but also of Muslim scholars from the golden age of Islamic civilization, from Ibn Ḥanbal and al-Ghazālī, through Ibn Taymiyyah and Ḥasan al-Bannā, to the present. His method of supporting the legitimacy of his arguments reflects this knowledge and Muslim tradition, insofar as he follows the same pattern by starting with a number of quotations from the *Qur'an*, then going to the *sunnah*, and finally to renowned scholars of the tradition, up to contemporary times.

A middle way

Qaraḍāwī has always intended, since his early writings, to adopt a middle way "between rejection and extremism", that is, between outright rejection of tradition or "excessive" reformism on the one hand, and a strict unilateral interpretation of the *Qur'an* and *sunnah* on the other. He calls this middle way *wasatīyyah* (Salvatore 2008, Soage 2010). It is not clear when this word was used for the first time in this sense, although scholars from al-Azhar were already using it in the 1960s. According to Qaraḍāwī (Gräf 2009, 218), the idea was already present in *Lawful and Prohibited in Islam*, where he wanted to avoid the opposing mistakes of too strict an interpretation of what *ḥarām* is, and an "excessive liberalization" due to Western influence. Later he used his discourse of *wasatīyyah* to distance himself from radical Islamic movements, for example, by criticizing the excessive use of *takfīr*. This balance also has to be understood in another specific sense, between authenticity and contemporaneity, i.e., between the need to go back to Islam's fundamental principles and roots, from

the point of view of doctrine, thought, and morals, and the need to live in our time of science and technology, freedom, human rights, the independence of peoples, and progress. In Western parlance, this is what we call modernity and late or post-modernity. However, this should not all be identified with the West. Qaraḍāwī concludes that there is a necessary reciprocity between authenticity and living in our age because he sees that Islamic culture has the capability and resources to play an active role in current conditions, as we shall see. This middle way, avoiding exaggeration, is also a balance between different and sometimes opposite aspects of life, like reason and revelation, science and faith, matter and spirit, individual and society, inspiration and obligation, and so on (Qaraḍāwī 1998, 32–33).

Qaraḍāwī intends *waṣaṭiyyah* as both a general foundation for his Islamic social, legal and political theory, and as a discursive strategy to differentiate himself on one hand from the supporters of a Western model of modernization, and on the other from extreme Islamic movements, e.g., *al-jamā'ah al-islāmiyyah* in the 1980s, and more recently *al-Qā'idah* and the self-appointed caliphate of al-Baghdādī. He clearly states this perspective in his writing on politics and the State, condemning "secularists (Liberalists or Marxists)", who "wish to apply to Islam what was applied to Christianity" (Qaraḍāwī 2004, 3) and stepping away from "some scholars, who promote activities that condemn the Islamic *shūrā*..., consider all forms of democracy as an evil..., and reject the right of woman to vote or even to be a candidate in the Representative Council." (Qaraḍāwī 2004, 2) He also wants to distinguish himself from Islamic thinkers like 'Alī 'Abd ar-Rāziq, al-Azhar's *shaykh* who wanted to draw a line between religion and politics, and arrives at the conclusion that "Islam directs the Muslim in his personal, family, social and political affairs, starting with manners for relieving oneself and ending with topics of the Caliphate, war and peace relationships." (Qaraḍāwī 2004, p. 26) As we shall see below, Qaraḍāwī also uses his method of *waṣaṭiyyah* extensively with respect to the theory of *jihād* and, generally speaking, to international relations.

Community, space, and political institutions: the *Ummah* and her politics

Even though Qaraḍāwī takes into account the existence of states, his basic perspective on international relations, or should we say world politics (because states are not the basic actors in his theoretical perspective), is that of the Muslim community, the *ummaḥ*. For this reason

his discourse on world politics often has a dichotomous structure, because he juxtaposes that part of the world in which Muslims are the majority with the rest of the globe. He does not make an explicit attempt to outline an all-encompassing analytical view of world politics, or a universalistic normative theory. Rather, from the point of view of Western International Relations scholars, he seems to have implicit assumptions on what world politics is about, assumptions that we shall try to analyse at the end of this chapter. His main interest lies in the Islamic *ummah*, why she is a polity, and what her political system is or should be. Moreover, he focuses his attention on inter-state relations within the *ummah*, and her relations with the rest of the world. To answer these questions, he deals extensively with the issue of *jihād* (Qaraḍāwī 2010) and considers the situation and role of Muslims, as well as their state of dialogue or confrontation with other areas, especially (if not exclusively) the West, as, for example, the title of his book *Naḥnu wa'l-gharb* (*We and the West*, Qaraḍāwī 2006) clearly indicates.

He divides humankind into two according to a classical partition, *ummat al-ijābah* and *ummat ad-da'wah*, where the former is the community of those who have accepted Islam's message, and the latter is where the *da'wa* has yet to be practiced, i.e., that part of humankind that has not accepted the Islamic message (Qaraḍāwī 1996, 11).⁴ In order to define the former community, which is central to his view of the world, he wants his definition to be supported by authoritative voices, like any Islamist thinker. In this case he quotes imam Raghīb al-Aṣṣahānī (d. 1108–1109 CE), who gave the following definition: “the *ummah*: any group that a common aspect unites either one religion, or one time, or one place, whether what unites is oppression or choice” (Qaraḍāwī 1996, 9). The Islamic *ummah* is certainly a fact, from all points of view: religion, history, geography, and the current situation. Not only does it have a historical continuity, but also a strong sense of unity, one common interest, and common enemies. This last fact, albeit denied – sometimes even unconsciously – by Muslims themselves, is well known by those enemies who see them as one single community characterized by common ideas, morality, and aspirations (Qaraḍāwī 1996, 17). Moreover, a global concern regarding single issues like Jerusalem, or, in the 1990s, the war in Bosnia, is, according to Qaraḍāwī, witness to the factual unity of the *ummah* (Qaraḍāwī 1996, 15–16).

A common “objective” interest (*maṣlahah*) keeps the *ummah* together in the contemporary age, because successful economic and technological competition against the big industrial powers, which cooperate among themselves in strategic sectors, is impossible without unity and

the development of some form of economic cooperation. What is most important is that these large economic blocs are often able to bring about political alliances. Although the word *maṣlahah* is not widely used in this context, this idea of a common interest, intended as both economic and social, within the *ummah* is an original part of Qaraḍāwī's discourse on *wasatīyyah* (Salvatore 2009), and tends to differentiate Qaraḍāwī from other currents of political Islam and the Islamic awakening of the 1970s. He is interested in widening the idea of *maṣlahah* from purely a jurisprudential concept to an idea of common social interest that can be traced back to leading Islamic reformists such as Muḥammad 'Abduḥ (1849–1905) and Rashīd Riḍā' (1865–1935). Qaraḍāwī (re-)constructs, while drawing on classical sources, but from a modern point of view, a "strong tradition...defining the factors of social cohesion throughout the *ummah*, centred on the conception of the common good." (Salvatore 2009, 245) This centrality of the issue of *maṣlahah* also appears in the theory of *jihād*, where the fight against injustice and corruption within Muslim societies is one of the basic components of *jihād* itself (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 185–224).

However, there are a multiplicity of peoples in this single community. This multiplicity does not represent a problem, insofar as Islam is a common ground for all these different peoples, and does not result in antagonism or fighting, insofar as there is a common allegiance to God, his prophet, and the community of believers. Qaraḍāwī does not deny the existence and importance of other identities,⁵ as Islam does not forbid or hinder an individual's attachment to their mother country or nation, since these different identities can be considered as complementing and not competing with each other, from the family and the village, up to the state, to the wider Arab nation, and finally the all-encompassing *dār al-islām*.⁶ There is no conflict among all these different identities if they are given the correct standing towards each other (Qaraḍāwī 1996, 21–22). Even non-Muslims living in the *dār al-islām*, especially those belonging to the People of the Book (*ahl al-kitāb*, Jews and Christians), share with Muslims a belonging to a common mother country and culture. However, conflict arises if these different identities are thought of as substitutes for, or even as competitors with, Islam, and are combined with ideologies hostile to Islam, such as Marxism or secularism. In turn, this competition between identities has caused a diffidence among Islamists, who differentiate between different strands of nationalists. These problems did not occur in previous centuries, even before "the age of cultural colonialism and intellectual invasion" (Qaraḍāwī 1996, 11).

In our contemporary age, so far the ideal unity of the *ummah* has not actually been implemented. However, the cause of this lack of unity is not the multiplicity of identities, but conflict within the *ummah* and the absence of political unity at any level of definition. Problems arise when particular local or group solidarities (*‘asabīyāt*) prevail with respect to overall Muslim solidarity. *‘Asabīyāt* other than Muslim ones must be refused: “They were sons of the unique *ummah* of Islam, until the idea of local and national solidarities (*‘asabīyāt*) took them, and this idea was imported from other lands and other heritages that wanted the only *ummah* to be made into many nations that not only compete, but are also enemy to each other and fight each other.” (Qaraḍāwī 1996, 11)

Qaraḍāwī tries to overcome the opposition between Arab and Islamic identities, which is part of the ideological conflict between local national identities (even pan-identities, like Turkish or Arab) and an Islamic identity. He manages to do that by making the Arab identity conceptually subordinate to the Islamic one in every way. He puts the question very generally (Qaraḍāwī 1998, 17), stating that religion is the first and most important component of the identity of any nation, followed by language and values, which also prevail over other inherited ideas and concepts. Despite more than a century of attempts to define an Arab identity on purely (or mainly) historical-cultural factors, Qaraḍāwī stresses the strict relatedness between Arabism and Islam, because of Arabic’s role as the language of Islam, and the role of Arab culture as the vehicle of Islam. To counter this situation of disunity, Qaraḍāwī lists four necessary conditions for the unity and success of the *ummah*: the delimitation of identity, and especially of allegiance/belonging; the identification of the highest source of authority (*marjī‘yyah ‘aliyyah*); *ijtihād* (qualified independent thinking) and renovation; and the implementation of Islam morals and deeds (Qaraḍāwī 1996; Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,070).

The territorial concept corresponding to *ummah* is the *dār al-islām*, which, as we shall see, finds its complement in the *dār al-ḥarb*. We could say with Qaraḍāwī that it is “the green colour on the map.” However, since, from an Islamic perspective, it would not be completely correct to use the borders of territorial states, we have to find more precise conditions for considering a certain territory part of the *dār al-islām*. It must meet three requirements (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 876):

- (1) It must be under the authority and control of Muslims, even if there is no Muslim majority.
- (2) There must be Islamic institutions.

- (3) Muslims rule over themselves with Islamic institutions and non-Muslims are ruled (*ahl adh-dhimmah*) as requested by the relative pact ('*aqd*).

After the *hijrah*, Medina was the first kernel that extended to Makkah, and later, by conquest or other means, to an area from al-Andalus – Islamic Spain – to China. In this territory, the political institutions of the Islamic *ummah* could not have the same simple security functions that characterize a modern Western territorial state: "The Islamic state is a dogmatic and ideological one, as it is based on a creed and an ideology. It is not a mere 'security device' to preserve the *ummah* from internal aggression or external invasion, rather its function is much greater than that. Its function and duty is to educate and raise the *ummah* on the teaching and principles of Islam." (Qaraḏāwī 2004, 22) Thus, the state can be only universal and not local in character. Different Islamic states can be a first step in the direction of the Caliphate, which is considered, to quote Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah*, a guide both in this world and the Hereafter, according to the states' interest in them.

However, Qaraḏāwī makes a difference between a theocracy and an Islamic state. We must always bear in mind that, in total opposition to the Western liberal idea of the separation between politics and religion, he thinks that the exclusion of religious ideas from the public space is not a step forward in freedom, but rather a limitation of the public discourse. An Islamic state is not theocratic because it maintains its structure separate from religion. Quoting Muḥammad Asad, he writes that "the Muslim state is a civilian one that executes Heavenly Law." (Qaraḏāwī 2004, 37)⁷ Whether this is a theocracy or not depends very much on how theocracy is defined.⁸

From the point of view of the system of power (*niẓām al-ḥukm*), Qaraḏāwī intends to differentiate himself from more extreme political theories, such as Nabahānī's theory of caliphate. Nabahānī (1990, 27–29) considers the republican system, based on democracy and the theory of popular sovereignty, un-Islamic, because it allows constitutions and laws to be made. In his view, in the Islamic political system neither the *ummah* nor the *caliph* has a right to make laws, since God is the only legislator, and all the forms of republican and democratic systems are in contrast to the caliphate institution.

Qaraḏāwī (2004) thinks that democratic principles do not contradict Islam. He avoids the question of ultimate sovereignty, even though he openly writes that the constitution must be derived from the *Qur'an* and *sunnah*, and strongly argues that those basic sources of law, plus reputed

Islamic thinkers and rulers, condemn oppression and corruption, and advocate consultation (*shura*). In this respect, Qaraḏāwī confirms his position of *wasatīyyah*, and avoids the most extreme consequences of the doctrine of God's sovereignty. In this respect, and in others as we shall see, he wants to make a difference – while trying not to say it explicitly – with respect to the admired figure of Sayyid Qutb, who was one of the most famous and respected supporters of the idea of *ḥakīmīyat Allah*.⁹ Qaraḏāwī's position is that the idea of the Islamic state emerged before the Western democratic state, and has some of its advantages but none of its failures; basically, it gives the right to choose rulers and to substitute them, but does not give unlimited freedom to make laws, because this would be in contradiction to the divinely inspired *sharī'ah*.

If *dār al-islām* is not united under a unique Islamic form of government, what should the relations be between the different local states that rule her various regions? As we have already seen, the "normal" situation between different states in the *dār al-islām* should be that of complete peace. The prohibition against practicing any form of violence, such as fighting, hunting, and even cutting down trees during the pilgrimage to Makkah should be considered as a symbol of, or a preparation for, the actual implementation of the *dār al-salām*. However, we know that this is not the case. Moreover, bloodshed between Muslims is *ḥarām*, prohibited by religious prescriptions (Qaraḏāwī 2010, 1,063). Notwithstanding the historical and political reality, this normative aspect leads Qaraḏāwī to deal in detail with different types of fighting (*qitāl*)¹⁰ between Islamic states, e.g., fighting due to group solidarities or identities, disputes about local borders, and power conflicts. In the case of intra-Muslim fighting, according to the *Qur'an*, a kind of collective security mechanism should be put into action (Qaraḏāwī 2010, 1,080–1,081); this is, first, an attempt to settle the question between the parties, and second, an intervention in the event a party violates the agreement. In any case, it is a collective obligation for the *ummah* to attempt to mediate the conflict.

Another problem is posed by factional conflicts, which concern basic issues and divisions among Muslims, e.g., the Sunni-Shia divide. Qaraḏāwī puts forward ten principles for dialogue and rapprochement between these two major communities. These proposals intend to stop conflictual behavior in order to improve mutual confidence, for example: avoiding the *takfir* of anybody who says "There is no god but Allah"; staving off the excesses of extremists; protection of minorities; and more "Sunni-minded" concerns, like stopping the diffusion of Shia'i in Sunni countries, or the problem of Sunni Arabs in contemporary 'Irāq. Whatever our judgment on these proposals, it is noteworthy that,

alongside borders and identities, the solution to, or rather the management of, conflicts deriving from the historical divide within the *ummah* is reputed to be one of the big political issues of intra-Muslim politics (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,085–1092).

Even from this viewpoint we can see that the *ummah* is at the center of Qaraḍāwī's concerns, not only from the spiritual, but also from the economic and political points of view. As we shall see, in a kind of analogy, the *ummah* is seen as a web of relations, which can be peaceful or conflictual, with other great communities that are basically identified by their religion. However, before dealing with the issue of levels of analysis, we must look into his theory of *jihād*, not only for its interest as such, but also as an approach to conflicts in world politics.

Action: *jihād* as duty or method

Qaraḍāwī's huge work on *jihād* (Qaraḍāwī 2010) is a wide and complex treatise dealing with many issues, but it gives ample room to the normative theory of armed *jihād*, in the framework of a more complex and multi-dimensional concept. For this reason, and because of the importance of the theory of armed *jihād* to relations with non-Muslims, I deal first with some aspects of the theory of *jihād* in general and then with respect to the armed struggle, and in the subsequent paragraphs in terms of relations with the West and Israel.

According to his idea of *wasatiyyah*, as far as *jihād* is concerned Qaraḍāwī defines his point of view of moderation as a middle way between the excesses of those who want to declare war on the whole world and those who want to limit *jihād* to the, so-called, greater *jihād*, i.e., a struggle for spiritual improvement. Thus, he refuses the *ḥadīth* that refers to lesser (military) and greater (spiritual) *jihād*, even though he sees spiritual purification as a precondition for the social and military struggle.

Substantially in line with mainstream tradition, Qaraḍāwī considers five types of *jihād*:

- (1) *jihād an-nafs* (of the soul)
- (2) *jihād ash-Shayṭān* (against the Devil)
- (3) *jihād aẓ-ẓulm wa'l-munkar* (against injustice and corruption)
- (4) *jihād al-lisān* (of the tongue)
- (5) *al-jihād al-'askarī* (the military *jihād*).

The first is a personal effort of spiritual improvement. The second is the fight against the presence of the Devil in the world. The third is a

struggle against social injustice and for a just Islamic social and economic order. The fourth is an effort for the propagation of Islam and, finally, the fifth is fighting with weapons. The two types of *jihād* with a political relevance are the *jihād az-zulm* (3) and the military *jihād* (5). Since the most relevant issue concerns the legitimate use of warfare and combat (*qitāl*), I will first discuss the relevance of the *jihād az-zulm wa'l munkir*. This struggle is domestic since this aspect of *jihād* takes place within the *ummah*, and within Muslim societies. However, it has an international impact if we take away the word international from the point of view of the system of states, because neither oppression nor corruption can be confined within borders. Muslims have two duties, they can neither oppress other people nor support or help oppressors. This *jihād* is of many types: against oppressors and various types of oppression; against vice and corruption; against intellectual deviation and heresy; and against apostasy. As is often the case, the use of violence is a crucial issue. Once again, Qaraḍāwī uses his criterion of *wasatīyyah* to avoid opposite excesses. He places those who deny any possible use of violence on one side, and on the opposite side those who support an extended use of violence, like the various *jihādīst* groups.¹¹ These latter groups not only support the use of violence against non-Muslims, but also declare as infidels those who retain power within the *ummah*, and, generally speaking, make use of violence without taking its consequences into account. In this connection, Qaraḍāwī criticizes both the *jamā'āt* of the 1970s and the 1980s and *al-Qā'idah* (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,325). Between these opposing trends, the middle way prefers the use of peaceful means in a kind of social and ideological *jihād*, even against "extremist secularist governments" (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,330–1,331), just because our age gives us plenty of nonviolent means (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 221–224). This reinforces the view that intra-Muslim relations must be as peaceful as possible.

Military *jihād* is "*jihād* in the sense of fighting (*qitāl*) against enemies" (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 231). With this definition, as is usually the case, all the verses of the *Qur'ān* referring to the two semantic areas of *jihād* and *qitāl* can be put in the same general theory, and the reader can (or must) understand from the context whether the word *jihād* is used in its most general meaning or in the more limited sense of a military fight. First of all, military fighting only concerns relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The classical issue of military *jihād* has two different questions: the issue of the legitimacy of defensive and offensive *jihād*; and the issue of *jihād* as an individual (*farḍ 'ayn*) or collective duty (*farḍ kifāyah*)¹² or as a matter of volunteering. So, we must clearly define the

different expressions. Defensive *jihād* or *jihād ad-difā'* takes place when parts of the *dār al-Islām* are either under military attack or under occupation. Offensive *jihād*, or *jihād aṭ-ṭalab*, takes place when there are no offensive operations against Islamic lands, and when enemies remain in their territories, but it is an Islamic authority that sets the conditions¹³ and pursues the enemy.

The differences concern offensive *jihād*, because there are no real disagreements regarding the defensive type, i.e., against aggression or the occupation of parts of Islamic lands, which is always considered not only legitimate, but also compulsory. The issue of offensive *jihād* is a delicate subject and has aroused great disputes among Islamic scholars of all ages. Quite logically, their opinions depend strongly on the context, for example, if we take into consideration Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who supported the view that *jihād* is mainly a military fight, we must remember that he lived in one of the periods of greatest conflict between al-Andalus and Castile, and had court appointments with the Almohads.

The dispute about *jihād aṭ-ṭalab* is along a continuum of an offensive-defensive axis, usually represented as offensivists vs. defensivists. In this picture, Qaraḍāwī takes, or pretends to take, an intermediate stance that limits but does not eliminate the offensive option. Even though offensivists purport that defensivists do not see any case for offensive *jihād*, Qaraḍāwī remarks that most of them acknowledge at least four cases for *jihād aṭ-ṭalab*. First, to make safe *da'wah* and resist those that prohibit *da'wah* by force, as was the case with Byzantium's emperors. Second, to ensure the security of the Islamic state and its borders. Third, to rescue the oppressed from their oppressors or from a minority situation. Fourth, and finally, to evacuate pagan fighters from the Arab peninsula. This, according to Qaraḍāwī, is the meaning of the Quranic "verse of the sword" in the chapter on *tawba*.

The idea that obstacles to the *da'wah* can be considered a legitimate cause for the initiation of military action is close to some ideas present in the theory of just war in medieval and early modern European juridical thought, as presented, for example, by Francisco de Vitoria in the *Relection de Indis noviter inventis* and in the *Relectio de jure belli ac pacis* (Vitoria 1995).¹⁴ In this connection, the *jihād aṭ-ṭalab* can also be a pre-emptive or preventive war. For example, Qaraḍāwī considers the military campaigns of the first four caliphs (*rashīdūn*, the well guided) as legitimate offensive *jihād* because they eliminated obstacles to the *da'wah* and because they liberated peoples oppressed by Byzantium and the Sasanids.

The middle way consists of maintaining the theoretical possibility of offensive *jihād*, but in a practical contemporary situation only enabling the defensive type. The moderate choice is also made by Qaraḍāwī because accepting the most extreme interpretation of the, so-called, sword-verse,¹⁵ which calls for the use of force until conversion or submission, would imply abrogating a huge number of verses advocating moderation, and considering even the *ahl al-kitāb*, Jews and Christians as polytheists (*mushrikun*).

Moreover, there are political implications that cannot be overlooked (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 243–245). The extreme interpretation would have important (and negative) political consequences (ibid, 263–264). First, the rejection of the UN Charter, because it relies on the possibility of coexistence and the lessening of conflicts and their causes. Furthermore, it forbids membership of the UN, because it outlaws offensive *jihād* and calls for coexistence between peoples of different religions. Here we can find a certain space for contradiction, since Qaraḍāwī wants to reconcile the purity of his doctrine with the discourse of moderation.

Jihād is, generally speaking, a collective duty. However, it makes sense to ask under what conditions it might be an individual duty. These cases can be determined by making a comparative analysis of the opinions of many Islamic experts: when Muslim territory is attacked by enemies (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 109); when there is a call from the proper authority (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 114); and when the Muslim army needs the experience of a particular person in the event of battle. So, defensive military *jihād* is a personal duty (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 88–120), whereas offensive *jihād* is always a collective duty.

Relations with the West and Israel

As a religion, Islam promotes and prefers peace, not only, as we have seen, among Muslims, but among all human beings. This is clear from its very name, which has the same root as peace (*s-l-m*). And many parts of the *Qur'an* state that Muslims must prefer peace, and must avoid war (*ḥarb*) even in their choice of personal name, as was the custom in pre-Islamic Arabia. In general, how should the ideal of peace be pursued if the ideal is not even realized among Muslim countries? What is more, how can this be reconciled with those places in the *Qur'an* dealing with fighting, and what meaning must be given to the issue of truces or attempts to reconcile with the enemy? Qaraḍāwī gives the example of the case of the Ḥudaybiyya treaty, when Muslims and pagans from Makkah decided not to fight for ten years.

In conceptual correspondence on the centrality of the *ummah*, Qaraḍāwī accepts the territorial partition between *dār al-islām* and *dār al-ḥarb*, albeit without the devastating consequences that seem implicit in the definition (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 865–918). Some Muslim scholars add a possible third part of the world: the *dār al-‘ahd* (pact), which can be also called *dār al-ṣulh* (peace as absence of war), *dār al-mawā‘adah* (agreement), or *dār al-muhāḍanah* (truce). All terms whose meaning varies from a simple ceasefire to a more general agreement, but without arriving at the more semantically rich term of peace, whose realm remains Islam. After the usual long discussion, Qaraḍāwī arrives at the conclusion that the two-way division is well founded and acceptable, and so refuses both the three-way partition and the more modern view that the world is a single home for all mankind, where conflict has to be solved by peaceful means. This classic partition of the world is only partially reflected in another opposition, us, that is, Islamic countries and people against the West (Qaraḍāwī 2006).

What kind of relations should the countries of the *dār al-islām* have towards the countries of the *dār al-ḥarb*? “Dialogue is the established Islamic method in the relations of Muslims with those who have differences with them.” (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,215) This general statement seems to open up a wide path to good relations between states and different actors from the *dār al-islām* and the rest of the world. However, as we shall see, many obstacles stand in the way of implementing such a reasonable declaration of purposes. We find at least four different discourses with respect to contemporary issues: the “inevitable clash” with Israel; relations between conflict and dialogue with Christians; European colonialism and imperialism; and attitudes towards the United States (Qaraḍāwī 2006, Qaraḍāwī 2010, Baroudi 2010).

The Palestinian question is central to Qaraḍāwī’s view of world politics and the relations between Islam and the West, for many reasons: resistance against the occupation of any part of the land of Islam is an individual duty (Qaraḍāwī 2006); Palestine is a special holy land, the land of al-Quds (Jerusalem), of the Night Journey, and of the prophet Muḥammad’s ascension to the seven heavens; and Palestinians have been subjected to British colonial domination, then to Israeli violence and expulsion policies. Thus, the Palestinian question (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,201) makes armed conflict with Israel, often called the Zionist entity (*al-kiyān as-ṣahiyūnī*), a reality. Antagonism and enduring conflict between Israel on one hand and Arabs and Muslims on the other is not rooted in the Semitic character (as a race) of the state or in its Jewish character (as a religious group). The objection of racism is refuted twice, once because

Jews and Arabs' share a common origin in Abraham/Ibrahim; and twice because of the intrinsic universalist character of Islam. Obviously, this argument only considers the doctrinal argument and overlooks traditional Arab prejudice against Blacks and Jews. Moreover, the problem of anti-Semitism (which, in common Western parlance, means prejudice and hate against the Jews) is solved in the ambiguity of the word Semitic, which can define a group of languages (and by dubious extension a race), or can mean Jews in a Western context. Moreover, as a religious community, the Jews belong to the People of the Book and, as such, they enjoy an important status in the revelation.

However, the forceful occupation of an Islamic land, Palestine,¹⁶ makes the present enmity between Muslims and Jews unavoidable. This battle has a religious character because all Muslims must enter a fight to defend the land of Islam, and this is, according to Qaraḍāwī, "the holiest type of *jihād*" (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,208). A peaceful settlement will be impossible as long as Israel claims as her own the land she took with violence. This analysis avoids the subtleties and ambiguities inherent in the Arab–Israeli, and even more in the Israeli–Palestinian, conflict,¹⁷ but his vision of politics and history, we must always recall, is not driven by an attempt to build a value-free approach to politics, or a rationally founded political theory, but by the idea of the all-encompassing character of Islam. Moreover, when he comes to terrorism, his thinking sometimes justifies it.

Qaraḍāwī's general statement about *wasāṭiyyah* and his condemnation of many terrorist acts, like the bombing of the Twin Towers, have been judged as not credible because of his discourse about the legitimacy of suicide attacks in the framework of defensive *qitāl*. This highly contested position, which caused him to be denied access to the UK, must be seen in the context of his systematic way of dealing with terrorism (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,173 ff.). Terrorism (*irhāb*) is different from violence (*ʿanf*), even though it shares with it the inappropriate use of force, because in the case of terrorism "there is no direct problem or dispute" (people are directly targeted by the use of terrorism), but it uses force "in order to terrorize other people" and manipulate their will. (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,181)

The focal point here is the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate terrorism. If the targets and means are legitimate, then terrorism is legitimate. Generally speaking, Islam considers violence and intimidation against ordinary people if they have committed the worst crimes (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,179). If neither aim nor method are legitimate, terrorism is both criminal and forbidden. Unsurprisingly, "Zionist terrorism" (*ibid*, 1,190–1,191) is the main example of this, both for its general aim, the construction

of a Jewish state on Arab and Islamic land, and its methods of taking the land and displacing people.¹⁸ When aims are legitimate but means are not terrorism is not admitted, as in the case of hijackings in support of the Palestinian cause. Thus, terror acts are, in most cases, non-legitimate. However, there are exceptions. National resistance against occupation is a legitimate action that is not prohibited in international law. In this context, Qaraḍāwī considers as legitimate all Palestinian actions against the Israeli occupation of their land, against both military and civilian targets, including “martyrdom operations” usually called suicide attacks in the West (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1, 192–1, 195). Qaraḍāwī has developed an articulate argument to legitimize Palestinian terrorism against Israel and the Israelis. As we have seen, the aim to free the whole of Palestine, which implies the destruction of the state of Israel, is not only legitimate, but is also an individual duty for every Muslim. He argues that the means are also legitimate. He considers every Israeli a soldier, owing to his view of Israeli society as a society of militarized colonial settlers. First, all citizens, male and female, are either in military service or in the reserves. Second, Israeli society is made up of people coming from different parts of the world who used violence to expel the local population. *Shari‘ah* gives non-Muslims two possibilities, to display either a peaceful or a hostile attitude with respect to Muslims, whose duty, in turn, is to fight those who fight them.

A further argumentation is devoted to Palestinian martyrdom operations, to explain why they are to be seen as legitimate terrorism. Usually suicide is absolutely forbidden, but Palestinians are allowed to use suicide attacks because of the extremely unfavorable ratio of forces. He says (with some exaggeration) that they have only their bodies as weapons and thus are justified in transforming them into arms.

Whereas in relations with the Jews the “established method” of dialogue finds its main obstacle to be the existence of the state of Israel and its inevitable occupation of Islamic territory, there are different aspects to contemporary Muslim–Christian relations. In some fields there are good common perspectives for cooperation, whereas from other points of view there are obstacles and difficulties. Sources of cooperation are seen in areas like: cooperation against blasphemy, atheism and pornography; the solution to the problem of justice and of oppressed people; the implementation of a spirit of mutual tolerance. The first and politically most relevant issue that harms Christian–Muslim relations is Christianity’s stance towards “the Zionist entity”. The second issue is the attempt to convert Muslims, which he takes very seriously. Finally, the crucial issues are the, so-called, crusader spirit and Islamophobia. Quite rightly, Qaraḍāwī sees the crusader spirit as contrasting with the essence

of the Christian religion, but detects this spirit not only in the ancient wars to seize Palestine from the Muslims, but also in many current attitudes in Western societies, like the famous speech by Benedict XVI on Islam,¹⁹ or the attitude of extreme rightist parties in Europe concerning immigrants from the Middle East.

Above all, however, the problem is posed by the most significant representative of the Christian West, the United States (Baroudi 2010). When his book on *jihād* was published for the first time, the US president was George W Bush Jr., a representative of the “Christian extreme right” (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1,222). Obviously the first issue with the United States is represented by her position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The US attempted to change the land of Islam from within through the Second Gulf War (1991), not only by means of military intervention, but also by trying to change the region from the inside, i.e., from the ideological point of view (Qaraḍāwī 2006). Second, her general approach to Muslim countries and the Middle East is a part of that intellectual invasion (already started by British and French colonialism) considered a major cause of conflict within the *ummah*. In particular, US wars against ‘Irāq and the intervention in Afghanistan are considered ways not only of taking possession of the land and resources of the *ummah*, but also of westernizing all her ways of thinking and living, to show the “road to apostasy (*takfīr*)” (Qaraḍāwī 2006).

A theory of world politics?

As has been correctly stated (Helfont 2009, 14), Qaraḍāwī must be seen as a Muslim scholar who is, nonetheless, always in dialogue or conflict with prevailing Western ideas. His views, while highly reputed by a large number of Muslims across the world, from a Western point of view are sometimes contradictory, sometimes, as we have seen, utterly outrageous. His problem is how to make sense for Muslim public opinion of a world dominated by Western political and economic structures, and Western ideologies and ways of life, sometimes compatible with Islam, sometimes incompatible, sometimes unfriendly. His work intends to construct (among other things) an Islamic approach to world politics that can contend with Western hegemony in this area.

History is seen as a succession of waves in opposite directions, with periods of Western hegemony, and periods of Eastern or, later, Islamic prevalence. These cycles of history must be seen in the context of two ideas: the inevitability of war, and the mutual checking or restraint between different parties (major actors, we would say in the parlance

of International Relations theory). Generally speaking, there is a double tendency in Islamic political theory, unity and fragmentation, both divinely inspired; the unity of the *ummah*, and the multiplicity of peoples and tribes, created so that human beings could get to know each other (*Qur'an*, XLIX, 13). Mutual checking (*tafādu'*), or, as Badouri translates it, mutual restraining, is another expression to be found in the *Qur'an* that Qaraḍāwī elevates to the level of a general law of history and politics (Qaraḍāwī 2006; Qaraḍāwī 2010, 443–444). It is how dominance by a single party is avoided.

The theoretical approach underpinning his views on world politics could be defined, in the parlance of Western IR, as a geo-cultural realism, resembling Huntington's clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996), but obviously one that puts Islam and the Muslim *ummah* – instead of the West – at the center of the picture.²⁰

Within this picture, the basic characteristics of Qaraḍāwī's civilizations and nations are religion and moral and spiritual attitudes. However, rather than a perpetual clash of civilizations, he sees a kind of reciprocal compensation that pushes and counter-pushes, which he elevates to the level of general principles, the *sunnat at-tadāfu'*, that is, a general law derived from a *Qur'anic* quotation; it is more a theory of historical cycles than something resembling a balance of power. Even the inevitability of war seems to derive more from a political/theological attitude than from a kind of Realist inclination, certainly more from Augustine than Waltz, or perhaps, as Baroudi (2014) thinks, Niebuhr.

One could try to draw a comparison or a parallel to standard IR theory from at least two points of view: the levels of analysis and Realist theories. Not unlike Huntington, Qaraḍāwī acknowledges the importance of the state as a basic actor in global politics, but focuses on civilizations as the fundamental explanatory level. At the same time, he makes use of concepts and ideas at the systemic level. The *sunnat at-tadāfu'* is certainly to be seen at this level, since it does not depend on the actors' characteristics. And his permanently underlying idea that conflict and war cannot be eliminated from global politics is typically systemic. However, Qaraḍāwī is not parsimonious (in the Waltzian sense), in that he focuses on more than one level of analysis, on both civilizations and systems.

His theory of offensive and defensive *jihād* cannot be compared to offensive and defensive Realism because it is normative in character. This fact notwithstanding, one could purport that he does not see the necessity for Muslim states to maximize power in order to survive global competition, as would be the case for offensive Realists.²¹ As we have seen, his view of world politics has something in common with Realism, and, in a totally

different frame of reference with respect to Western theories, leans more towards defensive than offensive ideas, in that he sees defense more as a common duty, and some form of balance as a general law of politics.

From the normative point of view, Qaraḍāwī tries quite consistently to tune his views of his founding idea of *wasatīyyah*, but fails to meet “Western standards” of moderation when he deals with Israel and the United States, as he used to do when he dealt with issues of communism and Islamic–communist relations, from the personal to the global level.

For example, with respect to terrorism, Qaraḍāwī uses a discursive strategy that starts from an attempt to give a kind of value-free definition of terrorism, and to distinguish between different types of terrorism, not only from the analytical point of view, but also from that of values, or at least of legitimacy. One can obviously argue with the value judgments he draws from his definitions and reasoning. However, his method is not necessarily the worst. Usually, in Western media, and even in Western and especially US publications, we do exactly the opposite, i.e., label what we morally or politically dislike as terrorism, but, as the saying goes, “one person’s terrorist is the person’s freedom fighter.” As we saw in the previous paragraph, he goes exactly the opposite way, trying to derive a value judgment from his definitions and his Islamic values and principles.

So, before trying to divide descriptive and normative theory, we can first sum up some theoretical underpinnings:

- cyclic vision of history characterized by the clash of civilizations;
- mutual checking of major actors as a divinely ordained law to avoid oppression and injustice;
- essentialist idea of identities;
- war as a fact that cannot be eliminated from international politics.

Second, his normative views can be summed up as follows:

- the end aim of Muslims is to establish a caliphate in the *dār al-islām*, but in the meanwhile the intermediate objective is to establish states that implement *shura* and *sharī‘ah*, within a renewed *ijtihād*.
- violence must be excluded within the *ummah* and all efforts to eliminate it are a collective obligation for Muslims;
- dialogue is always to be preferred as a means to solve disputes even outside intra-Muslim relations, but
- military *jihād* is in some cases a necessary means, even an individual obligation in the case of defensive *qitāl*
- terrorism is in most cases forbidden, but in some very special situations, like the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, it is legitimate.

In relation to the present international and world order, the tenets of Islam's political foundations in Qaraḍāwī's discourse are not completely compatible with the present world order, based on the sovereignty of territorial states and on Western ideas of human rights and political legitimacy, as is the case with most Islamist thinkers (Ragionieri 1997); nevertheless, most of his views do not clash dramatically with the present rules of governance and international law, with the notable exception of his ideas on the use of terrorism in the case of Palestine.

In conclusion, his writings state a theory of global politics. However, since Qaraḍāwī writes in the tradition of Islam, he does not satisfy the standard methodological conditions of Western social sciences, such as the division of fact and values and the separation of normative and explanatory theories. These differences in method sometimes hinder a correct comparison between his theories and modern approaches to International Relations.

Notes

1. On the life of Qaraḍāwī see, for example, Skovgaard-Petersen and Gräf 2009, Soage 2008, or the notes on his website *Sīrah wa masīrah*, <http://www.qaradawi.net/new/seera>, accessed February 10, 2015, where you can also find the text of his autobiography (2002–2006).
2. *Takfīr* comes from the Arabic stem *k-f-r*, and means to declare somebody or something non-Muslim, *kāfir* (infidel, literally refusing). It is of utmost gravity if done by Muslims, because it is equivalent to apostasy (*irtidād*), which must be punished with death.
3. In this connection, *shaykh* is meant to be a person whose authority is provided by his education and proficiency in religious sciences. The specification *al-ummah* (of the whole Muslim community, as we shall see) means that he is acknowledged globally (within the Sunni community), and is not related to any specific institution or territory.
4. This difference cannot be totally identified with the territorial partition *dār al-islām/dār al-harb*, because it is not territorial. Muslims that live outside the *dār al-islām* obviously belong to the *ummah al-ijābah*.
5. Even though Qaraḍāwī does not often use the word identity (*hūwiyyah*), but prefers to write about *intimā'*, i.e., sense of belonging, I think that there is a similarity with the common usage in Western languages, as well as in academic discourse, on the word identity.
6. See below for the place of the *dār al-islām/dār al-harb* contrast in Qaraḍāwī's thought.
7. However, we should not equate this position with Habermas' idea of re-admitting religion to the public sphere in the context of a "post-secular society" (Habermas 2001), because secularization has no place in Qaraḍāwī's ideas.
8. In common understanding, this looks rather theocratic, but, strictly speaking, it is not. According to Max Weber, for example, the relationship between

political power and church power can be of three types. Among these three types, only one is theocracy proper, when priests wield political power (Weber 1972, 689), and certainly this is not the case in an Islamic state. In Weberian terms, it implements a system of law that “must be considered holy per se and thus absolutely binding” (Weber 1972, 469). In substance, in Weberian terms, Qaraḍāwī’s Islamic state is not a theocracy but a state that implements a theocratic law.

9. The idea of God’s sovereignty is among the main tenets of Quṭb’s ideology. Starting from a political interpretation of some verses of the *Qur’ān*, he states that sovereignty belongs only to God.
10. He consistently uses the word *qitāl* rather than *ḥarb*, i.e., war, probably to underline the difference between fighting within the *dār al-islām* and war between Islamic and non-Islamic states.
11. Qaraḍāwī calls these groups *jamā’āt ‘al-jihād’* (groups of the *jihād*). I think that we can express the Arabic words with the English adjective *jihadist*, which points to the ideological character assumed by the choice of armed struggle.
12. The word *kifāyah* does not mean collective, but is a noun meaning sufficiency. It is used in this connection because it is common opinion that the *obligation* must have a sufficient response from the *ummah*.
13. The root *ṭ-l-b* means to ask, to request, and the word *ṭalab* is the infinitive.
14. The Christian medieval and early modern theory of just war is out of date in appearance only. Most of the public discussions concerning UN or foreign interventions in domestic conflicts are conducted, more or less explicitly, according to the three conditions openly stated by Thomas Aquinas: *legitima auctoritas, iusta causa, and recta intentio*.
15. *Surat at-Tawbah*, 9:5: “And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush.”
16. Obviously, here Palestine is used to mean the whole land, from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean Sea, and not just the territories occupied by Israel during the Six Day War and still under full or partial Israeli control.
17. I do not want to enter his detailed discussion of Jewish “historical rights” over Palestine (a concept that most recent research on nations and nationalism would question substantially). While acknowledging these rights, he very much brings them into the discussion through a mixture of traditional Islamic sources and a personal reconstruction of history (p. 1,208–1,212).
18. It is interesting that, according to the prevailing judgment in Arab and Islamic public opinion, they see no big difference between the mainstream Zionist military organizations, like Haganah, and organizations widely acknowledged as terrorist groups, like the Irgun (Qaraḍāwī 2010, 1190).
19. In a speech in Regensburg, Benedict XVI quoted the emperor Manuel Palaeologus, who said that the only innovation introduced by Mahomet was the diffusion of religion by the sword. It is not clear whether the pope shared this view, but nevertheless the speech aroused protests in Muslim public opinion (Benedict XVI 2006). However, the basic focus in Benedict XVI’s speech concerned another question, i.e., relations between Hellenism and Christianity.

20. Qaradāwī only quotes Huntington to denounce his fear of Islamic civilization (Qaradāwī 2006).
21. The basic reference for offensive neo-Realism is Mearsheimer 2001, whereas the founding text of (defensive) neo-Realism is Waltz 1979. According to Waltz, the first and paramount aim of a state is survival, then security; a substantially defensive aim in a dangerous world. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, purports that major powers must maximize their power (also in terms of military capabilities) if they want to maintain their status in international politics.

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9

Malaysia's Islam Hadhari and the Role of the Nation-State in International Relations

Muhamad Ali

Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2004–2009) promoted Islam Hadhari as a progressive, democratic, and tolerant approach to Islam. Malaysian leaders and scholars understood Islam not only in terms of Malaysian national politics and culture but also within the context of international relations. Abdullah, the head of the ruling party, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), and the former chairman of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), repeatedly promoted Islam as the religion of peace and described Malaysia as “peaceful, stable, democratic, and rapidly developing”.¹ Abdullah’s government claimed that they endorsed non-confrontation with Western, non-Muslim countries, and sought cooperation with both Muslim and non-Muslim governments, particularly on issues addressing economic development, scientific advancement, and global security.

In response to European modernity, some scholars have argued that religion plays a crucial role in shaping global politics and International Relations (IR). Materialists, culturalists, realists, and constructivists emphasize particular dimensions of international relations. Scholars argue that the relationship between political conflicts and religion cannot be understood by a primordialist-essentialism that sees religion as the sole source of conflict, or by modernist-instrumentalism, which belittles the role of religion and reduces conflicts to just their socio-economic determinants.² I argue that the question should no longer be whether Islam plays a role in international relations, but that we should focus on the ways in which Islam does play such a role. For three decades after independence (1957–1987), Malaysia had not made the Islamic cause the central feature of its foreign policy.³ But from the 1980s

onwards, the role of Islam became increasingly important in shaping its foreign relations with both Muslim and non-Muslim worlds.⁴ This chapter examines some of the ways in which Islam relates to international relations via Malaysia's Islam Hadhari.⁵ Abdullah's government and affiliated institutions advocated Islam Hadhari as a progressive and civilizational Islam by eclectically utilizing Islamic and Western sources, including their corresponding vocabularies, and in relations with Muslim and non-Muslim governments. They hardly used the medieval sunni's juristic division of the *dar al-harb*, or the abode of war, and the *dar al-Islam*, or the abode of Islam, in either theory or practice. They were characterized as realists and worked as a modern nation-state system while operating in international organizations such as the OIC, United Nations (UN), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as other regional and national forums and institutions.

Islamic, national, and global context for promoting progressive values

Carl Ernst argued that Islam Hadhari remains "a child of the particular political experience of Malaysia."⁶ For Ernst, Islam Hadhari was a result of political conflict and compromise between the ruling parties represented by United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the opposition by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS). However, I would argue that Islam Hadhari was a response to global Islamic ideas and movements that reached an international audience, particularly as a response to the perceived and real crises of Muslims in the modern world, as well as to Malaysian cultural politics and political culture. The phrase Islam Hadhari was not invented in Malaysia; the Moroccan scholar Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri, for example, used Islam Hadhari as a Muslim approach to democracy and a coexistence between Islamic and Western nations.⁷ Abdullah probably adopted the concept from other Islamic scholars he was exposed to. Islam Hadhari was popular from 2004 to 2009 and became associated with Malaysia both at home and abroad because of concerted governmental efforts, public diplomacy (particularly with the OIC and the UN), and their foreign policies.

Abdullah and his advocates used Islam Hadhari as an approach to Islam as a progressive civilization based on their interpretations of the Qur'an and the Hadith. They formulated it in terms of ten principles: (1) faith and piety in Allah; (2) a just and trustworthy government; (3) a free and independent people; (4) a vigorous pursuit and mastery of

knowledge; (5) a balanced and comprehensive economic development; (6) a good quality of life; (7) protection of the rights of minority groups and women; (8) a cultural and moral integrity; (9) the safeguarding of the environment; and (10) strong defense capabilities. One may argue that almost any government would agree with these "progressive" principles, except perhaps the first one. By cultivating these principles, Abdullah and his associates aimed to "empower Muslims to face the global challenges of today."⁸ They contended that, as a progressive Islamic interpretation, Islam Hadhari was neither a new religion nor a new school of legal thought, or *madhhab*, because they subscribed to the Islamic theological school of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah and the school of legal thought of Shafi'i, adhered by the majority of Muslims in the Malay world.

In articulating Islam Hadhari, Abdullah emphasized Islamic values or ethos, such as, *islah* (reform), *tajdid* (renewal), *maqasid al-shari'ah* (the objectives of Islamic law), *jihad* (struggle), *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), *'adl* (justice), *muhasabah* (accountability), *amanah* (trust), *karamah* (dignity), *maslahah* (public interest), *fard 'ayn* (personal obligation), and *fard kifayah* (collective obligation), but reinterpreted each of them in light of the modern world. He reinterpreted these within the context of modern nation-states and international relations, depending on the audience. For example, the Islamic concept of *amanah* was interpreted as trust by the people toward their government. The modern practice of national defense was regarded as one of the *fard 'ayn*. The emphasis on *kemajuan* (progress) and *tamaddun* or *hadharah* (culture, civilization) was interpreted as both material and spiritual, economic and moral, and national and worldwide. They were also a response to the existing concepts of Muslim politics, such as *negara Islam*, or *dawlah Islamiyyah* (Islamic state), and to *Islam politik* or *Islam siyasi* (political Islam) promoted by the opposition Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS). The advocates of Islam Hadhari claimed that they focused on the substance, as formulated by Muslim jurists, equating to the objectives of *shari'a* law: protection of religion, soul, reason, property, and family. They presented it as a substantive rather than a formalistic approach to Islam, a challenge to what they regarded as the "politicization and formalization of Islam" by the opposition party.⁹ The advocates believed that Islam Hadhari was both authentic and modern, in reaction to their critics who argued that, if they accepted the term, there would be other, non-progressive "Islams". Islam Hadhari was articulated and promoted within the context of the contending ideas and movements in Malaysia and its relations worldwide.

The emphasis upon values was a continuation and reformulation of previous concepts, such as “cultivation of Islamic values” and “Asian values,” promoted by former Prime Minister Mahathir and others in the 1980s and the 1990s. Mahathir promoted the cultivation of Islamic values to the Malaysian public as a reaction to the *dakwah* movement, starting in the 1970s in campuses, offices, and non-governmental associations around the country.¹⁰ For Abdullah, such values were shaped by civilizations and civilizations were informed by religions. Abdullah asserted a common lineage, particularly between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, i.e., the three Abrahamic and Semitic religious traditions. Islam prevailed, and went on to become one of the world’s great religions, but it suffered permanent schisms soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.¹¹ Abdullah’s understanding of Islamic origins in modern Malaysia was historically global (referring to early Jews and Christians) rather than local (emphasizing the pre-Islamic animism of Hindus and Buddhists), probably in a response to the geopolitics of tension between the Judeo-Christian West and the Muslim world.

Yet, in his formulation Abdullah hardly mentioned the revival of an Islamic global caliphate or a new world system based solely on Islam. He was aware of this concept, but he didn’t accept it, and worked within, what Naveed Sheikh calls, “the new politics of Islam in the post-caliphate world order.”¹² His Islam was deemed to be progressive rather than Wahhabi, conservative Salafi, or fundamentalist Islamist. To be progressive, Abdullah expressed some criticisms of the existing economic and political world order, but he stressed a shared or interdependent world. In part, he wanted to react against Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, but he admitted that such a clash did take place in the perceived and real world. Abdullah invited OIC members and the West to explore the common ground between Muslim and Western worlds, namely justice and human dignity. Juxtaposing the French Enlightenment philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau’s famous statement “man is born free” with the hadith “every child is born innocent,” Abdullah sought to demonstrate an eclectic approach to Islamic and Western sources. “Western notions of right and wrong could exist with the Islamic instructions for man to abide by God’s word,” he reasserted in one of the OIC meetings.¹³ Abdullah’s use of “Enlightenment”¹⁴ was selective, but he was probably influenced by his reading of the Qur’anic encouragement to seek knowledge (*ilm*) and use reason (*aql*). As commonly argued, instead of the global caliphate system, the Westphalian ideas and institutions for nation-states had been accepted by most Muslim leaders and societies after European colonialism. The adoption of modern nation-states,

however, needs to be situated within both Muslim and local contexts, as Muslim leaders and activists faced tensions and dilemmas. Thus, there was often tension between loyalty to global Muslim leaders and loyalty to multi-religious government. Conflict often occurred between the *ummah* (Muslim community) and the nation-state and between Islamic solidarity and multi-faith solidarity.

Abdullah reaffirmed his belief that Islam Hadhari was entirely consistent with democracy because "it was about living peacefully and respecting each other in the society," but the question of Islam and democracy was a contentious one. Some Muslims argue that rule from God and rule by the people do not mix. Others believe that Islam does not teach particular forms of government but that it teaches only values, such as *shura* and *adl*.¹⁵ For Abdullah, Islam Hadhari encouraged consensus building, or *mushawara*, an approach to solving problems, and accepted the consultative process as the best way of dealing with various societal issues. He cited John Dewey, whom he considered "the classical guru on democracy," from his book *Democracy and Education* (1916). Dewey's statement that "each has to refer his own actions to that of others, and to consider the actions of others to give point and direction to his own," was in conformity with Abdullah's understanding of *shura*.¹⁶ The concept of Islam Hadhari was articulated to be able to work harmoniously within the national and international democratic system.

As it was not in contradiction with democracy, Islam Hadhari was seen to offer a global ethos. Abdullah often talked about Islam as a blessing to all humankind (Arabic: *rahmatan li al-'alamin*). He conceived Islam as contextual in dealing with contemporary reality in a Malaysian state with its multi-religious, multi-racial, and multi-cultural society. He deemed the approach "rational, tolerant, loving, and respectful of other religions."¹⁷ He wanted Malaysia to cooperate with other countries and promote a peaceful and stable regional and international environment.¹⁸ His endorsement of Malaysia as a modern nation-state did not contradict his engagement with international communities. A portrayal of Malaysia as being a multi-racial, multi-faith, yet Islamic state did not make Abdullah reject international institutions, or Islamic and Western nation-states.

Trust should be built not only between the people and the government, but also internationally between countries. As the chairman, Abdullah urged OIC members to ensure cohesion and build trust and cooperation among themselves, before they could build trust and bridge the gap with the non-Muslim world. His focus on trust was inspired

by his interpretation of the Islamic values of mutual consent and trust between individuals or groups in economic and other forms of transaction. This was seen as one of the contributions that Abdullah and other Malaysian Muslim leaders could make to both international relations and to local and national politics. Moreover, Abdullah invited governments, think-thanks, Muslim groups and bodies, and Islamic higher educational institutions to undertake research and analysis of international issues and diplomacy.¹⁹

While it concerned ethos and values, the Islam Hadhari approach was pragmatic, as it used methods and sources deemed practical in addressing the economic, political, and social problems facing Malaysia and the world. The approach was said to be beyond the ideological debate between Western capitalism and Communist socialism, although it clearly was in response to both and embraces capitalism in practice if not also in theory. In his speeches, Abdullah made reference to and clearly endorsed free-trade agreements, the key characteristic of neo-liberal economies.

Global poverty and international economic cooperation

Abdullah said that ideally the world should not be divided between rich and poor, North and South, East and West, or Muslim and non-Muslim.²⁰ Yet, he spoke in terms of the civilizational divisions of the Muslim world and the West, and Muslim and non-Muslim countries. He also followed the economy-based division of nations: the poor, the developing, and the developed. He agreed that most Muslim nations were under the first category, a few under the second, and none belonging to the third. To sustain the need for progress for Muslims in this world, Abdullah quoted the Qur'an: "And seek, with what Allah had endowed upon you the abode of the Hereafter and do not neglect your portion of the world. And do good as Allah has seen good to you, and seek not to do mischief in the land. For Allah loves not those who do mischief." (28:77). He used this verse to call to embrace worldly progress as well.

When Abdullah talked about poverty and the role of governance in eradicating it, he appropriated the Islamic concept of *adl* as being justice. To uphold justice, the Muslim world could find guidance from Islam and its own best practices, including the commitment to good governance, citing the Qur'an (4:58): "Allah doth command you to render back your trusts to those to whom they are due; and when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice." He referenced the example of the Prophet Muhammad as a "lawgiver, administrator,

judge and military commander." Justice, equality before the law, and the rule of law formulated in classical Islamic jurisprudence, in his view, were pivotal to good governance.²¹ In his speech at the International Islamic University of Islamabad, Pakistan, February 2005, Abdullah outlined issues confronting the Muslim *ummah*, the foremost of which were poverty and underdevelopment: "If the Muslim world was rich and developed, no one would look down upon us," he reasoned. The solution was education and especially investing in human capacity.²² In his speech at the Arab Forum, in December 2004, he referred to the Qur'anic chapter 96 verse 1 on the grounds that it supported the promotion of human development (such as literacy, science, and English language skill) rather than oil and nature-based development. Justice and prosperity should be the priority of the nation-states, but international co-operations should support the upholding of these principles.

In some of his speeches, Abdullah quoted American economist Jeffrey Sachs from his book *The End of Poverty* (2006). Seeking beyond "pure politics and diplomacy", Abdullah emphasized capacity building programs involving three parties – host country, one or two OIC members giving technical support, and the private sector – all working with the Islamic Development Bank as the financial partner. Among the projects were: (1) capacity building of the palm and oil industry in Sierra Leone; (2) exploitation of oil and mineral resources, including capacity building in the administrative, planning, and management functions in Mauritania; and (3) development of the fishing industry in Bangladesh. More projects were being started in Guinea, Comoros, Indonesia, and Maldives. The capacity building programs encompassed the countries' human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.²³ Speaking at the World Islamic Economic Forum (WIFE) in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, Abdullah reminded the member states of the basic problems of poverty and illiteracy, and encouraged them to utilize natural resources and increase the number of Muslim academic and technical experts "for the betterment of the *ummah*."²⁴ For Abdullah and Islam Hadhari advocates, national and global economic problems are universally understood as the *ummah's* problems as well.

Projecting himself as a Muslim leader, Abdullah emphasized the link between economic development in Muslim majority countries and the positive image of Islam in the world. He emphasized that link so OIC could amend the image of the Muslim world from being backward, ignorant, and violent to being progressive, intelligible, and peace-loving. Abdullah quoted a hadith stating that "the best of men are those who bring good to other people," which implies that the good includes

the overall politico-economy and its relations with the international community.²⁵ This OIC initiative was viewed not in isolation from, but as a contribution to, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by world leaders in 2000. The Millennium Development Goals address extreme poverty, and promote gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability.

Due to Malaysia's position in the global market, Abdullah promoted cooperation through the production and distribution of the *halal* products. For example, he pointed out that New Zealand had exported *halal* food to Malaysia and that the production and distribution of that food would benefit both countries. These countries had also created a business forum to increase bilateral investments. Both governments commenced negotiations to establish a free-trade agreement between them. Abdullah paid attention to other areas of cooperation, including security software, digital media, health, telecommunications, forest resource management, and agriculture. He wanted both countries to share knowledge, expertise, and experience.

To address economic problems, Abdullah believed in cooperation between science and technological development. He tried to create and expand educational cooperation with Islamic and Western universities. He also endorsed good and reliable vaccination in the Muslim world, given the fact that the high risk of catching epidemic and endemic infectious diseases was one of the leading causes of high mortality rates. He established the Malaysian National Institute for Natural Products, Vaccines, and Biologicals as the focal point for research and development in vaccine production for the country, but he recognized the urgent need for OIC members to enhance cooperation.²⁶

International terrorism and promotion of global peace

Under Mahathir, Malaysia sought to forge regional and international cooperation in combating terrorism by: advocating against the profiling of an individual's religion or ethnicity; proposing a multi-faceted approach to combating terrorism, including identifying and eliminating its root causes; hosting the OIC Foreign Minister's meeting on terrorism in 2002; and establishing the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) to focus on training, capacity building, research, and public awareness programs. Abdullah continued several of his predecessor's policies. He promoted a normative approach to addressing problems of extremism while promoting politico-religious moderation. He asked Muslim governments to make necessary changes

to national policies and to expand intellectual debates and discourses among their peoples.

As mentioned earlier, Abdullah perceived OIC as a legitimate international platform for correcting misperceptions of Islam in the non-Muslim world.²⁷ Accordingly, the non-Muslim world, especially the West, must be prepared to discard their prejudices against Muslims. Muslims, too, must be prepared to begin a process of reform and renewal in their respective countries. He contended that Malaysia was not seeking approval from the West, but wanted to send a message that Islam can embrace Western prosperity. Islam Hadhari was not an approach for pacifying the West. Abdullah did not want to appear apologetic to a Western audience. "It is neither an approach to apologize for the perceived Islamic threat nor an approach to seek approval from the non-Muslims for a more friendly and gentle image of Islam; Malaysia offers a modest working model of renewal, reform, and perhaps, renaissance in the Muslim world."²⁸ He wanted a reformed Islam that could offer its glorious civilization to Muslim societies and the world.

Abdullah used Qur'anic concepts, such as *adl* and *wasatan*, to promote moderation. For him, *adl* stands for "moderation and balance, in matters concerning one's faith, action, community, life, worship, rituals, economy, and even in matters concerning friendship, war, and peace." The term *wasatan* is rendered as the middle position, as in *ummatan wasatan* (translated as moderate community) and a hadith "*khairul umuuri ausatuha*" (moderation is the best course). He emphasized the value of moderation in helping to curb extremism and its destructive excesses, as well as bigotry and hatred. For its advocates, Islam Hadhari is an antidote to extremism and militancy. Terrorists who commit crimes in the name of Islam are violators of the tenets of Islam.²⁹

The Islamic cause was particularly pertinent to Middle Eastern issues. On the Palestinian issue, for example, Abdullah endorsed the general view of the OIC, which was to support Palestinians and condemn "Israeli terrorist acts against Palestinian civilians," and expand the definition of terrorism to include "state terrorism." On the Iraq war issue, Abdullah expressed his critical stand against the US and its allies for invading Iraq on the baseless allegation of weapons of mass destruction. "True, Saddam was brutal and oppressive, but the climate of fear created by a doctrine of pre-emption and predominance is equally oppressive," he told his audience at Oxford in 2004.³⁰ Abdullah talked to the audience about his wish to establish Malaysia as a center for conflict resolution, emphasizing commonalities of principles and ideals among and within civilizations. He wanted Malaysia to

take the lead in energizing trade and services in the Muslim world and build Malaysia to be the focal point for promoting "a more open and diverse Islamic discourse."³¹ He cited the Qur'an (49:13): "O mankind! We created you from a single pair of male and female, and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each other, not that ye may despise each other."³²

Abdullah outlined some ways of addressing global insecurity. In Germany, May 2005, Abdullah talked about Islam and international peace and security by outlining his government's view of the core fundamentals for establishing a durable peace. The first one is a shift from a security order based on a morality to another one based on a moral purpose, that is, the protection of every man, woman, and child, without distinction. States have their legitimate interests but they too pursue the common interests of the wider regional or global community. To ensure international moral order, civil society and governments should conform to recognized moral standards and be accountable. In extreme cases, internationally approved sanctions can be applied, according to Abdullah. The second fundamental is a shift of the central objective from state security to people security, with states making sure people have their basic freedoms. The third is a shift from narrow to enlightened national interests. This means a recognition of the primacy of states and their national interests, while finding a common interest with others. The fourth one is a shift from a conflict approach to a cooperative approach toward peace. There is recognition of conflicts of interest, but there is also avoidance of violent confrontations. Abdullah emphasized that interdependence in a globalized world is a necessity rather than an option. The fifth fundamental, he said, is a shift from a focus on narrow military security to one on wider, comprehensive security. This includes security for individuals, society, and the state. In his concluding remarks, he quoted a Qur'anic verse regarding God's creation of men and women, peoples and tribes "so that they may know each other" (49:13), and a hadith that a "difference of opinion is a sign of the bounty of God", which to him signifies an invitation to proactively seek peace between cultures and religions by seeking non-violent negotiations.³³ Abdullah regarded Germany as a nation abiding by "the culture of readiness to give others a hearing", and an "open country which is committed to defending the dignity of the human person and devoted to fostering peace and goodwill among nations." On the Iraq war issue mentioned above, Abdullah recognized and praised Germany's multilateralism and diplomacy, rather than the use of force demonstrated by other Western nations.³⁴

In Tokyo, Japan, in May 2006, Abdullah considered Japan an important global player in bridging the Islamic world and the West, but invited all countries to address international terrorism. He also outlined that the path to combating terrorism was penetrating the terrorists' minds rather than their defenses since states cannot eliminate terrorism by military approaches alone. They need to share intelligence and exchange information, particularly regarding travel and financing. They need to find the root causes of terrorism, which could be political injustice and oppression against peoples, poverty, desire for ideological domination, or something else. More importantly, he said, the Muslim world and the West should work together, and abandon the politics of fear and distrust and ban the preaching of hatred and intolerance.³⁵ In an international conference of Islamic scholars held in Jakarta in June 2006, Abdullah again talked about the need for Muslims and Westerners to engage in dialogue and action. The West, he warned, should not have a hidden agenda when dealing with the Islamic world, such as promoting modernity and democracy merely in accordance with Western standards. The West should acknowledge that Islam is not merely a religion; it is also a way of life, a civilization, and a cultural entity.³⁶

On his visit to Finland to attend the 6th Asia–Europe meeting in October 2006, days after Pope Benedict XVI quoted a Byzantine emperor associating Islam with violence, Abdullah talked about Islam Hadhari and his country's success in racial and interfaith relations. He focused on the mistrust between the West and the Islamic world and invited all parties to rebuild trust and he promoted dialogue between cultures and civilizations. An Al-Jazeera news reporter described Abdullah's style as "a refreshing change from that of his predecessor Mahathir Mohamed." Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public University at the National University of Singapore, saw Abdullah as "a bridge-builder" at a critical moment in Muslim–Western relations.³⁷

Defending religion and nation as *jihad*

The concept of *jihad* has been interpreted in new ways, including the defense of one's nation-state and its official religion. The question of what to defend and against what are addressed often in general terms. *Jihad* is construed as primarily, or even solely, for defensive purposes, but it is inclusive of various kinds of constructive struggle on the path of God, including "the pursuit of knowledge, the mastery of science and technology, and economic activity."³⁸ In international relations *jihad*, and its related concepts of *qital*, *difa'*, and *harb*, have become appropriated

to mean, primarily, the defense of the nation and the religion of Islam and, secondarily, the protection of other religions (associated with the minority) as well.

An often cited Quranic verse is: "And fight in the way of God those who fight you and do not transgress. Truly God does not love the transgressors." (2:190)³⁹ The tenth pillar of Islam Hadhari, strong defense capabilities (In Indonesian: *kekuatan pertahanan*), is seen as an integral part of the accumulation and execution of physical and spiritual power (in Arabic: *quwwah*) of the Malaysian nation-state and people. Islam Hadhari advocates a strong self-defensiveness, that is, the defense of the nation to maintain stability, protect the people and their dignity, and ensure national development, while restraining from acts of aggression and the colonization of other nations.

Islam Hadhari was a normative approach for justifying the duty of every member of the Malaysian people to defend (*difa'*) lives, property, and not only the dignity of the nation (*bangsa*) but also of religion (*agama*). The discussion was primarily about defending Islam from ridicule and attacks by Islamophobes. The medieval *fiqh* concept of *fardu kifayah* was defined as a sacred duty for every citizen, either in the military or the police, or as ordinary citizens. The religious advisor to the Malaysian Military Force cited a Quranic verse in chapter (*al-Haji*) 22:39, supporting the right to defend one's self when attacked: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given to fight, because they are wronged and verily God is most powerful for their aid." The precondition for permission to go to war (*qital*) is that an attack is made against Muslims. The right to defend him/herself and the community or country are human and religious rights that belong to both Muslims and to all humanity. Wars were permitted in order to eliminate a great calamity (*fitnah*), considered more dangerous than murder itself, according to the interpretation of chapter 2:191. Defense was also viewed as crucial to protect the purity of Islam that it would not become the object of ridicule by irresponsible people, with reference to Quranic verse 9:12. This verse is emphasized by Islam Hadhari advocates who refer to the permission to wage war against non-Muslims who violate their peace agreement with a Muslim society, and on those who denigrate the religion of Islam.⁴⁰

The advocates of Islam Hadhari attempted to correct what they saw as the false interpretation and application of *jihad* in Malaysia and elsewhere. They asserted that going to war was one of the various manifestations of *jihad fi sabilillah*, the struggle on the path of God. Other types of *jihad* include struggles: against the self; in striving for justice and truth; intellectual, educational, and others in attaining the path of God. False

understandings of *jihad* among Muslims could lead to destruction and the negative image of Islam in the world. The false conceptions of *jihad*, a Malay author says, include (1) struggles that harm innocent people; (2) struggles that make non-Muslims view Islam as the religion of terror; (3) those extremists who attack Islamic governments, temples and churches; (4) arbitrary wars merely for martyrdom; (5) the struggle for revenge against disbelievers which involves innocents; (6) and struggle without proper preparation and means. *Jihad* is not aimed at converting others to Islam with force and violence. The promotion of this understanding of *jihad* is for Malays, and for Chinese and Indian Malaysians, to encourage them to training in knowledge, skills, and faith, for the sake of defending their religion and country from the attacks of both internal and external enemies.⁴¹

The Malay author also utilized Qur'anic verses, such as chapter 8:61, which reads "but if the enemy incline toward peace, do thou also incline toward peace and trust in God." But he emphasized that Muslims would not move back when facing the enemy, quoting chapter 8:15. He formulated war ethics, should a war take place, such as refraining from: (1) killing the elderly, women, and children; (2) attacking civilians; (3) transgression and animosity; (4) killing war captives or prisoners; (5) torture; and (6) attacking those seeking peace. He considered that these war ethics made a case for Islam as a blessing for all humankind. The same author claimed that these Islamic war ethics were formed much earlier than Western conventions, such as the 1949 Geneva Convention and all the previous conventions concerning war regulations.

Threats to the state are to be divided into the internal and the external. Internal groups, a Malay author argues, are religious extremists such as Malaysia's Militant Union (Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, KMM) and Jemaah Islam (JI). They are characterized as race supremacists, social movements that harm social order, and religious heretics who incite enmity among Muslims. According to the author, external threats would include: states or groups that jeopardized international borders: groups seeking regional independence: foreign intervention; negative perceptions of Islamic countries; and the intellectual war waged by the enemies of Islam, such as Christian missions and globalization.⁴² Some aspects of the threats – Muslim and non-Muslim – may suggest a conservative tendency of Islam Hadhari in religious terms. For non-Muslims, and Muslims with Islamic interpretations different from the mainstream, Islam Hadhari created a problem. In contemporary Malaysia, persecution or discrimination occurred in some cases against individuals and groups deemed heretic. Islamic authorities, often with

state support, tended to see themselves as guardians of religious orthodoxy and of Malay identity.⁴³ Responses were mixed.

Mixed responses in the international arena

Like previous and other slogans, Islam Hadhari was seen as another tool for maintaining the UMNO's political dominance.⁴⁴ According to critics, Abdullah's foreign policy and attitudes toward international relations are a function of domestic politics. Moreover, the emphasis on a plural, modern, and even liberal interpretation of Islam was not appealing to the wider public because the government was also cultivating a "narrow, reactionary, and conservative" community.⁴⁵ On the other hand, to UMNO leaders and scholars, Islam was not their ideological basis; rather, it served as a cultural language for the survival of Islam and *Malayness*, with the primary goal of unifying the Malay population.⁴⁶ I have argued elsewhere (2011) that Islam Hadhari serves multiple functions, with one or another being salient according to circumstances: (1) as a normative approach to the notions of piety and pragmatism, rather than a practical method for understanding the roots of the problem facing Malay Muslims; (2) as a tool for gaining or maintaining power amidst opposing ideologies of Islamization and ethnically divided political factions and alliances; (3) as an identity and image restoration of Islam as a great world civilization; and (4) as a response to the perceived and real Western domination of Muslim nations.⁴⁷ In 2008, Abdullah contended that his approach of Islam Hadhari was well received in the Islamic world and the West, and only rejected by those who needed more, and deeper, explanation.⁴⁸

On US–Malaysian relations, US Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes praised Islam Hadhari as a "powerful example" for all Muslims, and US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said in May 2005, "I had a chance to talk a little bit about Islam Hadhari with the Prime Minister because we think the Malaysian experience is one that is very important – the tolerance, the moderate Muslim majority country, the development of democracy, the rule of law here ... we talked about ways in which, perhaps, the government here could share some of its experience with the Iraqis as well as helping the new Palestinian Authority."⁴⁹ The US–Malaysia collaboration in combating terrorism helped lift the reputation of the government as the strategic alliance in the region. Abdullah was perceived as very eager to please the US and comply with Washington's requests, whether directly through bilateral diplomacy or indirectly, mediated by multilateral institutions such

as the UN. The US has been the largest source of foreign direct investment to Malaysia, especially in the manufacturing sector, and its most important trade partner. Malaysia also formed alliances through non-economic investments in the defense and aerospace industries.⁵⁰

Critics said that Islam Hadhari was hardly effective in reducing anti-Americanism in Malaysia and that the goal of bridging the gap between the Islamic world and the West was not achieved. According to surveys, anti-Americanism was more entrenched in Malaysia than in Indonesia. In other cases, Malaysian parliamentary backbencher Zaid Ibrahim did not see Abdullah's image of international bridge-builder as a success story, given the anti-American and Israeli demonstrations (with flags being burned) that took place in Malaysia after the Danish cartoon controversy in February 2006. As a response, people were not sure if the promotion of Islam Hadhari merely a public relations exercise. Moreover, the Malaysian proposal to reform the OIC was seen as a failure for different reasons, partly because of the internal politics of key OIC members, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran.⁵¹ Muslim cooperation had such limitations, apart from their own domestic challenges. Others however argued that Abdullah worked slowly but steadily toward his goals, and "even where he may be falling short, domestic policies should not be confused with international relations."⁵²

In one of the OIC International Islamic *Fiqh* Academy meetings in Kuala Lumpur in September 2007, a resolution was issued that included nine points, such as, restoring a civilizational approach to Islam, against aggressive materialism, foreign domination, sectarian fanaticism, extremism, and parochialism toward citizenship rights and obligations, and women's participation in public affairs. The concept of Islam Hadhari thus found a wide international recognition within OIC members.⁵³

A number of Muslim scholars supported the principles of Islam Hadhari. An American-Iranian philosopher, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, used a civilizational approach in his work, influenced by Ibn Khaldun. He cited Samuel Huntington's divisions of civilizations although he would disagree with "the clash" as the characteristic of these civilizations. Nasr contends that all civilizations are based on religion, e.g., Western civilization on Christianity and Islamic civilization on Islam. For Nasr, civilizational dialogue means, on the one hand, "dialogue between traditional civilizations weakened and modernized to various degrees, and on the other, between each of those civilizations and the modern and post-modern Western civilization, in which there still exist important religious and spiritual elements, but the driving force behind all

the idea and ideals which seek to destroy the very foundations of those existence, albeit, weakened traditional civilizations." The goal of the dialogue is to seek mutual respect and understanding, and Islam, for Nasr, as Islam Hadhari advocates, believes that Islamic civilization can be a bridge between East and West.⁵⁴

The chairman of Russia's Muftis Council, in his speech at the international conference "Islam Hadhari Responses to Global Challenges" on January 2008 stated that Islam Hadhari represented the positive ideological potential of Islam among Muslims suffering from an inferiority complex. Islam Hadhari was in accordance with the strategy of *al-wasatiyyah* (moderation) of Islam. The 21st century was not the century of confrontation and opposition, which was predicted by Western ideologists, but the century of dialogue of civilizations.⁵⁵ Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, said that Islam Hadhari would help Muslim and non-Muslim countries communicate better and avert a "clash of civilizations". He said OIC countries had acknowledged the role that Islam Hadhari could play in correcting the image of Islam around the world.

One of the scholars supporting Islam Hadhari is Mohammad Hashim Kamali, an Afghan Islamic scholar and a professor of Islamic law at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and the dean of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC). After elaborating each of the principles of Islam Hadhari, he argued that they should be promoted in the Arab world and the Muslim world at large, not merely in Malaysia.⁵⁶ In the Republic of Indonesia, a Muslim majority, semi-secular state-nation, Islam Hadhari played a little role in shaping discourse and policies. Professor Azyumardi Azra, then the rector of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, who gave Abdullah an honorary doctorate in Islamic Thought in recognition of his initiative on Islam Hadhari, said that some aspects of a modern progressive civilizational Islam were relevant to Indonesian society, but many Indonesians worked on what some called "civil or cultural Islam", which had emerged since colonial times and had developed beyond the state's intervention.

A positive response came from Saudi Arabia. Abdullah received the King Faisal International Prize in 2011, for five reasons stated in the website: (1) strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation through his active leadership of the League of Southeast Asian Countries, and of both the Non-Alliance Movement and the World Islamic Conference during Malaysia's chairmanship of these two organizations in 2003 and 2008; (2) reinforcing Malaysian economic development and competitiveness

through the expansion of modern agriculture and high-tech industries, investment in human resources development, and strong support for general and higher education; (3) encouraging Islamic religious studies and introducing private religious schools as part of the Malaysian basic education system; (4) supporting Islamic legal administration and strengthening alms, endowments and Hajj institutions in Malaysia; and (5) establishing the International Institute for Higher Islamic Studies, a non-political institution for widening the scope of Islamic thought. The Prize Committee stated that Abdullah introduced the concept of Islam Hadhari to guide development efforts in Malaysia and the wider Islamic world. "It was deemed an approach compatible with modernity and yet firmly rooted in the noble values and injunctions of Islam. Islam Hadhari espoused the ten fundamental principles which were accepted by Muslims and non-Muslims alike."⁵⁷ After stepping down as Prime Minister in April 2009, Abdullah remained committed to promoting progressive Islam as chairman of the Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding (IKIM) and Patron of the Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) in Kuala Lumpur, which he founded in 2009.

After reviewing foreign policies under Mahathir, Abdullah, and the current PM Najib, a Malay author suggested that Malaysia's foreign policy should no longer focus on multi-national organizations such as OIC, NAM, and the UN, but should focus instead on bilateral relationships, especially with big powers, such as the US, China, India, and Japan to gain more benefits for the people.⁵⁸ Yet, regardless of this distinction, the values – mutual knowing, understanding, and cooperation – were emphasized and expanded to the relationships between nations. Muslim nations had to reform themselves, but the West was also urged to change those policies which were discriminatory and unjust to Muslims. Abdullah repeatedly asserted that "reforms in the Muslim world must be accompanied by visible and meaningful changes to foreign policies by key Western countries."⁵⁹

Conclusion

Islam Hadhari's main contribution to international relations is the emphasis on shared values and the need for a change in ethos, rather than on a structural change to world systems. In addressing global poverty, illiteracy, and insecurity, Abdullah and the advocates promoted reforms in the economy, education, security, and conflict resolution primarily at home, but also in cooperation with other nations. In so doing, they understood multilateral and bilateral relationships within

the context of nation-states and globalization. At home but primarily abroad, they sought to present an Islam that was progressive, rather than conservative and regressive, democratic, rather than authoritarian, peaceful rather than violent, precisely at the time when many Muslims around the world remained backward, illiterate, and were perceived as violent due to their co-religionists' acts of violence and the world's perceived and real ignorance of Islam's teachings. The promoters of Islam Hadhari served as a Muslim agency in national and global settings, not only in reinventing their tradition and religion but also in their search for authenticity and reconstructing modernity.

The connection between the construction of progressive Islam and international relations has been demonstrated in a number of ways. Abdullah's government portrayed themselves as leaders and representatives of Malaysian citizens, comprising Malay Muslims and non-Malays or non-Muslims in the colonially and politically created boundaries of the Federated States of Malaysia, who were able to work with international organizations, Islamic (OIC), Western and non-Western (the United Nations). Islam Hadhari was a product of the local politics of the ruling and opposition parties, but its origins, values, programs, objectives, and audience, went beyond Malaysian local politics. The ten principles were deemed to be progressive yet regarded as authentically Islamic, regardless of their implementation and contestation in domestic and international politics.

Notes

1. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress* (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: MPH Group, 2006), 31.
2. Hatzopoulos and Petito, "The Return from Exile: An Introduction", *Religion in International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 7.
3. Bakar, "Islam in Malaysia's Foreign Policy: the First Three Decades (1957–1987)", in Baginda, ed., *Malaysia and the Islamic World* (London: ASEAN Academic Press, 2004), 17–30.
4. Mohd Salleh and Mohamad, "Malaysia and the OIC", in Baginda, ed., *Malaysia and the Islamic World* (London: ASEAN Academic Press, 2004), 69–83.
5. Progressive Islam has been constructed and contested in different parts of the world, including Indonesia and Malaysia. Abdullah Badawi appropriated the idea to suggest Islam's compatibility with the generally accepted ideas of progress, science and national development. From the early 2000s, some Muslim intellectuals residing in the USA described as "progressive Muslims" those who reinterpret Islamic texts and classical literature in light of modern ideas of justice, equality, and pluralism. See Omid Safi, ed., *Progressive Muslims: on Justice, Gender, and Pluralism* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003).

6. Ernst, "The Perils of Civilizational Islam in Malaysia", Ernst and Martin, eds, *Rethinking Islamic Studies: from Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism* (Columbia, SC: the University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 277.
7. Cited in Kamali, *Civilisational Renewal: Revisiting the Islam Hadhari Approach* (Selangor: Arah Pendidikan, 2008), 33.
8. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach: Towards A Progressive Islamic Civilisation* (Putrajaya: Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, 2007), 6.
9. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 33.
10. The dakwah movement was Islamic missionary activism promoted by the youth in colleges connected by the faith and pragmatism. Influenced by the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin and other movements, the activists were mostly educated in sciences and technical skills but they felt newly born, religiously. See Zainah Anwar, *Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students* (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk, 1987).
11. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 32.
12. See Sheikh, *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States* (London: Routledge, 2003).
13. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 51.
14. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 64.
15. See, for example, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: Critical Essays* (Cairo and New York: the American University in Cairo Press, 2002); Nader Hashemi, *Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
16. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 114.
17. Abdullah, "Islam sebagai Rahmatan Lil'alamin", *Jurnal Hadhari: An International Journal*, special edition, 2008, 1-8.
18. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 180.
19. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 66.
20. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 11.
21. Abdullah, 2004, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 37.
22. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 58.
23. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 88.
24. Yeoh, ed., *World Islamic Economic Forum: Partnership for Growth and Development* (Selangor: MPH Group Publishing, 2005), ix.
25. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 91-92.
26. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 132.
27. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 51.
28. "Call Made to End Islamophobia", April 8, 2005, Aljazeera.com. <http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/04/20084101455211967.html> last accessed January 2, 2015.
29. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 46-51.
30. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 34-35.
31. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 48-49.
32. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 51.
33. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 181-194.
34. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 152.
35. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 289-291.
36. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 240-241.

37. Gatsiounis, "Badawi's Interfaith Talk Faces Test at Home", Aljazeera.com <http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/10/200841012654937129.html> last accessed January 2, 2015.
38. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari Approach*, 2007, 7.
39. Kamali, 2009, 50.
40. Haji Baharom, *Prinsip Kesepuluh: Kekuatan Pertahanan* (Putrajaya, Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 2007), 3.
41. Haji Baharom, *Prinsip Kesepuluh*, 35–49.
42. Haji Baharom, *Prinsip Kesepuluh*, 12, 16.
43. Bowring, "Defending Malaysia's Diversity", Friday, December 30, 2005, the New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/30/opinion/30iht-edbowring.html>; Philip Bowring, 'Malaysian Malaise', Wednesday, April 12, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/12/opinion/12iht-edbowring.html> last accessed January 2, 2015.
44. Mohd Sani, et al, 'Malaysia in Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Asian Values, Islam Hadhari, and 1Malaysia', *Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol.2, No.3, September 2009, 110–118.
45. Noer, 2008, cited in Ernst (2010), 'the Perils of Civilizational Islam in Malaysia', Ernst and Martin, eds, *Rethinking Islamic Studies: From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism* (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press), 277.
46. Ab. Majid, *Memahami Islam Hadhari* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Budaya, 2009), 34.
47. Ali, 'The Eclecticism of Modern Islam: Islam Hadhari in Malaysia', *Studia Islamika*, 18, 1, 2011, 1–27.
48. Abdullah, *Islam Sebagai Rahmatan Lil'Alamin*, *Jurnal Hadhari: An International Journal*, special edition, 2008, 1–8.
49. England, "Malaysia Struggles with Islamic Path", *Newyorktimes.com*, May 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/12/world/asia/12iht-malaysia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, last accessed January 2, 2015; Gatsiounis, "Islam Hadhari in Malaysia", *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 2006, 78, 86.
50. Md. Khalid, "Malaysia's Foreign Policy under Najib", *Asian Survey*, Vol.51, No.3, May/June, 2011, 429–452.
51. Sinanovic, "Malaysia, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Limits of Muslim Cooperation", paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, November 29, 2014. http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p361462_index.html Last accessed December 31, 2014.
52. Gatsiounis, "Badawi's Interfaith Talk Faces Test at Home", Aljazeera.com <http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/10/200841012654937129.html> last accessed January 2, 2015.
53. In Kamali, 2008, 33–40, 81.
54. Nasr, "Civilizational Dialogue and the Islamic World", *Islam Hadhari Bridging Tradition and Modernity* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 2009), 14–19.
55. Mufti Sheikh Ravil Gaynutdin, a speech on the International Conference "Islam Hadhari Responses to Global Challenges", Malaysia, January 26, 2008. <http://www.muslim.ru/en/articles/143/3270/> last accessed December 31, 2014.

56. Kamali, 2008, 82–84.
57. <http://kfp.org/h-e-abdullah-ahmad-badawi/> last accessed January 23, 2015
58. Khadijah Md Khalid, "Malaysia Foreign Policy Orientations and Relations in Post-Mahatir Years," 321. http://eprints.um.edu.my/10906/1/11_Malaysian_Foreign_Policy_Orientation_and_Relations_in_the_Post-Mahathir_Years.pdf last accessed December 31, 2014.
59. Abdullah, *Islam Hadhari*, 2006, 45–46.

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